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Preface
This volume represents a sort of mission statement for the National
Competence Centre for Research (NCCR) Democracy, a Swiss research
program on democracy funded by the Swiss National Science Founda-
tion (SNF) since 2005. We elaborate our particular approach to democ-
racy research and what we see as the main challenges of democracy
today. This new perspective on democracy and its challenges consti-
tutes the basis of the research conducted in more than two dozen
projects in our program. The present volume summarizes the results
that have been published in more detail in a series of NCCR working
papers (http://www.nccr-democracy.uzh.ch/publications/workingpaper/
challenges-to-democracy-in-the-21st-century), in monographs, and in
journal articles (http://www.nccr-democracy.uzh.ch/publications).
The volume comprises two parts. In Part I we lay the groundwork for
our view of democracy and the way we wish to approach democratic
processes: we discuss the preconditions of democracy and democrati-
zation, we present a model for the key mechanisms linking citizens
and politicians in a representative democracy, and we show the empir-
ical variety of established representative democracies across the globe.
Against the background of the fundamental concepts and empirical facts
introduced in Part I, we discuss in Part II the challenges of mediatization
and globalization, which we consider to be the most important ones for
democracy under contemporary circumstances.
We come from different fields in two related social sciences – political
science (international relations and comparative politics) and commu-
nication science (political communication and media effect studies).
But although we are all social scientists and we are all trying to test
theoretical insights with empirical research, it took considerable time
to find a common conceptual meeting ground and to agree upon a
shared understanding of democracy research. It has taken us several
years to arrive at the cross-disciplinary conceptualizations and find-
ings the reader will encounter in this volume, and we certainly do not
pretend that the theoretical and empirical tool kit we present here rep-
resents in any way a complete and authoritative view. But we hope
ix
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x Preface
that our approach to the study of democracy and democratization
will prove to be helpful to our readers and stimulate further research
on denationalization and mediatization processes and their impact on
democracy.
Zurich, July 2012
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1
Introduction – The New Challenges
to Democracy
Hanspeter Kriesi
During the last half of the 20th century, democracy became the only
legitimate game in town. The world witnessed an extraordinary and
unprecedented expansion of the number of democracies, as a result of
the third wave of democratization. Of course, not all countries have
completed and consolidated their transition to democracy, and there
are still a considerable number of countries that have not even begun
to make their transition to democracy. Beyond the West, the process of
democratization has proven to be more difficult than expected. More-
over, the world is currently changing in ways that, according to many
observers, pose new threats to the already established democracies.
In contrast to the optimism of the early 1990s, when some observers her-
alded an ‘end of history’ that would definitively seal the victory of liberal
democracy across the world, a realistic assessment of the state of democ-
racy today must admit that democratic regimes are faced with numerous
challenges that threaten to undermine their very legitimacy. Contrary to
the optimists’ predictions, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the triumph of
democracy it symbolized have given way to a severe political malaise
almost everywhere in the West. Today, citizens in Western democracies
are increasingly disillusioned with their leaders and institutions. This
disillusionment is, for example, expressed in declining levels of elec-
toral, or in the increasing populist, mobilization in Western Europe and
the US.
We shall concentrate in this volume on two challenges to democracy,
which we consider the major ones in the 21st century – globalization
and mediatization. While concentrating on these, we by no means
imply that they are the only challenges to contemporary forms of
democracy. Before we go on, we should just briefly mention a series of
1
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2 Introduction – The New Challenges to Democracy
other challenges that are of considerable importance for democracy as
we know it.
First, technological change tends to drive economic transformation
with a vast range of implications for political-interest mobilization and
the complexity of policy making. Many observers argue that most of
the risks generated by modern societies are the product of technologi-
cally induced structural transformations inside national economies (e.g.
Iversen and Cusack 2000).
Second, demographic change has become a major force, making it
increasingly difficult for politicians to deliver rising levels of benefit and
satisfy popular demands at a time of rising pressure on health and social
security systems. The demographic transition may causally drive certain
aspects of globalization (such as migration) rather than the other way
around.
Third, the increasing socio-economic inequality and cultural heterogene-
ity of national political communities, which are, of course, intimately
related to globalization, tend to undermine the societal preconditions
for political equality. Current economic trends of increasing inequal-
ity ‘raise the question of whether democracy can flourish in the midst
of great concentrated wealth’ (Bartels 2008: 284). As Bartels shows for
the US example, economic inequality has ‘pervasive, corrosive effects
on political representation and policy making’. Fears of cultural het-
erogeneity linked to global migration flows are particularly salient in
Western European democracies and have given rise to defensive forms
of mobilization by the indigenous populations.
Fourth, social-cultural preference formation is a partially autonomous
force of democratic change that gives rise to new demands for demo-
cratic autonomy. Thus, social movement scholars suggest that our
contemporary modern societies have become ‘movement societies’
(Meyer and Tarrow 1998) – that is, they suggest that political protest
has become an integral part of modern life; that protest behavior is
employed with greater frequency, by more diverse constituencies, and
is used to represent a wider range of claims than ever before; and
that professionalization and institutionalization may be changing the
social movement into an instrument of conventional politics. As protest
becomes a part of everyday politics, we assist in the ‘normalization of
the unconventional’ (Fuchs 1991).
Finally, the continuing expansion of what Mény (2002) has called
the ‘constitutionalist element of democracy’ to the detriment of its
popular element is also driven by forces internal to the political
system.
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Hanspeter Kriesi 3
Globalization
‘There has been an assumption at the heart of modern democratic the-
ory ‘concerning a “symmetrical” and “congruent” relationship between
decision-makers and the recipients of political decisions’, David Held
(2006: 290) explains in his Models of Democracy. This is the assump-
tion of a political community which governs itself and determines its
own future. This political community inhabits a bounded territory, and
decision-makers and decision-takers are both locked into that territory.
For centuries, the development of the nation-states in Europe was a
process of territorial consolidation, center formation in the newly con-
solidated territories, nation building and democratization. To the extent
that the populations in the consolidated nation-states could no longer
avoid the consequences of the decisions taken by the political centers
in the consolidated nation-states, and to the extent that these centers
imposed ever more demanding obligations on their populations, the
members of the national populations began to identify with the others
equally locked into the delimited territory and to demand a share in the
control over the national centers of power. According to the ‘dialectic of
control’ (Giddens 1985: 202), the increasing power of the national cen-
ters went hand in hand with an increasing democratization of national
politics. As a result of this development, the ‘demos’ has come to be
defined as the set of members of the political community locked into
the territory of a given nation-state, or, more precisely, by the residents
of that territory who enjoy citizenship rights. As a result of this long-
term development, congruence or symmetry between decision-takers
and decision-makers exists to the extent that the members of a nation-
state are exclusively affected by the decisions taken by the authorities of
their own territory. In other words, modern representative democracy is
based on the ‘container’ of the modern nation-state.
Today, as Held goes on to explain, this congruence is fundamentally
put into question by the challenge of globalization, which tends to
invert the century-long experience of European nation-states. Today,
advancing economic, cultural, and political globalization leads to an
expansion, deepening, and acceleration of global interdependencies
across the borders of the nation-states. These processes can be inter-
preted as processes of ‘denationalization’ (Zürn 1998). They imply the
dissolution of boundaries between the nation-states, or, as Ruggie (1993)
calls it, the ‘unbundling of territory’; that is, the dissolution of the dif-
ferent types of relationships which have been packed together by the
national borders.
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4 Introduction – The New Challenges to Democracy
Congruence and symmetry can break down in different ways. First of
all, the lives of citizens in a given state can be affected by the trans-
border effects of decisions taken by the authorities of neighboring or
other, more remote nation-states. Neighboring states may locate nuclear
power plants at their border, which poses a potential threat for the pop-
ulation across the border. Industrial plants pollute the water of rivers,
which poses a problem for the populations living downstream in coun-
tries that did not have any say in the location of those plants. Landing
approaches of airports are designed to alleviate the collateral impact on
the national population, whichmay create considerable nuisance for the
people living across the border whose well-being has not been consid-
ered in the siting decisions. In some cases, the states concerned by such
decisions may retaliate, creating problems for the citizens in the coun-
tries where the original decisions were taken. The Czech nuclear power
plant Temelin, located close to the Austrian border, provides an illus-
trative case of the resulting problems in the relationship between states
when one of the state authorities takes decisions which impinge on the
populations of neighboring states to whom they are not accountable.
This case is particularly problematic, because neighboring Austria had
not put into service its own nuclear power plant at Zwentendorf (in the
same region) and had decided to get out of nuclear energy altogether.
These examples all involve neighboring states, for the simple reason
that they are caused by the physical proximity of the source of the
nuisance. There is another set of political decisions with transborder
impacts which do not depend on physical proximity: these concern reg-
ulations that incite citizens from other states to exit from their home
country, or prevent citizens from other states from doing so. This kind
of problem is by no means restricted to the relationship between neigh-
boring states. For example, tax laws may be crafted in such a way as
to incite tax evasion among citizens or corporations from countries all
over the world. The Irish corporate tax code illustrates this possibility.
Immigration regulations provide examples of countries trying to attract
citizens from other countries (the ‘brain drain’), as well as examples of
countries trying to prevent citizens from other countries from entering.
Phenomena such as the ones illustrated by these examples have
always been troubling the relationship between sovereign states, and
one could maintain that they are nothing new. Borders have never been
completely closed, and the siting decisions and regulations of one state
have always had an impact on the citizens of other states. Taking issue
with the view that, in this respect, there is nothing new under the sun,
we would like to suggest that – as a result of technological developments,
10.1057/9781137299871 - Democracy in the Age of Globalization and Mediatization, Hanspeter Kriesi, Daniel Bochsler, Jörg Matthes,
Sandra Lavenex, Marc Bühlmann and Frank Esser
Co
py
rig
ht
 m
at
er
ia
l f
ro
m
 w
w
w
.
pa
lg
ra
v
ec
o
n
n
ec
t.c
om
 - 
lic
en
se
d 
to
 U
ZH
 H
au
pt
bi
bl
io
th
ek
 / 
Ze
nt
ra
lb
ib
lio
th
ek
 Z
ür
ic
h 
- P
al
gr
av
eC
on
ne
ct
 - 
20
13
-0
3-
29
Hanspeter Kriesi 5
as well as of social and political change – the siting decisions and reg-
ulations introduced by nation-states are likely to have much greater
potential impacts on the populations in other states than they did in
the past. That is, the sovereign decisions taken by the authorities of any
given state pose a potentially much greater threat for the life chances of
the populations in other states. Thus, as illustrated by the nuclear power
plants (e.g. Chernobyl), the pollution potential by a source in any given
nation-state is today immeasurably greater than it used to be in the past.
Similarly, the example of the Irish corporate tax code illustrates that the
character of a policy changes with the changing technological, social,
and political environment: with the deregulation and opening up of
the financial markets, the implications of the Irish corporate tax code
took on proportions that had been unknown before, which implies that
the specificities of this code pose a much greater threat to a much larger
number of countries than it did in the past.
Second, congruence and symmetry can also break down within a
given nation-state. The citizens of one territorial sub-unit within a
nation-state may be affected by the decisions of the authorities of
another sub-unit which are not accountable to them. In other words,
the incongruence and asymmetry that we encounter at the level of the
nation-states may, in perfectly analogous ways, repeat itself at the sub-
national (regional or local) level. The more decentralized a given nation-
state, the more likely this kind of incongruence and asymmetry will be.
In federalist states, one sub-unit (state, Land, canton) may take decisions
which pose a threat to the population of another sub-unit. At the local
level, the authorities of one city may take decisions which hurt the pop-
ulation of a neighboring township. Local incongruences are particularly
widespread in metropolitan areas, where the core cities provide services
and infrastructures for the residents of the suburban areas.
At this level, too, incongruences become more important as a result
of technical developments, and of social and political change. Thus, as
a result of improving transport systems, the size of the metropolitan
areas increases, and formerly unconnected political units become part
of the metropolitan area. In reaction to such a change, the authorities
of some of these formerly unconnected units might decide to change
some local or regional regulations – such as their tax laws – in order
to make their unit more attractive to residents from other parts of the
metropolitan area. Their decision, of course, will have consequences for
the life chances of the citizens in the other parts of the metropolitan
area who do not have the opportunity or the intention to move and to
whom the authorities in the unit concerned are not accountable.
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6 Introduction – The New Challenges to Democracy
Both types of incongruence we have discussed so far concern rela-
tionships between decision-makers and populations at the same level –
either the national or the sub-national level. This type of incongruence
could be called horizontal incongruence. The authorities of one territo-
rial unit at a given level take a decision that has serious consequences
for the population of another territorial unit at the same level. This type
of incongruence should be distinguished from vertical incongruences,
which imply that decision-makers at a higher level take decisions which
are binding for decision-makers and populations at a lower level of a
multi-level governance structure, without being accountable to them.
This second type of incongruence is at least as important as the two
versions of horizontal incongruence which we have already introduced.
It concerns the decisions of supranational decision-makers, such as the
World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund, the United
Nations, and the EU, which increasingly impinge on the life chances of
national populations.
One could argue that, in Europe, globalization mainly means Euro-
pean integration. The process of European integration can be described
as the process of forming a supranational state, which goes beyond the
common intergovernmentalism, even if the EU has not yet reached the
character of a completely autonomous state. Stefano Bartolini (2005)
interprets the European integration as the last stage in a process of
European political development. The preceding stages corresponded to
the formation of state centers, the formation of nations, the democra-
tization of nation-states and the creation of the national welfare states.
Bartolini suggests that this last stage can be analyzed along the same
lines as the preceding development of the nation-states and based on
the same processes. At the European level, the new center already has
considerable policy competencies, and EU law is now recognized as
superordinate and directly applicable by the member-states, even if the
resulting institutional structure of the EU and its borders do not (yet)
correspond to the model of the nation-state. Thus, the EU institutions
presently still lack the necessary means of coercion and the bureaucratic
apparatus to impose EU law against the resistance of the member-states.
In the EU, the hierarchy of law is not based on a corresponding hier-
archy of real power. Still, the expansion of the competencies of the EU
means that the supranational governance structure becomes ever more
important.
The extension of existing multi-level governance structures to the
supranational level is, of course, a response to increasing global inter-
dependencies, which involve the problem we have just described, with
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Hanspeter Kriesi 7
respect to the horizontal incongruences, of externalities or spillovers of
decisions taken in one sovereign state affecting all the other sovereign
states. As is pointed out by Hooghe andMarks (2003: 239), the chief ben-
efit of such structures lies in their ‘scale flexibility’. This benefit comes,
however, at a double price: the ‘demos problem’ is accompanied by
a ‘coordination problem’ – that is, the problem of how to coordinate
the spillovers of decisions taken in some units or jurisdictions for other
units or jurisdictions. Hooghe and Marks call this a ‘second-order coor-
dination problem’ because ‘it involves coordination among institutions
whose primary function is to coordinate human activity’. Second-order
coordination costs increase exponentially as the number of relevant
units or jurisdictions increases. There are two strategies to limit these
costs – either one limits the number of autonomous actors who have to
be coordinated or one limits the interactions among actors by splicing
competencies into functionally distinct units.
The first solution leads to what Hooghe and Marks call type-I
governance – governance by general-purpose, non-intersecting, and
durable jurisdictions hierarchically structured into units of ever more
encompassing scale. The units of such structures are typically territo-
rially defined. This is the model we know from federalism. The sec-
ond solution leads to type-II governance – governance by functionally
specific, intersecting, and flexible jurisdictions which are not hierarchi-
cally structured into ever more encompassing units, but are more like
task-specific networks often of a more informal character.
Given that the demos is defined in territorial terms, type-I governance
structures are much more compatible with liberal democracy as we
know it than type-II governance structures. Type-I governance structures
are, however, subject to increasingly long chains of delegation, which
is likely to lead to problems of accountability. Type-I structures may
also give rise to new incongruences and asymmetries between decision-
makers and decision-takers. Such incongruences may arise when the EU
decision is taken by authorities within the EU who are not account-
able to the national electorates. In addition, several territorially defined
demoi may be concerned, and the question is how the multiple chains
of delegation are coordinated. New incongruences may arise when the
representatives of a (qualified) majority of national demoi imposes a
decision on a minority of national demoi within the supranational
structure. Even more serious are incongruences arising from powerful
minorities of states imposing their decisions on a majority of weaker
states. Thus, from the point of view of small states, governance beyond
the nation-state typically seems to imply that a small group of powerful
10.1057/9781137299871 - Democracy in the Age of Globalization and Mediatization, Hanspeter Kriesi, Daniel Bochsler, Jörg Matthes,
Sandra Lavenex, Marc Bühlmann and Frank Esser
Co
py
rig
ht
 m
at
er
ia
l f
ro
m
 w
w
w
.
pa
lg
ra
v
ec
o
n
n
ec
t.c
om
 - 
lic
en
se
d 
to
 U
ZH
 H
au
pt
bi
bl
io
th
ek
 / 
Ze
nt
ra
lb
ib
lio
th
ek
 Z
ür
ic
h 
- P
al
gr
av
eC
on
ne
ct
 - 
20
13
-0
3-
29
8 Introduction – The New Challenges to Democracy
states gets the upper hand in the formulation of internationally agreed
rules, through a combination of formal and informal influence, and that
most nation-states become rule-takers rather than rule-makers.
Compared to type-I governance structures, type-II governance is
even more problematic for democracy: the territorially structured juris-
dictions and corresponding political communities do not necessarily
correspond to the functionally defined jurisdictions, which means that
there is no demos to whom the decision-makers could be accountable.
Functionally defined ‘stakeholders’ replace territorially defined demoi,
which leads, as Papadopoulos (2009: 7) notes, to a form of democracy
that is quite different from what we usually mean by the term, i.e. to
‘advocacy democracy’. In such a situation, actors eligible for participa-
tion in decision-making are ‘those who can credibly claim that they
express strong preferences and defend causes that are of central con-
cern to them’. Traditional forms of advocacy democracy include the
well-known forms of representation by interest groups and social move-
ment organizations – that is, forms of representation which operate
outside of the electoral channel. As a result of the emergence of multi-
level governance structures, functional channels are generally said to be
strengthened (for the EU, see Bartolini 2005: 382; Papadopoulos 2010).
With the increasing interdependence between nation-states, the cre-
ation of supranational governance structures becomes necessary to
provide a solution for the externalities or spillover effects produced by
the decisions of sovereign national decision-makers. But while the estab-
lishment of a supranational governance structure may solve some of the
horizontal accountability problems for democracy which arise at the
national level, it creates new, possibly more serious, vertical account-
ability problems, which arise from the specificities of the relationship
between the authorities at the national and the supranational levels
in the multi-level governance structure. Thus, it increases the number
of stakeholders to whom the national governments are held account-
able. As Peter Mair (2009: 14) has observed, by ‘disembedding liberalism,
globalization in general and Europeanization in particular create many
new principals to whom governments must act responsibly’, which, in
turn, increases the governments’ difficulties in responding to their own
citizens.
At its most abstract, this is the challenge of globalization for democ-
racy in the 21st century, which we shall further elaborate in this volume:
how can the ‘democracy deficit’ of multi-level governance structures be
alleviated, and what does it mean for the existing forms of democracy,
if such structures as the EU are democratized?
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Hanspeter Kriesi 9
Mediatization
The second major challenge for democracy which we shall focus on
in this volume concerns the processes of communication between
decision-makers and the citizens. In the process of democratization of
the nation-states the populations locked into the consolidated territo-
ries, whose exit options were heavily reduced by the national power
centers, increasingly raised their voice in order to get a share of control
over national political decision-making. As described by Manin (1995),
elections became the key mechanism of control of the national centers
by the locked-in populations. The principle that all legitimate author-
ity is to be based on the consent of those over whom it is exercised
has been imposed by the three modern (British, American, and French)
revolutions. Elected representatives, who were accountable to the pub-
lic, replaced the former autocratic authorities. As a result, the process of
political communication between the citizens and their representatives
became of crucial importance.
The archetype of classical Athenian democracy was essentially local
democracy. It was an assembly democracy where ‘all major issues such
as the legal framework for the maintenance of public order, finance
and direct taxation, ostracism and foreign affairs [ . . . ] came before
the assembled citizens for deliberation and decision’ (Held 2006: 17).
It is, however, often overlooked that the direct assembly democracy in
Athens also relied on elected authorities. The assembly was too large
a body to prepare its own agenda, to draft legislation, and to be a
focal point for the reception of new political initiatives and propos-
als. However, the assembly constituted the public sphere, where the
communication between the citizens (the audience) and their represen-
tatives (the speakers) – who were, by the way, all designated by lot, and
not elected (Manin 1995: 19–61) – took a very direct form.
The scope of modern representative democracy is no longer local,
but essentially national. The extension of the scope of the democratic
process required a change in the basic communication infrastructure
between the citizens and their representatives. As the public sphere
extended beyond the local realm, it became much harder for the two to
meet in assemblies; the communication between citizens and their rep-
resentatives became essentially media-based. Assemblies of all citizens
are still of some importance at the local level (town meetings, citizens’
assemblies (‘Landsgemeinde’), meetings of local party sections), and for
the internal coordination of those political actors who link the citizens
to the political decision-making bodies (parties and interest groups).
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10 Introduction – The New Challenges to Democracy
Moreover, they have a particular importance for those non-established
political actors, like social movement organizations, who do not get
access to the media (Neidhardt 1994: 10). But, for all practical purposes,
in the modern representative democracy the communication between
politicians and the citizens at large is media-centered.
This means that the process of political communication depends on
the media infrastructure and is subject to change as the media are chang-
ing. The challenge of mediatization refers to the consequences of the
changing conditions of the media infrastructure for democracy, and can
be defined as the growing intrusion of the media logic as an institu-
tional rule into fields – such as political communication – where other
rules of defining appropriate behavior prevailed (see Chapter 7). This
challenge results from a double transformation the media have under-
gone over the last few decades, both of which are, ultimately, rooted
in technological change, although they are not entirely technologically
determined.
The first transformation is the proliferation and diversification of the
media channels. Blumler and Kavanagh (1999) call this the emerging
third phase of political communication systems. It is marked by media
abundance, ubiquity, reach, and celerity. We experience the multipli-
cation of radio stations and television channels, and a proliferation
and increasing integration of communication equipment in people’s
homes. Beyond mass media, political news, information, and ideas can
be circulated via the internet and the personal computer.
In Europe, television and radio had once been concentrated com-
munication outlets, largely controlled by the state according to the
‘public service’ model of broadcasting regulation. Both radio and tele-
vision were nationally organized and eventually reached out to the
nation as a whole. Public radio started its explosive expansion in the
early twenties, just at the time when political suffrage became universal.
It reached levels of coverage of about three-quarters of the households in
the US by the end of the inter-war period, of two-thirds in the UK, and
of roughly one half in Germany. Other countries, such as Switzerland,
were slower in the development of radio coverage, but they followed
suit only few years thereafter. The national demos was increasingly cov-
ered by national news, provided for the entire population at prime time.
In German-speaking Switzerland, for example, comfortably installed at
the lunch table, the whole nation received the national news at 12.30,
after the ‘time-signal’ from the observatory at Neuchâtel, which allowed
the listeners to synchronize their watches. In this respect, the rise of tele-
vision after World War II did not introduce much of a change: the public
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Hanspeter Kriesi 11
service television stations just added one more medium to the standard-
ized diet of news and information programs that were the same for the
entire demos. Nationwide public radio and television reached out to sec-
tors of the electorate that were previously more difficult to reach, and
they reduced selective exposure. In other words, they contributed to the
inclusion of disadvantaged citizens into the public audience. Moreover,
they were constitutionally mandated to non-partisan norms and were
expected to fulfill the highest standards of quality, and to contribute
to the development of a democratic public sphere and to the political
enlightenment of the citizens (Jarren et al. 2002: 28).
In Western Europe (but not in the US), this nationwide broadcasting
systemwent hand in hand with partisan print media, which were closely
controlled by or allied with political parties and churches. ‘Political par-
allelism’ characterized the print media in many European countries up
to the more recent past. Therefore, we do not think that Blumler and
Kavanagh’s (1999) distinction between the ‘golden age of parties’ before
the 1960s and the age of limited channel nationwide television starting
in the 1960s makes much sense.
While globalization leads to incongruence between the national
demos and the decision-makers from without, the proliferation and
diversification of the media channels fragments the ‘demos’ from
within. It leads to increased competitive pressures for politicians and
to centrifugal diversification (Blumler and Kavanagh 1999). As media
abundance advances, politics must vie for the attention of editors,
reporters, and audiences in a far more competitive environment. More
television channels mean increased availability of entertainment, sports,
and other forms of specialist journalism (business, fashion, celebrity)
which compete with political journalism for resources and appeal.
Moreover, the big players of political journalism no longer control
the field. Diversification changes the relationship of the politicians to
the public as well: in the age of nationwide broadcasting, when radio
and television offered relatively little choice, the news audience was
near-universal and captive to the uniform message. Politicians aimed
to project a limited set of master images and priorities throughout most
sectors of the electorate. Standardized notions prevailed of what counted
and what did not. Under the changed environment of multiple chan-
nels, they have more incentives or chances to tailor their message to
particular identities, conditions, and tastes. The size of the mass audi-
ence is reduced. This creates openings for previously excluded voices
to express themselves. But it also restores the prospects for selective
exposure, widening cultural (‘digital’) gaps in society, and, in the final
10.1057/9781137299871 - Democracy in the Age of Globalization and Mediatization, Hanspeter Kriesi, Daniel Bochsler, Jörg Matthes,
Sandra Lavenex, Marc Bühlmann and Frank Esser
Co
py
rig
ht
 m
at
er
ia
l f
ro
m
 w
w
w
.
pa
lg
ra
v
ec
o
n
n
ec
t.c
om
 - 
lic
en
se
d 
to
 U
ZH
 H
au
pt
bi
bl
io
th
ek
 / 
Ze
nt
ra
lb
ib
lio
th
ek
 Z
ür
ic
h 
- P
al
gr
av
eC
on
ne
ct
 - 
20
13
-0
3-
29
12 Introduction – The New Challenges to Democracy
analysis, for the segmentation or even ‘balkanization’ of the public
sphere – a specter evoked by Sunstein (2001) in his analysis of internet-
based communication. Without any doubt, however, the multiplication
of channels creates a much more complex flow of information, and it
disrupts the media’s and elites’ ability to establish dominant frames.
The proliferation and diversification of media channels is not a
purely technical phenomenon, but is inseparably linked to the sec-
ond transformation of the media systems in established democracies –
commercialization, which is, in turn, a result of the admission of private
broadcasting stations (both radio and television) with their orientation
to the consumers’ demands, and their dependence on advertisers and
investor-owners. In combination with the multiplication of the chan-
nels, commercialization contributed to the autonomy of the media
from politics and the imposition of the ‘media logic’ on the ‘politi-
cal logic’. Commercialization replaced the traditional supply market of
mass communication in Europe, provided by the established national
broadcasting monopolies, by a demand market. That is, it replaced a
market in which the media decided what content to offer to their public
with a market where the consumers’ desires and expectations as well as
considerations of commercial success have come to play a much more
important role. As Hamilton argues (2004), consumers’ desires are the
key exogenous determinants of the production of news. Under such
conditions, news content is a product, the creation and distribution of
which depends not in the first place on the needs of politicians, but
on the market value attached to the attention and tastes of its con-
sumers, the technologies affecting the cost of information generation
and transmission, and the values pursued by journalists and media own-
ers. Competition drives news organizations to maximize profits, so the
media play more to the audience than to the source.
Focusing on the consumers, however, overlooks some other impor-
tant players, such as advertisers and investor-owners, who may play
an even more important role in the commercialization of the media.
As MacManus argues (1995), the consumers, in fact, find themselves in
an asymmetrical relationship with media firms. On the one hand, this
asymmetry results from the fact that news is most often not an expe-
rience, but a credence good – a good you buy on faith, because you
as a consumer may not be able to establish its quality, even after con-
sumption. Consumers, in other words, are vulnerable to opportunism
on the part of the media firm, much more so than investors, advertis-
ers, and sources, even if brand names sometimes help them evaluate
quality after a product gains a reputation. On the other hand, and
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Hanspeter Kriesi 13
even more importantly, investors, advertisers, and sources as individ-
uals exert much greater influence over the media corporation than an
individual consumer, and they also have a greater stake in the outcome
of the transaction with the media corporation than the consumer. The
individual consumer is the least powerful and the least interested stake-
holder in the news production. To the extent that it increases their
profits, rational investors are expected to take advantage of the con-
sumers’ inability to recognize quality news and of the low reward for
reading or viewing it. This implies that the media may lower their costs
in news production without losing their viewers or readers by providing
‘soft’ or low-quality news.
The mediatization thesis maintains that, as a result of these momen-
tous transformations, the media increasingly follow their own, com-
mercial logic in selecting, presenting, and interpreting the political
news. In other words, the ‘media logic’ as ‘the frame of reference
within which the media construct the meaning of events and per-
sonalities they report, increasingly has come to reflect the commercial
logic of the media industry, mixing the structural constraints of media
communication with the typical aims of commercial communication
activity’ (Mazzoleni and Schulz 1999: 251). The fact that everyone else
in society – including politicians, parties, and governments – has learnt
to adjust and adapt to the media logic as the way of perceiving and inter-
preting the world, and acting upon it, has further boosted the media’s
significance.
Politicians are among those who have learnt to adapt to the media
(Mazzoleni and Schulz 1999: 249–251). One of the most significant
results is that politicians who wish to address the public must negoti-
ate with the media’s preferred timing, formats, language, and even the
content of their messages. Pessimists argue that television in particu-
lar has come to ‘colonize’ politics to the extent that we now live in a
‘mediacracy’ (Meyer 2002). They argue that the public agenda is increas-
ingly defined by the media, that political news is increasingly replaced
by ‘faits divers’ (Bourdieu 1996) – that is, by the trivial inanities of daily
life – and that the news formats are increasingly guided by viewer figures
(television) or coverage figures (print media). This means that the news
formats are said to increasingly cater to the precepts of ‘popular cul-
ture’, typified by personalization and dramatization, which leads to the
depoliticization of the citizen public. From a more optimistic point of
view, van Zoonen (2005) suggests that even if this were true, and even
if popular culture admittedly has its flaws, the style of popular culture
may offer a way into politics for people otherwise excluded or bored.
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14 Introduction – The New Challenges to Democracy
Popular fictions of politics may enable people to perform as citizens,
and popular culture needs to be acknowledged as a relevant resource
for political citizenship, a resource that produces comprehension and
respect for popular political voices and that allows for more people to
perform as citizens.
In the new preface to the revised edition of his Strukturwandel der
Öffentlichkeit, Habermas (1990) reassesses his originally very critical eval-
uation of the transformation of the public sphere. Among other things,
he uses the example of the fall of the Berlin Wall to point out (p. 49)
that the revolutionary change in the German Democratic Republic (the
former East Germany) could only have come about because the tele-
vision coverage of the mass demonstrations in East Germany turned
the physical presence of protesters in the streets and squares into an
omnipresent phenomenon (but see Kern 2011). Eventually, he comes to
the conclusion that the democratic potential of the public sphere under
contemporary conditions is ‘ambivalent’. We take this assessment as our
point of departure and shall ask how the challenge of mediatization
impacts on the prospects of democracy in the 21st century.
Content of the volume
This volume is divided into two parts. Before embarking on the detailed
discussion of the two challenges in Part II, we propose to discuss the
preconditions, models, and varieties of democracy under contemporary
conditions. In this way, Part I will lay the groundwork for the discussion
of the two challenges. There we also intend to drive home our view that
democracy is both a moving target and a highly complex, and variable,
set of institutions and practices. As we see it, democracy is a moving tar-
get because democratization is an ongoing process that not only leads
to an extension of democracy to new countries and to new layers of
supra- and international governance, but also continuously transforms
the way politics works in established democracies. In the Chapter 2, we
introduce the preconditions of democracy against the background of the
two major challenges which we have singled out. The challenge of glob-
alization seriously questions some of the conditions that the literature
has insisted upon as necessary requirements for the proper function-
ing of a democratic polity – the existence of a demos, of a state, as
well as of appropriate economic and cultural conditions. As we shall
show, however, it does not necessarily increase the importance of the
international context for the democratization of nation states, which
has been important all along. Both the challenge of globalization and
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Hanspeter Kriesi 15
mediatization raise serious questions with respect to the preconditions
of political communication more specifically.
At the same time, we conceive of democracy as a highly complex
and variable set of institutions and practices. Given its complexity,
democracy can be conceptualized in different ways. Chapter 3 presents
our process-oriented model of representative democracy that follows
in the footsteps of Robert Dahl (2000). The second transformation of
democracy which extended democratic forms of government from the
city state to the nation-state introduced the principle of representa-
tion and the designation of the representatives by elections. Elections
establish a double link between the political input (the citizens’ prefer-
ences) and the political output (public policies adopted by the elected
representatives) by allowing for a combination of responsiveness and
accountability. We shall elaborate this double link given by the chain
of responsiveness and the chain of accountability. We believe that the
electoral channel of representative democracy constitutes the core of
any model of democracy under contemporary conditions. To become
empirically more realistic, this model should, however, be extended in
several respects. Accordingly, Chapter 3 extends this core model in three
directions – in the direction of direct democracy, advocacy democracy,
and protest politics.
The normative principles of democracy cannot only be combined in
different ways in theory, but also in practical implementations. The
different existing democracies constitute varying attempts to imple-
ment the general underlying normative principles of democratic theory.
They have implemented these principles by various formal institutional
arrangements, and informal practices and procedures. In Chapter 4,
we shall conceptualize and empirically measure the existing variety of
established democracies. Our analysis will be largely exploratory, an
attempt to map out a largely unexplored territory. As we shall show,
existing democracies differ considerably in the way they implement the
basic principles under conditions of globalization and mediatization.
Moreover, we shall also show that there are trade-offs involved in the
implementation of the democratic principle: in the real world, it is not
possible to maximize all the aspects of this principle. The institutional
designers have to make some hard choices when trying to make democ-
racy work. The diversity of existing democracies implies that they may
be confronted quite differently by the two challenges of mediatization
and globalization.
The four chapters of Part II present a detailed discussion of the two
major challenges. They elaborate the theoretical concepts linked to
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16 Introduction – The New Challenges to Democracy
these challenges and provide empirical results from our own and related
research, which allows us to assess the impact of these two challenges on
democracy as we have come to know it. Chapters 5 and 6 deal with the
two major aspects of globalization-related challenges – the transforma-
tion of democracy in its vertical and horizontal dimensions. Chapter 5
discusses the implications of the establishment of multi-level gover-
nance structures (the vertical dimension), while Chapter 6 focuses on
the horizontal spread of democracy, with particular attention to external
democracy promotion. Chapters 7 and 8 are devoted to the challenge
of mediatization. Chapter 7 systematically introduces the concept of
mediatization, while Chapter 8 discusses its consequences for news con-
tent, for political organizations, for decision-making processes, as well
as for the public audience. Finally, Chapter 9 concludes with a short
assessment of the state of democracy today.
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Part I
Democracy, a Moving Target of
Great Complexity and Variability
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Democracy as a Moving Target
Hanspeter Kriesi
The challenge of globalization seriously questions some of the
conditions that the literature has insisted upon as necessary require-
ments for the proper functioning of a democratic polity – the existence
of a demos, and of a state, as well as of appropriate economic and
cultural conditions. Similarly, the challenge of mediatization raises seri-
ous questions with respect to the cultural preconditions of democracy
and, most importantly, with respect to the preconditions of political
communication more specifically. We shall discuss the preconditions of
democracy with particular attention to the implications of our two chal-
lenges for the future chances of democracy. In this respect, we shall be
especially attentive to European integration as the most advanced form
of political and economic integration at the supranational level.
The question of the preconditions of democracy has given rise to an
enormous amount of literature, which we shall review here in order to
get an idea about how it can be answered under contemporary condi-
tions of globalization and mediatization. Our reading of this literature
suggests that six ‘structuralist’ arguments about necessary conditions of
democracy deserve closer scrutiny:
• Democracy presupposes a demos.
• Democracy is only possible in a state.
• Democracy requires a supportive culture and cultural heterogeneity
is an insurmountable obstacle to democracy.
• Economic prosperity is a precondition for democracy.
• The international context facilitates or constrains democracy on any
given count.
• Democracy presupposes a public communication system that allows
for the free deliberation of all.
19
10.1057/9781137299871 - Democracy in the Age of Globalization and Mediatization, Hanspeter Kriesi, Daniel Bochsler, Jörg Matthes,
Sandra Lavenex, Marc Bühlmann and Frank Esser
Co
py
rig
ht
 m
at
er
ia
l f
ro
m
 w
w
w
.
pa
lg
ra
v
ec
o
n
n
ec
t.c
om
 - 
lic
en
se
d 
to
 U
ZH
 H
au
pt
bi
bl
io
th
ek
 / 
Ze
nt
ra
lb
ib
lio
th
ek
 Z
ür
ic
h 
- P
al
gr
av
eC
on
ne
ct
 - 
20
13
-0
3-
29
20 Democracy as a Moving Target
We shall discuss these arguments one by one. The upshot of our assess-
ment of these preconditions will be that, in the contemporary situation,
there are no necessary, but only more or less favorable, conditions for
democracy.
We shall argue that politics – the configuration of power, the goals
of power holders and challengers, and their interaction in the con-
text provided by the structural conditions – is crucial for the chances
of democratization. We shall argue that politics may even create the
required conditions for democratization. Crucial for the consolidation
of democracy is the choice of an appropriate institutional design that
takes into account the variable conditions encountered under contem-
porary circumstances. As Schneider and Wagemann (2006: 775) observe
at the end of a particularly systematic analysis of the conditions under
which democracies consolidated in 32 countries from six world regions
between 1974 and 2000: ‘some democracies consolidate in unfavourable
conditions, while others fail to consolidate in favourable contexts. The
reason for this seems to be the choice of an (in)appropriate config-
uration of institutions’. New democracies consolidate if the specific
combination of political institutions chosen fit the societal context in
terms of power dispersion. Put differently, even under adverse condi-
tions, there exists a chance to consolidate democracies through skillful
institutional choice and adaptation (p. 776).
This conclusion is in line with the agency-oriented or ‘voluntarist’
approach to democratization, which was originally put forward by
O’Donnell et al. (1986). According to this approach, democratization
is ultimately a matter of political crafting. As Przeworski (1986: 48) for-
mulates this position: ‘objective factors constitute at most constraints to
that which is possible under a concrete historical situation but do not
determine the outcome of the situation’. We would like to suggest that
this is also true under conditions of globalization and mediatization –
at the global level, and in regions yet to be democratized at the domes-
tic level. This is what we deduce from the discussion of each of the six
major structuralist arguments.
The existence of a demos
Democracy is, first of all, about a demos. Democratic procedures presup-
pose the existence of a demos. As Greenfeld (1992: 10) has observed,
the idea of democracy at the national level was originally closely
related to the idea of the nation. The idea of the nation – and by
implication the idea of nationalism – was originally based on two
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Hanspeter Kriesi 21
principles, which are at the same time the basic principles of democracy
(Greenfeld 1992: 10; 1999: 37): the principle of popular sovereignty
which sought expression in a polity of its own, and the idea of the
fundamental equality of the members of the national community. Orig-
inally, she writes, the idea of democracy was contained in the idea of
the nation as the butterfly in the chrysalis. The nation constitutes the
demos at the level of the nation-state.
But what is a nation? A nation is an ‘imagined community’, as the title
of Anderson’s (1983) study famously declares. It is an imagined commu-
nity, because the members of even the smallest nation will never know
most of their fellow members, meet them, or even hear of them. In fact,
all communities larger than primordial villages or face-to-face groups are
imagined. However, even if it is too large for its members to know each
other, the nation is still a limited community of solidarity, based on the
belief of its members that they are united by some set of characteristics
that differentiate them (in their own minds) from outsiders. A nation
is an exclusive group that is distinguished from other nations. Its defin-
ing characteristic is that its members are striving to create or maintain
their own polity (see Weber’s (1948: 176) well-known definition). The
members of the nation have ‘a collective consciousness because of their
sentiment of difference, or even uniqueness, which is fostered by the
group’s sharing of core symbols’ (Haas 1986: 726f.).
The difficulty of a democracy beyond the nation-state is that there is
no corresponding community of solidarity at the global level, or even at
the level of a single continent like Europe. The question of whether such
a community of solidarity – a demos – is possible beyond the nation-
state has mainly been discussed in the context of the EU. The basic
question here is not, in the first place, whether a polity as large as the
European continent can be democratized, but whether it is capable of
being a democracy in a more fundamental sense, that is, whether there
exists something like a community of solidarity among Europeans from
different nation-states. There are quite a number of theorists who argue
that the creation of a European demos has to precede the democrati-
zation of Europe, and who are at the same time very skeptical about
the possibility of such a demos developing. Kielmansegg (2003: 57), for
instance, observes that a politically resilient identity of the Europeans as
Europeans does not exist, not yet, as he adds for the hopeful among us.
He explains this absence of a European identity as being above all due
to the lack of a ‘communication community’ in Europe, attributable to
the elementary fact that Europeans live in their languages as separate
‘structures of perception and understanding’. Moreover, there are no
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22 Democracy as a Moving Target
common memories, as he sees it: the past is remembered nationally,
in highly specific ways.
This analysis is shared by other German observers. Thus, Grimm
(1995: 296), in a very influential paper, argued that ‘the absence of a
European communication system, due chiefly to language diversity, has
the consequence that for the foreseeable future there will be neither
a European public nor a European political discourse’. What obstructs
democracy at the European level, in his view, is not so much the lack of
cohesion of Union citizens as a people, but ‘their weakly developed col-
lective identity and low capacity for transnational discourse’ (p. 297),
from which he deduces that the democracy deficit at the European
level cannot be removed by institutional reforms in any short term.
Offe (1998, 2003) shares this analysis and adds the pessimistic twist
that the increasing functional integration in Europe might provoke a
reaction on the part of the European citizens that seeks to reduce the
community of solidarity and trust to the national, or even regional or
group, level. As he suggests (1998: 132), the functional needs and the
moral prerequisites of European integration might develop in opposite
directions.
This perspective is based on the cultural definition of a nation, typ-
ical for Germans whose nation constitutes the paradigmatic case of a
‘cultural’ nation. The opposite view, the French, republican, or politi-
cal definition of a nation suggests instead that the existence of a demos
is not an immediate precondition for the democratization of a polity.
A political view of the demos suggests that the political institutions
and the political practice within the institutional framework are capa-
ble of creating a demos where there had been none before. According
to this argument, which is defended by Habermas (1995, 1998), an
untypical German theorist, the collective identity is not a precondition,
but a consequence of the creation of political institutions. According
to this alternative view, the European demos would be a side product
of institutional constructions, above all of the creation of a European
constitution. The European demos would be held together by what
Habermas calls a ‘constitutional patriotism’.
In line with this voluntaristic view, the demos is largely the result
of a process of political structuration (Schimmelfennig 2010: 217).
It takes intermediary organizations – political parties, interest groups,
social movement organizations – to mobilize and articulate the citizens’
interest for a demos to be capable of effective political action. In the
analysis of Bartolini (2005: 89), the democratization of the European
nation-states was ‘a process of internal voice structuring in externally
10.1057/9781137299871 - Democracy in the Age of Globalization and Mediatization, Hanspeter Kriesi, Daniel Bochsler, Jörg Matthes,
Sandra Lavenex, Marc Bühlmann and Frank Esser
Co
py
rig
ht
 m
at
er
ia
l f
ro
m
 w
w
w
.
pa
lg
ra
v
ec
o
n
n
ec
t.c
om
 - 
lic
en
se
d 
to
 U
ZH
 H
au
pt
bi
bl
io
th
ek
 / 
Ze
nt
ra
lb
ib
lio
th
ek
 Z
ür
ic
h 
- P
al
gr
av
eC
on
ne
ct
 - 
20
13
-0
3-
29
Hanspeter Kriesi 23
consolidated and relatively closed territorial systems, whose military,
economic, and cultural boundaries had already tended to stabilize.’
From this point of view, the lack of appropriate political structuration
at the EU level is the main reason to be pessimistic about the prospect
of democratization of the EU.
Switzerland may serve as a possible model for this contrasting view.
Switzerland, the ‘nation of political voluntarism’, succeeded with a
minimum of common culture, and its political democratization pre-
ceded nation formation (Kriesi 1999, 2007). In line with this argument
Stojanovic (2009: 14f.) maintains that ‘a repeated practice of direct
democracy strengthens the sentiment of the Swiss that they belong to
the same “people” or to the same “nation”.’ The direct-democratic prac-
tice, as he argues, makes the nation visible: ‘When, in the aftermath of
a referendum, politicians and the media affirm that “the people” has
decided, there can be no doubt what “people” they have in mind: it is
the Swiss people, the Swiss demos’. Probably no other country, he argues,
better illustrates Ernest Renan’s famous definition of a nation as a ‘daily
plebiscite’: the Swiss do not vote every day, but they vote frequently
enough to recognize themselves in the popular verdict – even if they do
not participate in the vote.
The Swiss example shows that even a culturally very heterogeneous
population with rather diverse historical memories can be constructed
as a demos. As far as mediatization is concerned, the Swiss example
also illustrates that a common communication system is not a neces-
sary condition for the existence of a demos. In Switzerland, the mass
media are essentially segmented along linguistic lines. What the Swiss
case illustrates is that the linguistically segmented communication sys-
tem does not prevent the emergence of common public debate (Kriesi
1993). Thus, Tresch (2008) has shown that there is no fundamental
incompatibility between a multilingual context and an integrated pub-
lic sphere. As long as all the segmented communication systems discuss
the same political issues, and as long as politics in the different linguis-
tic segments are structured along the same lines (i.e. as long as they are
vertically integrated, as we shall argue below), such a common debate is
bound to emerge.
Cederman and Kraus (2004) take an intermediary position and, with
respect to the emergence of a European demos, plead for a perspec-
tive that combines the two competing points of view in an approach
which they term ‘bounded institutionalism’. On the one hand, they
share the ‘voluntaristic’ political view that democratic practice can con-
tribute to the integration of the political community at the European
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24 Democracy as a Moving Target
level. On the other hand, they agree with the ‘deterministic’ cultural
view that this mechanism alone is insufficient: they argue that the
democratic practice has to be rooted in an already existing demos,
which it reinforces in turn. According to this intermediary position,
which we share, a demos cannot be constructed out of thin air.
It takes some common memories, myths, symbols, and a common
territory to build upon. This is the basic insight of Smith’s (1986)
argument about the ‘ethnic origin’ of nations. However, the degree to
which the demos requires cultural standardization can be exaggerated
(see below).
As far as Europe is concerned, there are indications that the density
of social interactions across Europe and the willingness of Europeans
to identify themselves as Europeans are increasing, some think to the
point where ‘it is possible to say that there now exists a European
society’ (Fligstein 2008: 244). There are also signs that, as has been
argued by Hooghe and Marks (2009), the European populations are wak-
ing up to the increasing importance of the EU for their well-being.
The increasing salience of the EU is already undermining the ‘per-
missive consensus’ about the EU, which may eventually lead to an
intensification of political conflict about Europe. This in turn, may
provide leverage for the political structuration of the European inte-
gration both at the domestic and the European level (Kriesi et al.
2008, 2012).
However, Cheneval and Schimmelfennig (2011: 7) insist the basic
fact about the EU is that there is no consolidated European demos;
instead, ‘the coexistence of primarily national demoi with a secondary
and mediated European demos appears to be a stable pattern for
the foreseeable future’. As they argue, the debate on the democratic
deficit in the EU suffers from neglecting this multiple-demoi condi-
tion. There is no voluntaristic fix to this predicament, and a return
to the protection of the existing national demoi comes down to the
resigned conclusion that the EU is not ready for any kind of democ-
racy. As Cheneval and Schimmelfennig show, however, the EU rather
closely corresponds to the principles of a new kind of democratic sys-
tem that can best be described as ‘demoicracy’ – a model of democracy
that builds on the premise that national demoi will persist for the fore-
seeable future rather than being replaced or superseded by a regional
or even global demos, and that in ‘any democratic polity beyond the
nation-state, multiple demoi will therefore need to play an indispens-
able part as bearers of negative and positive rights of protection and
participation’ (p. 5).
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The existence of a state
Democracy is not only about a demos, but also about kratos, that is,
about power. Linz and Stepan (1996: 7) argue that democracy ‘is a form
of governance of a modern state. Thus, no modern polity can become
democratically consolidated unless it is first a state’. Referring to Dahl
(1989: 207), who maintains that the democratic process presupposes
a unit, they argue that ‘agreements about stateness are logically prior
to the creation of democratic institutions’ (p. 26). Democracy requires,
in other words, a political center that has the capacity to make bind-
ing decisions and to implement them for the demos that inhabits the
bounded territory over which it governs. The monopoly of violence and
an administrative infrastructure of this center are necessary to restrict
the capacity of local power holders to ignore and challenge the decisions
taken by democratic institutions.
However, the question is again how much centralization of force is
needed to guarantee the possibility of democracy. As Koenig-Archibugi
(2010: 9) points out, the early experience of the US as well as the cur-
rent experience of the EU disconfirm the thesis that a central monopoly
of force is necessary to ensure high levels of compliance with the law.
We would even go a step further and argue that these experiences show
that democratization processes are possible without a strong central
state. As is pointed out by Schimmelfennig (2010: 218), mainstream the-
ories are ill-equipped to explain de facto EU democratization because
they assume a centralized state with a mature demos. They are not
attuned to the question of how the democratization of the multilevel
and multinational realities of the EU has become possible – at least to a
modest extent.
But even at the national level, we find trajectories to democratization
which did not rely on a strong state. Thus, Tilly (2007: Chapter 7) dis-
tinguishes between three ideal–typical trajectories of domestic democ-
ratization: ‘strong state’, ‘medium state’, and ‘weak state’ trajectories.
In a strong state trajectory, state capacity increases well before significant
democratization occurs. The opposite may happen in a weak state tra-
jectory. As Tilly points out, weak states have often existed in history, but
until recently they have rarely democratized at all. Instead, they have
most commonly disappeared into the territories of more powerful com-
petitors. In recent decades, however, an increasing number of regimes
have been following weak state trajectories toward democracy, that is,
they experienced considerable democratization before any substantial
increase in state capacity. As Tilly (2007: 164) also suggests, a weak state
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26 Democracy as a Moving Target
suffers from significant obstacles to continued democratization beyond
some threshold – the existence of subordinate autonomous power cen-
ters, insulated citizens’ networks, and large inequalities. But weak states
may eventually move toward significant strengthening of central state
authority, change to the medium state trajectory, and guarantee the
expansion of democracy.
Switzerland illustrates the weak state trajectory, and it suggests that
democracy both slows down the strengthening of central authority,
and creates the preconditions for a move toward a stronger center.
In the Swiss case, the early introduction of direct-democratic institutions
generally limited the expansion of state activities. This can be shown
especially with respect to the expansion of the welfare state (Kriesi and
Trechsel 2008: 161f.). At the same time, as we have already argued in
the preceding section, the early, radical democratization which meant
that the disparate parts of the country had repeated occasions each year
to debate the same political issues provided a strong incentive for the
creation of a common demos.
With Koenig-Archibugi (2010: 12) and Tilly (2007) we can conclude
that a certain state capacity constitutes a necessary condition for democ-
ratization, ‘because democratic rights of participation (input) as well as
compliance with democratic decisions (output) need to be secured.’ But
the required level falls far short of a strong state. A strong state may even
be detrimental to democracy (Lipset 1993: 4), as is illustrated by the rich
petrol states, where resources supporting state activity flow in without
bargaining between rulers and citizens for those resources (Ross 2001).
The main problem in democratizing non-state entities, such as the EU,
may actually not lie in their insufficient stateness, but in the fact that
this democratization involves institutional mechanisms, as discussed
in Chapter 5, which are unfamiliar to the citizens, since they diverge
from the standard democratic models developed in the state contexts
(Hurrelmann 2010: 7).
The cultural preconditions
Culture is relevant for democracy in two respects. Democracy requires
both a supportive culture and a culturally integrated demos. Dahl (2000:
147) lists both of these cultural preconditions among his five essential
conditions of democracy. We take up these two aspects one at a time.
Inglehart and Welzel (2005) provide a comprehensive framework
for discussing the socio-economic (see below) and cultural prerequi-
sites of democracy. Their theory postulates that macro socio-economic
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development is linked to value change, that is, it contributes to the
spread of self-expression values, which in turn increases the demand
for democracy. They are able to demonstrate these linkages empirically.
The upshot of their argument is that, as a major effect of modern-
ization, mass demand for democracy increases (Welzel and Inglehart
2008: 136). Their optimistic view suggests that the modernization pro-
cess quasi-automatically produces the general cultural demand for the
democratization process today. Amartya Sen (1999) even suggests that
democracy has become a universal value. He attributes this claim to
a plurality of virtues of democracy, including the intrinsic importance
of political participation and freedom in human life, the instrumental
importance of political incentives in keeping governments responsi-
ble and accountable, and the constructive role of democracy in the
formation of values and in the understanding of needs, rights, and
duties.
Having come to this optimistic overall assessment, the question
remains how the universal value of democracy is to be institutional-
ized in a given cultural context. We would agree with Saward (2003:
113) that there are ‘no wholly non-Western models of democracy’, but
that ‘there can be significant, and legitimate, adaptations, variations and
institutional innovations of democratic understanding and practice’.
Political scientists have been more skeptical about the cultural pre-
conditions for democracy in the past, and the quest for the appropriate
political culture for democracy goes at least back to Almond and Verba’s
(1963) ‘civic culture’. This culture, which they considered as a requisite
for a democracy, was a ‘mixed culture’, very much inspired by the Anglo-
Saxon political culture, that struck a suitable balance between power and
responsiveness, consensus and cleavage, and between affectivity and
affect neutrality. Putnam’s (1993) study on the democratic performance
of regional governments in Italy has revived the interest in political
culture by famously arguing that civicness was, indeed, a prerequisite
for democracy to work. Advancing in Tocqueville’s footsteps, Putnam
argues that a society’s civicness was rooted in social networks, especially
in voluntary associations and political parties, that is, in what is usually
called ‘civil society’. Associations create the basis for generalized social
trust, which in turn constitutes the basis for social cooperation and the
solution for the collective-action problems in democracy.
Putnam’s study met with a number of critiques. One that is particu-
larly important from our point of view here is that it is impossible to
treat political culture as an exogenous factor, independent of politics.
Thus, as Tarrow (1996) has argued, the malfunctioning of the state in
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28 Democracy as a Moving Target
the Italian south is not the result, but the origin of its pervading lack of
civism. According to this interpretation, the lack of civism in southern
Italy is best viewed as a side-product of the development of the state, and
not the other way around. In contrast to Putnam’s neo-Durkheimian
approach, we ought to take into account the inevitable interdependence
between the state, politics, and society (Skocpol et al. 2000: 542), which
is to suggest that political culture is, among other things, a product
of the way politics works. Freitag and Bühlmann (2005), for example,
show on the basis of world value survey data that universalistic, impar-
tial, and power-dividing institutions contribute to the development of
social trust. Similarly, Rothstein (2001) has shown that the universal-
istic Swedish welfare state contributes to social trust, and Kumlin and
Rothstein (2005) present empirical evidence for the more general thesis
that social trust depends on the type of welfare. In other words, even if
a democratic political culture is helpful for the consolidation of democ-
racy, democratic institutions and practices in turn are likely to constitute
the best support for such a culture.
The second aspect of cultural preconditions, the question of cultural
diversity, has also much preoccupied scholars of democracy. As Lijphart
(2004) observes, most experts would agree that deep societal divisions
pose a grave problem for democracy, and that it is therefore gener-
ally more difficult to establish and maintain democratic government in
divided than in homogenous societies. It is important to observe, how-
ever, that ethnic conflicts are not any more likely in culturally diverse
countries: ethno-demographic diversity indices rarely achieve signifi-
cance in the explanation of ethnic conflicts, and they do so only for
a circumscribed subset of conflicts. As pointed out by Wimmer et al.
(2009: 335), cultural (ethnic) diversity does not matter per se, rather,
it matters for politics because the nation-state itself relies on ethno-
national principles of political legitimacy: the state is ruled in the name
of an ethnically defined people and rulers should therefore care for their
own people. ‘The state is an active agent of political exclusion that cre-
ates ethnic conflicts in the first place – especially in poor states that lack
the resources for universal inclusion, as well as in states with weak civil
society institutions where other, non-ethnic channels for aggregating
political interests and rewarding political loyalty are scarce’ (Wimmer
2002).
In line with this argument, Cederman et al. (2010b) show that large
ethnic groups that are excluded from state power or under-represented
in government are much more likely to challenge the regime’s insid-
ers through violent means. Moreover, a loss of power in recent history
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or previous conflict further increases the likelihood of armed conflict.
Finally, ethnic exclusion by incumbent governments leads members of
ethnic groups that are systematically excluded from state power to fight
longer conflicts (Wucherpfennig et al. 2012). Rebel organizations from
excluded groups develop stronger group solidarities and become more
cost tolerant, which allows them to recruit and fight on behalf of such
groups and to maintain their fighting base for longer periods of time.
This is to say that cultural heterogeneity does not per se pose problems
for democracy. The adverse political consequences of cultural diversity
are themselves a product of politics and can be made more manageable
by suitable strategic and institutional arrangements, which allow for
the political inclusion or the political autonomy of cultural minorities.
Dahl (2000: 151–156) mentions four ways to do deal with the problem:
assimilation into the dominant culture (the American way); deciding by
consensus (the Swiss, Belgian, or Dutch way); electoral engineering, that
is, the introduction of suitable electoral systems allowing for adequate
representation of cultural minorities (the proportional representation
(PR) way); and separation, that is, the introduction of federal systems
with the possibility of adding new federal units (the Indian or the Swiss
way) or secession (the Norwegian way).
The political scientist who has probably made the most impor-
tant contribution to the discussion of this problem, Arend Lijphart
(2004), recommends power sharing for culturally divided polities, which
implies appropriate constitutional engineering. This recommendation,
which is shared by many other observers, includes nine areas of con-
stitutional choice. The first two, indeed, refer to the electoral system:
Lijphart recommends PR-systems that are simple to understand. Next,
he recommends parliamentary systems, power sharing in the executive,
cabinet stability (to be strengthened, for example, by the introduc-
tion of a constructive vote of non-confidence), a primarily symbolic
head of state, with very limited power and elected by parliament,
and power sharing beyond the cabinet and parliament (in the civil
service, judiciary, police, and military). These elements largely cover
what Dahl meant by ‘deciding by consensus’. The final two elements
concern federalism and decentralization of power, as well as non-
territorial autonomy for communal groups in divided societies that are
not geographically concentrated.
There are some dissenting voices. The question of the electoral system
has been subject to particularly intense discussions. Horowitz (2003),
for example, has argued that the alternative vote would be a better
solution for divided societies than PR, and Stojanovic’s (2006) analysis
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of the Swiss case, the paradigmatic case of multicultural integration
revealed that, in fact, PR was not the privileged electoral system in the
Swiss cantons. Rothchild and Roeder (2005: 9) launched a more gen-
eral attack on power sharing. They maintain that the conditions for the
success of power sharing – the continuing commitment of the leaders
of ethnic groups to moderate their own demands and their ability to
contain hard-line elements within their own communities – may be
in short supply in situation where it is needed most, that is, in post
civil-war situations. They argue that power sharing after civil wars may
lead to institutional instability, the escalation of conflict and to blocked
transitions to democracy (Roeder and Rothchild 2005: 325). As an alter-
native, Rothchild and Roeder (2005) propose power-dividing strategies,
in the Madisonian tradition: instead of empowering minority groups,
they propose to empower civil society by expanding individual liberties
and rights at the expense of government (reduce the scope of gov-
ernment) and to empower different majorities in independent organs
of government (separate powers) – civil liberties, multiple majorities,
and checks and balances. Given the power-dividing logic, they prefer
presidentialism with a real balance of powers between executive and leg-
islature to parliamentarism in protecting democracy and human rights.
And they prefer bicameral legislatures with competing bases of repre-
sentation to unicameral bodies; and independent judiciaries empowered
with judicial review over weak judiciaries (p. 17).
As we see it, the strategies of power sharing and power dividing are –
with the important exception of the choice between parliamentary or
presidential systems – actually complementary and mutually reinforc-
ing. Lijpharts’ (1999) conceptual map of democracy accommodates the
two strategies for dealing with cultural diversity in one overarching
scheme. Power sharing refers above all (although not exclusively) to
the sharing of power within institutions, that is, to the executive-party
dimension (which includes PR, parliamentary systems, multi-party sys-
tems, and power sharing in the executive) of Lijphart’s two-dimensional
map. Power dividing, by contrast, refers to the sharing of power
between institutions, that is, to the federal-unitary dimension (which
includes federalism, bicameralism, judicial review, a flexible constitu-
tion, and an independent central bank) of Lijphart’s two-dimensional
map. The leaders involved in the processes of democratization will have
to reach agreement on what to pick from this set of institutions, but
it is important to note that the solution to the democratic compro-
mise consists, as Przeworski (1986: 60) suggested a long time ago, of
institutions.
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The economic preconditions
The forerunner of the debate about the economic preconditions of
democracy is Lipset (1981 [1959]), whose conjectures on economic
development as a requisite of democratization proved extremely influ-
ential in the following decades, especially as part of a broader set of
hypotheses known as ‘modernization theory’. Lipset (1981 [1959]: 31)
suggested that ‘the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances
that it will sustain democracy’. As Boix (2003: 1–2) observed, ‘excluding
Duverger’s law on the effect of single-member districts on party systems,
it may be the strongest empirical generalization we have in comparative
politics today’. In the same breath, however, he also pointed out the
weaknesses of this thesis.
In fact, recent research has considerably nuanced the conjecture
that economic development increases the chances of democratization.
In their landmark study, Przeworski et al. (2000) purported to show that
the level of economic development has no effect on the emergence of
democracies, if one looks at data from the post-World War II period
(1950–1990). They suggested that democracies can emerge at almost
any level of per capita income. They failed to detect any thresholds of
development that would make the emergence of democracy predictable.
In turn, they found that the survival of democracies is quite closely
related to economic development: per capita income turned out to be
by far the best predictor of the survival of democracies. Democracies
survive in affluent societies whatever may be happening to them. They
are brittle in poor countries, but they are not always sentenced to die.
As they saw it, this argument pulled the rug from under the moderniza-
tion theory. Teorell (2010: 57–60) arrived at similar results for the period
1972–2006.
Critics have, however, challenged Przeworski et al.’s study on both
empirical and theoretical grounds (Wucherpfennig and Deutsch 2009).
Thus, Boix and Stokes (2003) show that, contrary to the claims of
Przeworski et al., economic development both contributes to the transi-
tion to democracy and sustains it.
In a more recent study, Boix (2011) confirms that the effect of
economic development on democracy plays only in certain time peri-
ods. Also, economic development matters to the prospect for poor
countries to democratize. In already developed and democratized coun-
tries, however, any extra growth has no further effect on the level of
democracy. Moreover, the effect of economic development on democ-
ratization turns out to be conditional on the international context
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(Boix 2011: 821): income per capita had no effect on political regimes
in the first half of the 19th century and it had no such effect from the
thirties to the end of the Cold War. By contrast, it had a strong effect on
democratization from the 1850s through the post-World War I settle-
ment, and again during the third wave of democratization, that is, the
period from the 1970s up to the present.
Having set the empirical record straight, the question then becomes:
which causal mechanisms account for the fact that development causes
dictatorships to fall to democracy and causes democracy to last. The
younger literature on economic effects on democracy suggests that
democracy is caused not by income per se, but by declining levels
of income inequality (Boix and Stokes 2003). In economically highly
unequal dictatorships, the political elites usually heavily overlap with
the rich part of society. They are afraid of revolutions and democrati-
zation, because this would threaten their wealth, and will therefore opt
for heavy repression to avoid upheavals. As countries have developed,
income has become more equally distributed (at least until more recent
decades, when we witness a ‘great U-turn’ in this relationship) (Alderson
and Nielsen 2002). More equal income distributions, in turn, mean that
democracy becomes less threatening for the rich, that is, they become
more willing to countenance democratization. In an extended version of
this theory, Boix (2003) emphasizes not only income equality, but also
capital mobility as a structural condition for democracy. As with income
equality, capital mobility is expected to reduce the threat of democracy
for the rich – it makes their assets harder to tax. Therefore, it also reduces
their resistance against democracy.
Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) present a similar framework for
explaining the relationship between economic development and
democracy. Their approach, however, is a bit different from that adopted
by Boix: whereas Boix argues that democracy is most likely to occur
when it is least threatening to the elites, according to Acemoglu and
Robinson, it is an immediate threat of revolution from below that leads
elites to consider democracy as the lesser evil. Just as Boix does, these
authors argue that democracy becomes a greater threat and repression
more attractive to the elites when inequality increases. On the other
hand, too much equality is not conducive to democracy either: it is
likely to reduce the pressure of the lower classes for change. It is a
medium range of inequality that is most conducive to democratization
(Acemoglu and Robinson 2006: 36–37). Under these conditions, they
argue that democratization constitutes a credible commitment of the
elites to future policies in favor of the majority of the population, a
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commitment made credible by the redistribution of the future political
power in favor of the majority, that is, by the transition to democ-
racy. This argument, they boldly suggest, is consistent with much of
the historical evidence.
These theories, which put economic inequality in the national pop-
ulation at the center of their explanation of democratization, are
contradicted by a recent result: Teorell (2010: 60f.), on the basis of a
new dataset and very elaborate controls, shows that economic inequal-
ity does not have any effect on democratization during the third
wave of democratization. As he argues, Boix’s (2003) previous results
appear to be highly sensitive to specification, and only apply to a sam-
ple of 50 countries, while he covers 165 countries. Moreover, these
theories hardly apply to democratization at the supranational level.
As Schimmelfennig (2010: 215–216) observes, the EU in particular not
only has the highest standard of living in the world, but Europe is also
the region with the world’s lowest inequality. Moreover, capital mobil-
ity is high, and the repressive capacities of the EU are extremely weak
or, more precisely, extremely decentralized. Finally, the comparatively
high wealth of the region does not create significant social pressure, and
grievances would have to be directed at national governments who still
do most of the taxing in the EU. In spite of all these conditions, several
of which are unfavorable to democratization, the EU has been undertak-
ing steps in the direction of democratization. How this has been possible
is beyond the explanatory scope of these theories.
We conclude from this discussion that the empirical record has gener-
ally vindicatedmodernization theory and has established that (national)
economic development in particular and socio-economic moderniza-
tion more generally may facilitate democratization. However, and we
would like to put the emphasis on this point, economic development
does not seem to have an impact on democratization per se, but its
impact seems to be conditional on the international political context.
It is to this set of conditions that we turn to now.
The international context and diffusion
Huntington’s (1991) well-known thesis of the three ‘waves’ of democra-
tization maintains that the worldwide democratization process took the
form of a wave-like movement where waves of progressing democratiza-
tion were interrupted by periods of set backs. He distinguishes between
three waves of democratization and two set backs. The fact that democ-
ratization processes have occurred in waves suggests that they have been
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influenced by the international context and by diffusion processes, but
also by important global shocks (world wars or economic crises), or
even parallel developments, which might have affected democratiza-
tion simultaneously. The fact that these waves characterize the entire
history of democratization suggests that the more recent push of glob-
alization did not change much with respect to the importance of the
international context for the spread of democracy. We shall focus here
on the structural, non-purposeful conditions of the international con-
text and diffusion processes. Chapter 6 will show in more detail to what
extent these processes result from explicit attempts by political actors to
promote democratization across the globe.
As far as the international context is concerned, Boix’s (2011) real-
ist conception of the international order focuses on the extent to
which the structure of the international system affects the relationship
between rising income levels and democratization. Looking at the rela-
tionship between great powers, he distinguishes between democratic,
anti-democratic and neutral international orders. In a democratic inter-
national order, all great powers are democratic. They do not generally
intervene in favor of authoritarian regimes. This situation, which pre-
vailed briefly after World War I until the Wilsonian order collapsed,
as well as after the breakdown of the Soviet Union, supports democ-
ratization. And, indeed, Boix is able to show that under a democratic
international order, the likelihood of democratic transitions increases
with higher levels of income and the probability of democratic break-
downs is reduced. By contrast, anti-democratic international orders,
where at least one of the great powers is anti-democratic and where
great powers structure their alliances along political ideologies, depress
democracy. Such a situation existed under the Holy Alliance in the early
19th century, in the interwar period, and during the Cold War, which
explains why many middle-income countries took so long to become
democratic in the immediate post-war period, even though they enjoyed
an income level similar to that of European countries before 1920. In the
polarized version of the anti-democratic international order, which
characterized the Cold War when great powers were divided into two
politically homogenous blocs (an authoritarian and a democratic one),
even the democratic great power has stronger preferences for authori-
tarian regimes in poor (and, that is, unstable) countries – especially if
the competing (authoritarian) great power benefits from and supports
a revolutionary movement. In a neutral international order, as existed
from the mid-19th century up to World War I, cooperation and alliances
among great powers do not follow a political or ideological cleavage and
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no great power invests any extra resources in maintaining the regime
type of its clients or changing those of its enemies. In such a context,
income affects political regimes unconditionally.
Diffusion processes partly specify the mechanisms through which
great powers exercise their vertical control, partly they add mechanisms
accounting for the horizontal spread of democracy during waves of
democratization. Thus, Huntington (1991) points out that the democ-
ratization of any given country creates favorable conditions for the
democratization of other countries. According to this view, democratiza-
tion spreads as a result of demonstration and snowball effects. Wejnert
(2005) distinguishes between three sets of structural elements that serve
as diffusion mechanisms: spatial factors, networks, and media commu-
nication. Spatial proximity is important, because the closer the countries
are to each other, the greater the number of linkages between them
through which democracy can be promoted or spread. In addition, it
often implies structural and cultural similarities. Thus, Teorell (2010:
81) found fairly tight long-run adjustment of the levels of democracy
among neighboring states during the third wave of democratization.
Wejnert (2005) also found strong spatial proximity effects for the 168
countries and the whole period (1800–1999) covered by her data.
Membership in international networks exposes a country to the influ-
ence of the other members in these networks, and might either hinder
or foster democratization. The impact of the networks strongly depends
on their internal structure. In heavily centralized networks, the cen-
ter exerts a strong influence on the peripheral members, who may be
forced to adapt their practices to the standards set by the center. The
best example for such an influence is the highly centralized, coercive
economic and political network of the former communist bloc, where
the authoritarian center – the Soviet Union – had prevented any kind
of democratization processes for a long time. Once the center weakened
and eventually fell apart, the bloc unraveled and the former satellites of
the Soviet Union democratized one after the other (Bunce 1999). The
former colonial empires provide other examples for such centralized,
coercive networks, where the former colonial dependencies only got
a chance to democratize once they were set free. Wejnert’s (2005: 68)
study indicates, however, that the hegemonic imposition of a demo-
cratic system on newly independent colonial dependencies did not lead
to sustainable democracy. By contrast, her results (p. 68) suggest that
membership in international economic and political networks (such as
the Council of Europe, the Arab League, NATO, or the Warsaw Pact) is
important for democratization: the larger the number of democracies in
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such a network, the more likely it is that the other members democratize
to some extent. In different analyses of successful democratization, the
regional environment of a country (spatial proximity), membership in
international networks, and international leverage turn out to be very
important factors, especially in the third wave (Levitsky and Way 2010;
Pevehouse 2002; Teorell 2010: 140; Wejnert 2005: 69). In Wejnert’s
model, after considering these factors, economic development hardly
plays a role any more.
In an important study of the democratizing effect of intergovernmen-
tal organizations (IGOs), Torfason and Ingram (2010) add three new
ideas regarding the democratizing effect of international networks: first,
the IGOs who may have influence are not restricted to a select few
(as the ones studied by Wejnert); the authors count some 300 orga-
nizations. It is not only the powerful, but also the obscure and weak
IGOs, which might play a role. Second, there are different mechanisms
through which IGOs may exert influence. One of them is coercion, but
Torfason and Ingram find that there are also other mechanisms that play
a role. Third, the influence does not flow top-down, from the IGO to
its members. Rather, IGOs promote horizontal exchange from member
to member. This is also reflected in a slightly different research design
from Wejnert. While she looked for the influence of IGOs on democra-
tization by counting a country’s membership in various IGOs, Torfason
and Ingram investigated whether joint membership in IGOs of dyads of
countries helps democratic standards to spread.
Democracy’s long-term rise around the world is not simply a con-
sequence of IGOs, but Torfason and Ingram argue that the channels
of contact offered through IGOs have provided important support for
this process and hastened it. IGOs provide interpretation and interac-
tion venues for elites, while also supporting a shared identity among
the populace of member-states. This increases the likelihood of change
consistent with shared norms and decreases the likelihood of inconsis-
tent change. Normative diffusion among rulers is important even when
demands for change originate with the public. Their results confirm
the idea that democracy diffuses through this normative mechanism
provided by IGOs, while autocracy does not.
This key result holds up, even when Torfason and Ingram control
for other diffusion mechanisms. They find evidence for spatial dif-
fusion, whose geographical reach seems to have expanded over time
as the world has become smaller. They find support for world polity
theory which maintains that exposure to international society, as
measured by the number of memberships in IGOs and International
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Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs), enhances democratization.
They also find that the example of rich countries influences poor coun-
tries and that the militarily powerful influence the weak. Controlling for
all these other mechanisms, diffusion of democracy through IGO net-
works turns out to be both statistically and substantively significant.
We can conclude with the authors that it is no overstatement to say
that the IGO network has been fundamental to global democratization.
Finally, media communication may contribute to democratization by
exposing the public of non-democratic societies to the reality in demo-
cratic countries, by providing their civil society with a forum for debate,
and by providing channels for mobilizing the general public. Therefore,
Teorell (2010: 67–70) has been interested in media effects as an aspect of
modernization in the third wave of democratization. It turns out that as
radios, televisions, and newspapers spread in the population, democracy
becomes more consolidated, so that anti-democratic coups are either
deferred or aborted. There is nomeasurable media effect, however, under
authoritarian conditions, that is, the media do not promote democrati-
zation. Therefore, he suggests (p. 6) that widespread access to media
outlets might be an aspect of modernization that defers backsliding from
these achieved levels rather than triggering movement toward more
democracy. These tentative results are seconded by Wejnert’s (2005)
study, which finds evidence for media becoming a factor sustaining
democratization in the post-war period (1950–1999). This was the time
when television and radio became the key means of political com-
munication. The media’s effect varies depending on the world region,
however. Thus, the media’s pro-democracy effect was particularly strong
in Africa, while the media had a significant negative effect on democ-
ratization in the Middle East, where authoritarian regimes censored
them and had them distribute anti-democratic information. In line
with Teorell’s interpretation, Wejnert (2005: 72) concludes that mod-
ern means of communication enhance democracy only if the country’s
domestic conditions allow for the promotion of democratic principles.
The preconditions for political communication
Let us, finally, turn to the domestic preconditions of political commu-
nication and to the question of how they are transformed in the age of
globalization. As a point of departure for the discussion of the first ques-
tion, we can take a quote fromManin (1987: 351f.), who points out that,
in democracy, ‘the source of legitimacy is not the predetermined will of
individuals, but rather the process of its formation, that is, deliberation
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itself. An individual’s liberty consists first of all in being able to arrive at
a decision by a process of research and comparison among various solu-
tions’. And, by implication: ‘A legitimate decision does not represent the
will of all, but is one that results from the deliberation of all. It is the
process by which everyone’s will is formed that confers its legitimacy
on the outcome, rather than the sum of already formed wills’ (p. 352).
This implies, as Habermas (1990: 38) added, that the processes of public
communication, that is, the procedures of democratic opinion and will
formation constitute the crucial precondition for democracy. In short,
democracy crucially depends on the quality of the process of political
communication.
As already discussed in the introduction, the communication between
citizens and their representatives has become essentially media-based,
which means that the process of political communication depends on
the media infrastructure. Accordingly, the media are expected to fulfill
some important functions for the democratic process. There are differ-
ent ways to characterize and summarize these functions. We shall follow
Beierwaltes (2000) who distinguishes between the two dimensions of
‘publicity’ and ‘discursiveness’. Publicity refers to the media’s coverage
of the relationship between elites and citizens, discursiveness to their
responsibility for allowing a free public exchange of arguments among
the citizens. Müller (2012) suggests the labels ‘vertical’ and ‘horizon-
tal’ media functions for these two dimensions. The vertical (publicity)
functions include the ‘forum function’, the ‘information function’, and
the ‘watchdog’ function. The media have to provide a forum for can-
didates and political parties to debate their demands and proposals
before a national audience. As discussed in more depth in chapters 3
and 7, the media are also expected ‘to serve as eyes and ears for cit-
izens’ (Graber 2003: 146), they have to inform the citizens about the
performance of their elected representatives so that they can be held
accountable. In turn, they are also expected to give voice to public opin-
ion, that is, to keep the elected representatives informed about public
opinion so that the elected representatives can be responsive to the
public’s demands. The watchdog function refers to investigative journal-
ism, which is expected to monitor misbehavior, corruption, and abuses
of power by government. As Müller (2012: 6) observes, this vertical
dimension of the media’s functions for democracy is heavily empha-
sized by the classical liberal model of the public sphere (Ferree et al.
2002: 206–210).
The horizontal dimension refers to themedia’s role as a marketplace of
ideas. Themedia are expected to provide a forum not only for candidates
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and parties, but also for interest groups, social movement organizations,
experts of all stripes, and individual citizens. This function is especially
valued by the participatory, deliberative, and constructionist models of
the public sphere (Ferree et al. 2002: 210–229), which put the accent on
popular inclusiveness and empowerment of the citizens, in addition to
the liberals’ concern with diversity, and pluralism of opinions.
The ability of the media to deliver on these functional requirements
varies considerably across societies and media systems, as a function of
regulatory policies and market forces (Iyengar and McGrady 2007: 19).
In the final analysis, it is these factors which constitute the conditions
determining how political communication works. As already pointed
out in the introduction, in Europe heavily regulated public broadcast-
ing systems that were mandated to observe non-partisan norms and
were expected to fulfill highest standards of quality went hand in hand
with a highly partisan press, characterized by ‘political parallelism’. This
situation changed as a result of two major trends that characterized
the development of European media systems: professionalization and
commercialization. As a result of these developments ‘media logic’ has
become differentiated from ‘political logic’ (see Chapter 7). As Hallin
and Mancini (2004a: 290) point out, it is important to recognize, how-
ever, that the emerging media logic is a ‘hybrid logic’, rooted in each
one of the two trends. Both professionalization and commercialization
lead to a greater differentiation between the political system and the
media system; but while the former implies the growth of autonomy,
critical professionalism, distinct professional norms, and public service
orientation, commercialization leads to a de-differentiation between the
media system and the economic system, which undermines the auton-
omy, blurs the boundaries between news and entertainment, as well as
those between advertising and news.
The situation of the media in Europe also changed as a result of the
multiplication of channels, that is, the decentralization of political com-
munication, which we also briefly sketched in the introduction. New
forums of public debate have been created, especially by the develop-
ment of the internet. Compared with traditional media, the internet
supplies information collected by a wider array of sources allowing for
the representation of more diverse viewpoints. It offers citizens more
information than ever available before. Moreover, many of the sites
permit and often invite two-way communication via the Web, SMS, or
email (Graber 2003: 152). Brants and Voltmer (2011: 9) argue that ‘with
its openness, interactive structure and flexibility, the Internet has fun-
damentally changed the position of the public from simply being at the
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consuming end of political communication to active, creative and vocal
citizenship.’
Reviewing the extent to which the US media system fulfills its func-
tions for democracy, Graber (2003: 156) comes to the conclusion that
‘democracy manages to function, albeit imperfectly, despite a media sys-
tem that gives it too little support much of the time’. In addition, we
would like to suggest that the way the media logic is affecting the devel-
opment of democracy depends a lot on the way politics and the citizens
react to the changing circumstances of political communication. Again,
politicians are capable of adapting to these changing circumstances, and
citizens are likely to use the new technological opportunities in as yet
unexpected ways.
Turning to the aspect of the transformation of the conditions of polit-
ical communication in the age of globalization, we can distinguish
between the supranational, the cross-national, and the domestic level
of communication. With respect to the relationship of these three lev-
els of communication, we can get some first cues from the discussion
about the Europeanization of the public sphere. As already observed, a
European communication system has not yet emerged. But, as the Swiss
example we discussed earlier tends to suggests, this may not be neces-
sary for democracy to work at the supranational, European level. Just
as it did in the Swiss case, the political process may again endogenously
produce the requisites for political communication, and, by implication,
for democratization.
To see how this may come about, Koopmans and Statham’s (2010:
38) distinction between vertical and horizontal Europeanization, which
they distinguish from the emergence of a supranational European pub-
lic sphere, proves to be useful. An example of vertical Europeanization
is Gerhard’s (1993, 2000) view of the Europeanization of the various
national public spheres – a view which assumes that nationally based
mass media are here to stay, but that their content may become less
focused on the nation-state context and may increasingly include a
European perspective. That is, the national media may increasingly
cover European themes and actors, and evaluate them from a perspec-
tive that extends beyond a particular country and its interests. Gerhard’s
view presupposes a form of Europeanization of policies and politics
along lines similar to the process of nationalization in the traditional
nation-states. This position has been criticized by Eder et al. (2000) as
too restrictive. In their view, which illustrates the horizontal version of
the concept, the Europeanization of public spheres may instead lead to a
parallelization of national public spheres, in the sense that increasingly
10.1057/9781137299871 - Democracy in the Age of Globalization and Mediatization, Hanspeter Kriesi, Daniel Bochsler, Jörg Matthes,
Sandra Lavenex, Marc Bühlmann and Frank Esser
Co
py
rig
ht
 m
at
er
ia
l f
ro
m
 w
w
w
.
pa
lg
ra
v
ec
o
n
n
ec
t.c
om
 - 
lic
en
se
d 
to
 U
ZH
 H
au
pt
bi
bl
io
th
ek
 / 
Ze
nt
ra
lb
ib
lio
th
ek
 Z
ür
ic
h 
- P
al
gr
av
eC
on
ne
ct
 - 
20
13
-0
3-
29
Hanspeter Kriesi 41
the same themes are discussed at the same time under similar criteria
of relevance. This type of Europeanization does not consist of direct ref-
erences to European actors and themes, but of increased attention to
public debates and mobilization in other member-states.
Empirically, Koopmans et al. (2010) found, for the seven countries
they studied during the period 1990–2002, that, in the fields where
the EU has gained strong supranational competencies (monetary policy,
agriculture, and European integration), actors from the European level
were highly visible participants in the public debate. Moreover, levels of
Europeanization have increased over time. However, these increases per-
tained exclusively to vertical Europeanization. By contrast, horizontal
forms of Europeanization declined. Arguably, this is a shift from weaker
toward stronger forms of Europeanization. Overall, these results suggest
that the Europeanization of the public sphere is, indeed, taking place –
as a reaction to the transfer of decision-making competencies to the
European level, and, we would add, as a function of the politicization of
the decision-making processes at the European level.
The relationship between the three levels of communication is also
illustrated by the experience of the Arab Spring in 2011. One of the
explanations of how the long-standing grievances of the Arab public
were translated into collective action in early 2011 emphasizes the role
of the media (Dalacoura 2012: 68). On the one hand, cross-national
political communication (such as the influence of Al Jazeera) may have
undermined the control of domestic media by authoritarian regimes.
The Qatari-based satellite channel Al Jazeera continued to air reports on
Egypt and Tunisia despite the regimes’ pleas to the Qatari government
to stop it. On the other hand, social media such as Facebook and Twitter,
and of course mobile phones, were widely used to organize the revolts
and link the protesters to each other and the outside world. Perhaps
even more crucially, as suggested by Dalacoura, media played a role in
preparing for the rebellions over a number of years and even decades,
by facilitating the circulation of ideas in national and global spaces and
challenging state monopolies of information.
The precise role of the new media in these revolts has not been clari-
fied yet. As is observed by Dalacoura (2012: 69) and Anderson (2011),
the hype which has surrounded the use of social media in the Arab
Spring obscures the fact that enormous popular mobilizations in the
past were achieved using much more basic methods of communication
and organization. It also overlooks the fact that social media are used
by conservative as much as by progressive and revolutionary forces,
and that governments used them for their own purposes or simply shut
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them down. For instance, in the weeks leading up to the fall of Mubarak
internet access was often blocked in Egypt.
The Chinese example documents the capacity of politicians to adapt
to the possibilities of the new media. As MacKinnon (2011) points out
on the basis of the Chinese example, authoritarian regimes rapidly learn
how to deal with these new media and pour unprecedented resources
into building their capacity to influence and shape digital communi-
cations networks in direct and indirect ways. The internet may even
enhance the life of authoritarian regimes, by providing them with
deliberative venues to bolster regime legitimacy (He and Warren 2011).
MacKinnon (2011: 44) suggests that without some baseline conditions
of rule of law, transparency, and accountability opposition, dissent,
and reform movements will face an increasingly uphill battle against
progressively more innovative forms of censorship and surveillance.
In other words, we may conclude that there is no easy technological fix
to overcome the obstacles to democracy, but that, once again, politics
decisively shapes the preconditions of democracy.
Conclusion
Multiple paths to democracy exist and there do not seem to be any hard
and fast necessary conditions for democracy, except for the existence
of a minimal demos and a minimal polity. One could argue that these
minimal conditions are met even at the global level, that is, that democ-
racy is a possibility even at the supranational level. As we have argued
in the introduction, the key problem in an emerging multi-level gover-
nance structure is rather that the political communities and the polities,
that is, the demoi and the stateness, no longer tend to be congruent:
the group of people who are affected by political decisions (decision-
takers) no longer corresponds to the decision-makers or the people to
whom the decision-makers are accountable (see also Hurrelmann and
Debardeleben 2009). Attempts to democratize multi-level governance
structures such as the EU should in particular pay attention to this prob-
lem. In the context of globalization, as Saward (2003: 97) has argued,
we need to ask with a new urgency: ‘what is the appropriate group
or community or unit to whom democratic rules apply?’ The chal-
lenges involved in uploading democracy to the supranational level are
discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.
As regards the horizontal spread of democracy toward authoritar-
ian regimes, Teorell’s (2010: 146) full model provides explanations
for the variation in the long-term democratization during the third
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wave. Teorell concludes that, on average, the actual level of democracy
comes fairly close to the long-term equilibrium level determined by the
(mostly) structural explanatory variables. What appears unpredictable
and erratic in the short term, turns out to be stable and predictable in the
long term. By contrast, in reviewing the six ‘structuralist’ arguments, we
have repeatedly argued that the cultural, economic, international, and
communication-related preconditions are not given once and for all, but
that they are evolving in interaction with politics. Instead of putting the
accent on the long-term ‘structuralist’ view, we propose to view democ-
racy as an ongoing process of democratization and de-democratization.
Moreover, we propose that the process of democratization creates, in
part at least, its own prerequisites. Finally, we should not forget that de-
democratization is also a possibility, the seeds of which may be found in
the democratic process, too. In the next chapter, we shall set out a model
that specifies the details of our process-oriented approach to democracy,
which we build following the examples of Dahl (2000) and Tilly (2007).
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Models for Democracy
Marc Bühlmann and Hanspeter Kriesi
Democracy can be conceptualized in different ways. Tilly (2007: 7)
distinguishes between no less than four ways to define democracy: con-
stitutional, substantive, procedural, and process-oriented. These four
ways to approach our subject essentially boil down to two, how-
ever: process-oriented (procedural, constitutional) vs. substantive. In his
Gettysburg address, Lincoln famously spoke of ‘government of the
people, by the people, for the people’.1 His short phrase encapsulates
the essence of the different theoretical perspectives of the democratic
process. ‘Government of the people’ and ‘government by the peo-
ple’ refer to process, ‘government for the people’ refers to substance.
Scharpf (1970, 1999a: 6–20) makes the same point by distinguish-
ing between input- and output-oriented democratic thought. From the
input-oriented perspective, political decisions are legitimate because
they reflect the ‘will of the people’. From the output-oriented perspec-
tive, they are legitimate because they effectively promote the common
welfare of the people.
We adopt a process-oriented approach here. Very broadly, we follow in
the footsteps of Robert Dahl (2000: 37–38), who, in a classic statement,
identifies five criteria for a democratic process:
• effective participation;
• voting equality;
• enlightened understanding;
• exercising final control over the agenda; and
• inclusion of all adults.
Democracy provides opportunities for these five criteria, which are
clearly process-oriented, even if they do not specify any rules for
how they might be implemented in any given democracy. Applied to
44
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‘large-scale democracy’, Dahl (2000: 85) suggests that they are imple-
mented in six distinctive institutions: elected officials; free, fair, and
frequent elections; freedom of expression; alternative sources of infor-
mation; associational autonomy; and inclusive citizenship. We provide
a more detailed view of the democratic process in order to be able to
situate its different elements.
Dahl’s (1989: Chapters 12 and 13) discussion of the possibility that
a democratic process may fail to achieve desirable results, that is, that
it may be difficult to find the proper balance between procedural and
substantive values, leads him to reject the contrast between substance
and process (p. 175): ‘For integral to the democratic process are substan-
tive rights, goods, and interests that are often mistakenly thought to be
threatened by it’. Included in the democratic process in particular is the
right to self-government by means of the democratic process, which is
not ‘merely process’, but also an important kind of distributive justice.
It is not ‘merely process’, because it helps to determine the distribution
of the crucial resources of power and authority and thereby influences
the distribution of all other crucial resources as well.
We do not contest that the democratic procedures themselves have
a normative content. On the contrary, we share the idea that demo-
cratic procedures cannot be reduced to purely formal legality, as Carl
Schmitt (cited by Poggi 1978: 107) has maintained. However, we would
keep the distinction between procedure and substance. The (substan-
tive) outcome of democratic procedures is open and may violate some
other norms, such as liberal principles defending the rights of minori-
ties, or social principles defending the claims of some discriminated
groups. Having rejected the contrast between procedure and substance,
Dahl admits that the democratic process may impair important substan-
tive rights or other requirements of justice. In particular, he admits that
it may come into conflict with the liberal principle of the protection of
minority rights. Dahl has no definitive solution for such conflicts, and
there probably isn’t one. He proposes to rely on constitutional engineer-
ing, hopes for the evolution of public opinion, and considers, but is not
convinced by a kind of ‘quasi-guardianship’, that is, the possible protec-
tion by officials (above all judges) who are not subject to the democratic
process.
Our process-oriented model focuses on representative democracy, the
classic form of democracy under contemporary conditions of large poli-
ties. This model can be regarded as a model for the ‘government of the
people’. Examples of the representative model are liberal democracy,
protective democracy, competitive elitism, pluralism, or legal democracy
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(Held 2006; Schmidt 2010). We provide a heuristic framework for the
discussion of these models. More ambitious models rely on an expan-
sive conception of democracy and aim at ‘government by the people’.
Examples of these more ambitious models are participatory, delibera-
tive, constructivist, or feminist versions of democracy. After presenting
our core model, we shall briefly extend it by discussing three additional
channels of representation that are related to these more demanding
models. The third element of Lincoln’s dictum – ‘government for the
people’ – certainly shares the idealism of these more ambitious models
(Cohen and Fung 2004; Fuchs 2007; Fung 2006; Sen 1980, 1997). The
substantive orientation is most important in models of social democ-
racy (Meyer 2005) and social citizenship (Marshall 1974). However, one
could argue that any model of democracy, even an explicitly process-
oriented one, is designed to implement the idealistic goal of good
governance, that is, to improve the citizens’ common welfare.
Under contemporary conditions, democracy essentially means repre-
sentative government. The second transformation of democracy, which
extended democratic forms of government from the city state to the
nation-state, introduced the principle of representation and the des-
ignation of the representatives by elections. Elections of the political
decision-makers at regular intervals constitute the key institution of
representative democracy today (Manin 1995: 18; Powell 2000: 3). Elec-
tions establish a double link between the political input (the citizens’
preferences) and the political output (public policies adopted by the
elected representatives) by allowing for a combination of responsiveness
and accountability (Figure 3.1). The ‘chain of responsiveness’ links the
citizens’ preferences to the results of policy making. Democratic respon-
siveness occurs when the democratic process induces the government to
form and implement policies that citizens want (Powell 2004a: 91). The
chain of accountability, in turn, links public policies to the citizens’ pref-
erences. It refers to the obligation of incumbent governments to assume
responsibility for their acts and to enable voters to respond with sanc-
tions, if the political output does not correspond to their preferences.
Accountability combines an obligation of information and justification
Responsiveness
Accountability
Input: 
political 
preferences
Output: 
public 
policies
Figure 3.1 A simple model of representative democracy
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on the part of the representatives (they have to explain and justify their
decisions to their voters) with the possibility of control on the part of
the voters (they can sanction their representatives, if they do not deliver)
(Papadopoulos 2007: 470). Accountability and responsiveness are widely
and broadly used concepts in democratic theory. We shall conceptual-
ize them in some detail and combine their different components in our
model of representative democracy. The combination of responsiveness
and accountability as we present it closely resembles the combination of
a chain of delegation (from voters to elected officials, to governments,
to the head of government and to public officials) with a corresponding
chain of accountability (Strom 2000: 267). All democracies entail a com-
bination of these two chains, but different constitutions imply different
articulations of the links in the two chains.
Responsiveness
Democratic responsiveness requires that the outcomes a government
produces reflect the policy preferences of the citizens. Following Powell
(2004a), we can distinguish four different links in the chain of respon-
siveness (see also Fuchs 1993): the formation, mobilization, aggregation,
and implementation of preferences. These links are institutionalized in
the most central process in representative democracy: elections. How-
ever, it is important to note that responsiveness must also be guaranteed
by ongoing processes between elections. In the following, we take a closer
look at the different stages in order to identify the key requirements for
ongoing responsiveness.
The first, most fundamental link concerns the formation of prefer-
ences. Doing what the citizens want presupposes knowing what they
want. Contrary to minimalist realist economic models of democracy,
we assume that preferences are not exogenously given but that they
are, in part at least, the result of endogenous processes. Responsive-
ness crucially depends on the quality of this process, which, in turn,
is influenced by the institutional arrangements of the representation
process and by the citizens’ own characteristics. ‘Democracies require
democratic citizens’ (Galston 2001: 217), and one of Dahl’s (1989: 307)
five criteria mentioned earlier requires democratic citizens to have an
‘enlightened understanding’. This means that democratic citizens must
be capable of discovering and validating (within the time permitted by
the need for a decision) the choice on the matter to be decided that
would best serve their interest. Dahl adds that ‘a person’s good or inter-
est is whatever that person would choose with the fullest attainable
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understanding of the experience resulting from that choice and its
most relevant alternatives.’ Enlightened understanding presupposes the
motivation to take part in, as well as a sufficient understanding of, pol-
itics. To adequately formulate their wants and desires, citizens must be
interested, informed, and capable of understanding and evaluating the
available political options. The citizens’ preference formation is influ-
enced by a number of additional factors of crucial importance, such as
access to substantive and uncensored information about political affairs
as well as opportunities for deliberation. The availability of diverse infor-
mation sources and the existence of multiple competitors are equally
decisive for this first link in the chain of responsiveness. A media system
that fulfills its required functions (see Chapter 2) provides a favorable
context for the process of preference formation.
The second link in the chain of responsiveness refers to the mobi-
lization of preferences. At this stage, political organizations – political
parties, interest associations, and social movement organizations – play
a key role. They provide the political structuring of the individual pref-
erences by supplying a limited number of options for the citizens to
choose from, and by mobilizing them during election campaigns and
between elections. It is not the sheer number of parties and interest
groups that counts here. Rather, the offer must be manageable and it
must consist of competing alternatives. New organizations must be able
to enter the fray to cater to newly arising preferences. But, as is empha-
sized by Bartolini (1999, 2000), there is a trade-off between, on the one
hand, the possible entry of new political organizations (contestability),
and, on the other hand, the structuration of the citizens’ preferences
(the distinctiveness of the political offer), which is, foremost, guaran-
teed by the stability of the organizational supply. Bartolini deconstructs
political competition into different dimensions and suggests that a good
balance between contestability (open access to the electoral contest) and
decidability (availability of distinctive political offers) is a requirement
for responsiveness at this stage.
The third link – the aggregation of preferences – focuses on elec-
tions and the subsequent government formation. This is the stage of
the selection of policy-makers who are ‘committed to doing what the
citizens want’ (Powell 2004a: 94). Political programs are translated into
the formation of political offices. How preferences are aggregated and
translated into parliamentary and governmental seats crucially depends
on electoral mechanics, that is, on the electoral system. Proportional sys-
tems aim at ensuring responsiveness via the inclusion of all important
preferences, weighted according to the size of the parties representing
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these preferences. Majoritarian systems accept vote-seat distortions in
the name of clarity of responsibility and clear government mandates
(Powell 2000). As we shall reiterate below, there is a clear trade-off
between representation and accountability, which is resolved differently
by the two major options for electoral systems, and the related type of
government (i.e. single party government vs. coalition).
At the aggregation stage, responsiveness heavily relies on political
competition as well. It is at this stage that the other two dimensions
of competition discussed by Bartolini (1999, 2000) – availability and
vulnerability – come into play. The translation of political preferences
into seats can only reflect the preferences of the citizens if incumbents
are vulnerable and not protected by gerrymandering, the asymmet-
rical allocation of campaign funds, or traditional loyalty of voters,
and if the voters are to some extent available, that is, open to the
different options offered by the parties. If, due to traditional partisan-
ship, there is no chance for new competitors to attract voters with
new programs, the preferences that they represent cannot be trans-
lated into seats. Competitiveness in the four senses of the term is not
only a question of party competition, but also of a viable civil soci-
ety more generally: a civil society consisting of multiple private and
public interest associations articulating a large spectrum of different
interests and points of view, as well as of a myriad of informal, hetero-
geneously composed groups discussing the arguments proposed by the
political elites.
Lijphart (1997) reminds us of the importance of participation for
responsiveness. Inclusion is crucial, too: if suffrage rights are limited and
large parts of the adult residents in a given system are excluded from
the vote, responsiveness cannot be high. Equal participation guarantees
that votes mirror the preferences of the whole population. If citizens
are not mobilized by the political campaigns, and do not translate their
preferences into votes, the very idea of responsiveness is compromised:
unequal participation leads to unequal representation and to policies
that cannot reflect the wants of all the citizens. Note that responsiveness
is less affected by abstention when participation is unbiased. Assuming
that voters are similar to non-voters with respect to important character-
istics such as gender, social class, income, or education, the bias in the
representation of different wants should not be strong. However, com-
parative research on participation shows that this is normally not the
case (Teorell et al. 2007a). Thus, responsiveness at all three stages (for-
mation, mobilization, and aggregation of preferences) depends heavily
on the equality of participation.
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The final link in the chain of responsiveness concerns the implemen-
tation of public policies. An adequate translation of preferences into
seats is only one necessary condition for responsiveness. ‘Doing what
the citizens want’ must eventually be reflected in the decisions adopted
by the political representatives, that is, substantive representation is
most important for the idea of responsiveness. ‘Democratic represen-
tation means that the actions of these policy makers are supposed to be
responsive to the wishes of the people’ (Powell 2004b: 273) and respon-
siveness is high when the citizens’ policy preferences correspond to the
roll-call behavior of the representatives (Miller and Stokes 1963).
It is the regular repetition of elections which constitutes the crucial
mechanism that allows voters to influence the decisions of those who
govern, that is, to incite their representatives to be responsive (Manin
1995). Based on this repetitive mechanism, the elected representatives
are forced to take into account the retrospective (and, we should add,
the prospective) judgment of the voters about the policies they have
adopted. Repetition creates anticipatory pressure on elected represen-
tatives to take into consideration the preferences of the voters, which
allows the voters to have an influence on their representatives on a
daily basis. As Dick Morris (1999), a former political advisor of Presi-
dent Clinton, has observed, every day is election day in the US today.
In other words, voters do not make their choice of representatives
between competing elites only once every so many years and then let
their representatives govern, as suggested by Schumpeter’s (1962 [1942])
‘realistic’ theory of democracy, but they influence their representatives
between elections, too. This means that, in representative democracy,
the elected officials have a strong incentive to adapt their decisions to
the opinion of the mass public between the elections. This idea corre-
sponds to the model of ‘dynamic representation’ of Stimson, MacKuen
and Erikson (Erikson et al. 2002; Stimson et al. 1995). According to
this model, the citizens have a direct and an indirect effect on policy
decisions: on the one hand, their opinion influences policy decisions
indirectly, by determining the election outcome, which, in turn, leads to
modifications in the policy decisions; on the other hand, public opin-
ion influences the policy decisions of the political authorities directly via
their rational anticipations during a legislative period.
The ‘dynamic model of representation’ is, however, still unrealistic to
the extent that it considers public opinion as an exogenous factor, which
implies, of course, a highly restricted view of what political representa-
tion in a democracy is all about. In fact, in democratic systems, the key
issue for political actors is precisely to shape public opinion on specific
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issues. Public opinion is the product of the debate in the public sphere –
a communication system involving a wide range of political actors. The
public debate, its inclusiveness, and its deliberative quality are essen-
tial for the quality of a democratic decision. This is Schattschneider’s
(1975 [1960]) view of democratic politics, for whom the expansion of
conflict constitutes the essence of democracy. For Schattschneider, con-
flict is contagious and the larger the attentive public for a given conflict,
the more democratic is the struggle in question. Accordingly, the most
important political strategy is concerned with the expansion of the
scope of conflict, that is, the number of people involved in the conflict.
For Schattschneider, it is the scope of conflict which essentially deter-
mines its outcome and, at the core of each political conflict, there is
the struggle for its privatization or socialization. The privileged attempt
to privatize the conflict, that is, take it out of the public’s view, while
the disadvantaged attempt to socialize it, that is, to expand the atten-
tive public: ‘Democratic government is the greatest single instrument
for the socialization of conflict in the American community’ (p. 12).
Schattschneider’s view of democratic politics corresponds to that
of the agenda-setting approach (see Burstein 1998, 1999, 2002;
Baum- gartner and Jones 2002; Jones 1994). This approach distinguishes
itself from traditional approaches to democratic representation by the
fact that it focuses on the information processing of citizens and
decision-making authorities and on the struggle for attention among
the actors in the political elite. The participants in the public debate
not only include government actors, but policy-makers of all types may
opt for ‘going public’ too. Any collective or individual political actor
may participate in this struggle – policy-makers as well as challengers
from outside of the political system (see below). This extended view
of representation implies that the political supply by the elite is cru-
cial for the democratic process. Accordingly, the vote basically appears
as a reaction of the citizens with regard to the terms proposed by the
elite. As Manin (1995: 290) observes, in politics, there is no demand
which is independent of the supply, which, among other things, means
that the metaphor of the market is rather inappropriate for the polit-
ical process and obscures the fundamental character of the political
sphere.
The dependence of the democratic process on the elite’s supply does
not mean that the elite, that is, the representatives or the political
decision-makers, are no longer responsive. However, decision-makers
are only responsive under quite demanding conditions (Kriesi 2011):
to guarantee responsiveness of decision-makers requires the fulfillment
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of at least three conditions. Competition is the first, as we have already
argued. In the words of Bartolini (1999: 450): ‘Elections make politicians
accountable on a regular basis, but only competitive interactions make
them responsive’. Second, a responsive elite requires an attentive public.
Such a public implies less than full participation from all the citizens;
nor need all the citizens be fully informed, or fully involved in poli-
tics. It suffices that they monitor the political process (Schudson 1998),
and keep the scores (Stimson 2004): monitoring or scorekeeping citizens
scan (rather than read) the informational environment so that they may
be alerted if something goes wrong, and they often use heuristic short-
cuts (rather than elaborate arguments) to make up their political minds.
Third, responsiveness on the part of the political elites is enhanced by
the independence, resourcefulness, and plurality of the news media,
because this constitutes a crucial precondition for the presence of an
attentive public. The combination of these three requirements defines
the liberal representative model of the public sphere. This model is
distinct from more radical normative models (participatory, discursive,
and constructionist models), which set more demanding standards with
respect to the citizens’ involvement in the public debate, and place a
high value on their ‘empowerment’ (Ferree et al. 2002: 205–231). The
three conditions, in other words, define a minimal set of conditions that
have to be fulfilled for the public debate to attain the quality required
for elite responsiveness.
Finally, we should not forget that responsiveness finds its limits in
exogenous, uncontrollable events and conditions, which also influence
the actions of policy-makers. They are often constrained in their deci-
sions by circumstances they cannot control. Economic developments
(e.g. on the bond market) or supranational regulations can narrow the
alternatives for different policies. It is one of the key tenets of our
approach to democracy that the maneuvering space of the national
political decision-makers is increasingly constrained by the multi-level
governance structures. However, ‘distinguishing between truly uncon-
trollable conditions and those that national policy makers can alter’ is
not an easy task (Powell 2004a: 96).
In a nutshell: responsiveness is measured by the substance of rep-
resentation, that is, by the degree of correspondence between the
representatives’ decisions and the citizens’ preferences. For substan-
tive representation to work, the electoral system has to be inclusive
and participation high or at least unbiased. Furthermore, the degree
of competition should be high and parties must be able to structure
political conflicts and issues into comprehensible programs. Finally, an
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attentive public and independent media system should monitor the
policy-makers and induce them to keep their electoral promises, imple-
ment their programs and adapt their policies to the changing public
opinion between elections.
Accountability
While our idea of responsiveness links input to output, that is, high-
lights the preconditions for the adequate translation of citizen pref-
erences into policy outcomes, accountability links output to input.
We adopt a narrow concept of accountability and understand it as the
relationship between an actor (such as the government as an account-
holder) and a public (a ‘forum’, such as the citizens as accountees) in
which the former has an obligation to inform the latter and to explain
and justify his decisions. The public has the right to pose questions
on these decisions and to scrutinize explanations and justifications.
Based on the accounts given, the accountees can either accept the deci-
sions (and their consequences) or sanction the decision-makers. When
it comes to sanctions, the account-holders have the obligation to submit
to these sanctions (Bovens 2007; Schmitter 2004).
We can again distinguish three links in this chain. The first link refers
to the obligation of the policy-makers to inform the citizens about their
decisions and to explain and justify their policies. In the next link the
citizen public evaluates whether the actions, political decisions, and
justifications of the policy-makers meet its expectations. In the third
step this evaluation leads to a positive or negative judgment, possi-
bly followed by sanctions. If they are effective, these sanctions must
have consequences, that is, the sanctioned account-holders must be
induced to accept the sanctions and to face their consequences. In the
following, we take a closer look at each one of these three links and
discuss the requirements that facilitate and ensure accountability at
each stage.
The first link is best described by the notion of answerability: accord-
ing to Schedler (1999), being accountable means the obligation of
decision-makers to answer questions regarding their decisions and/or
actions. This obligation can be formal (induced by different checks and
balances) or informal (imposed by the public) and has two aspects:
information and justification. Answerability implies that the policy-
makers inform the public about their actions and decisions, that is,
answerability implies transparency. Evaluating and sanctioning (the fol-
lowing two stages of the accountability chain) are not possible in the
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absence of access to transparent and comprehensible information. But
answerability goes beyond the simple provision of facts and figures.
It also demands explanations and justifications of actions and decisions,
that is, a dialogue between account-holders and accountees. Ideally,
democracy is characterized by ongoing debates between representa-
tives and represented. This is the idea of interactive or communicative
representation (Mansbridge 2009).
Mansbridge (2009) reminds us that transparency also has its costs.
Among other things, democratic decision making depends on negoti-
ations behind closed doors. Negotiators must be able to act creatively
and think about and say things that they would not think or say in
public. ‘We should not favor extreme transparency in process (for exam-
ple making all committee meetings public), but instead transparency in
rationale – in procedures, information, reasons, and the facts on which
the reasons are based’ (Mansbridge, 2009: 18). Transparency should
above all be claimed for the justification of decisions.
The second link in the chain of accountability consists of the eval-
uation of the decisions and acts of the policy-makers by the citizens.
Representative democracy is a regime, where the decisions of those who
govern are submitted to the public’s judgment. Manin (1995) main-
tains that the concept of ‘public judgment’ best describes the role of
the people and its representatives in such a system of government. This
judgment may be positive or negative. The object of this judgment
can be a specific policy, the (mis)conduct of a single policy-maker, or
the performance of the whole government during a given legislation.
Accountees assess whether the policy-makers have met the expected
standards. At this stage, they must have opportunities to question the
quality of the given information and to test the honesty of the acts,
conduct, and justifications of the account-holders.
There are different types of accountees: we may distinguish between
the public at large, on the one hand, and institutionalized agencies that
are mandated with the control of the policy-makers, on the other hand.
This distinction corresponds to the one between vertical and horizontal
accountability (O’Donnell 1994). Vertical accountability lies at the heart
of our model of representative democracy. In democracies, the evalua-
tion of decisions and acts of account-holders must be the principal duty
of the citizens themselves. Citizens not only have the right, but also
the obligation to evaluate their representatives and to sanction them
when expectations are not met. As we have already pointed out, this
kind of accountability is an ongoing, day-by-day process; because of the
repetitive nature of elections the representatives are induced to heed the
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citizens’ demands on a daily basis. Vertical accountability is essentially
public accountability. The public includes the monitoring individual
citizens, but also social movement organizations, interest groups, and
the media. Schmitter (2004: 54) stresses the importance of the citi-
zens’ active involvement: ‘the more citizens participate actively [ . . . ]
the more attention they will pay to the subsequent process’. Thus,
mechanisms that facilitate awareness and encourage civic and polit-
ical engagement as well as a free press help to strengthen vertical
accountability.
While vertical accountability highlights the bottom-up evaluation
of acts and conduct, horizontal accountability refers to the agencies
with formal competencies to control the account-holders’ behavior
and to effectively sanction misconduct if necessary. ‘Checks and bal-
ances’ are an important characteristic of a democracy as a whole and
of accountability in particular: ‘Political accountability must be institu-
tionalized if it is to work effectively’ (Schmitter 2004: 48). A comparison
of existing democracies reveals varying forms of institutionalized hor-
izontal accountability. The distinction here is mainly one between
presidential and parliamentary systems: presidential constitutions tend
to feature institutions that facilitate active legislative and juridical over-
sight, while parliamentary systems do not have monitoring capacity
necessary to determine when sanctions are appropriate (Strom 2000:
274). By contrast, parliamentary systems heavily rely on ex ante control
mechanisms, especially prior screening of representatives, as compared
to ex post accountability. As Strom (2000: 282–284) argues, the prob-
lem with this reliance on screening is that the screening devices (reliant
on ascriptive information and prior experience) are generally in decline
today: voting along ascriptive lines (such as class voting) is declining,
while the increasing volatility of the political agenda is making reliance
on past experience problematic.
At the stage of evaluation, other issues concern the target of evalu-
ation and whether an evaluation of representatives is possible at all.
The principal target of the evaluation by voters is the performance
of the government in a given legislative period. Voters retrospectively
assess the past performance of the decision-makers. If this performance
is perceived as satisfactory, voters re-elect the incumbents. If not, they
throw the rascals out. Or as Manin et al. put it (1999: 40): ‘Govern-
ments are “accountable” if voters can discern whether governments are
acting in their interest and sanction them appropriately, so that those
incumbents who act in the best interest of citizens win reelection and
those who do not lose them.’ Accountability to the voters, however,
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56 Models for Democracy
presupposes the possibility that responsibility can be clearly attributed
by the voters. When it is not possible to relate a given decision to a spe-
cific decision-maker then how should voters be able to decide whom to
re-elect and whom to sort out? As Lord and Pollak (2010: 973) point out,
it is worth emphasizing the indeterminacies of ‘account-giving’. In the
complex contemporary governance structures (see below), the attribu-
tion of responsibility is often difficult. Such circumstances are propitious
to credit-claiming and blame shifting, and ‘to continuous attempts to
renegotiate the terms of account-giving itself: to shift its standards and
understandings of cause-effect relationships in ways which will make
some behaviours more praiseworthy, others more reprehensible’ (Lord
and Pollak 2010: 973).
The possibility of attributing responsibility also depends very much
on the institutional make-up of a democracy: as is well known,
majoritarian systems (including presidential systems, see Shugart and
Mainwaring 1997: 33f.) allow for a much clearer attribution of responsi-
bility than proportional systems (Powell 2000), with measurable conse-
quences for the way policy-makers operate: Tavits (2007) shows that in
systems where responsibility can be clearly attributed, politicians have
incentives to pursue good policies and reduce corruption. Powell (2000)
is, however, also very clear about the trade-offs involved here: while
majoritarian systems are better able than proportional systems to clarify
the representatives’ responsibility, they are less inclusive than propor-
tional systems, override the interests of minority groups, and, in the
final analysis, turn out to be less responsive to the median voter. There is
an irreducible trade-off between representation and accountability (see
also Lord and Pollak 2010).
The outcome of the evaluation is a judgment that is followed by sanc-
tions and consequences. Depending on the quality and the object of
the judgment, we can thus distinguish different situations with dif-
ferent possibilities of sanctions and consequences. If the judgment is
positive, no sanctions will follow. Positive evaluations strengthen sup-
port for and confidence in the respective policy-makers, which, in turn,
fosters legitimacy and finally responsiveness. The positive evaluation of
the government’s performance at election day (the second situation)
translates into re-election of the respective government. Arguably more
important for accountability are the sanctions and consequences that
follow the negative judgments.
Individual actors may be negatively evaluated and sanctioned for their
legal or moral misconduct. Although elections are the key mechanism
of accountability, ‘representation, and the electoral process themselves
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depend on accountability to the courts and independent administrative
bodies such as Ombudsmen, especially for protections against the grave
misconduct of representatives’ (Lord and Pollak 2010: 973). However,
moral misconduct is usually not illegal, and is above all sanctioned
by public disapproval. Consequences can be informal such as loss of
reputation or the forced retirement from a political career. Negative eval-
uations may also refer to specific decisions. When a given decision does
not meet the expectation of particular interest groups or stakeholders,
these groups can put pressure on the policy-makers who may depend
on the support of the respective groups. In this case, the sanction may
consist of a withdrawal of resources (e.g. in terms of support at the polls
or in terms of financial support).
The most important sanction in representative systems is electoral
punishment. Negatively evaluated incumbents may be sanctioned and
thrown out of office. However, a negative judgment of the government’s
performance only leads to such consequences if there is competition in
terms of contestability, decidability, availability, and vulnerability.
The threat with sanctions is a constitutive element of accountabil-
ity (Mulgan 2003; Strom 2000). Sanctions function like the sword of
Damocles: because policy-makers know that undesired decisions and
illegitimate conduct can lead to sanctions, they act according to the
expectations of the accountees. They ‘anticipate the negative evalua-
tions of forums and adjust their policies accordingly’ (Bovens 2007:
453). Of course, such forums must again be part of a lively civil soci-
ety. This is the point we already made above when we referred to
the anticipatory pressure exerted on representatives by the repetitive
nature of elections. The more (formal or informal) opportunities for
sanctions exist and the more serious the effective consequences of
these sanctions are, the better for accountability and for responsive-
ness, because of the prevention and anticipation function of these
sanctions.
Figure 3.2 summarizes our expanded model of representative democ-
racy. This model breaks down the two key processes of responsiveness
and accountability into a chain of three sub-processes each, and links
these two chains to nine generic processes which make representa-
tion work: (equal) participation, political communication in the public
sphere, competition, transformation of votes into seats (regulated by
the electoral system), coalition formation, the provision of transparent
information, attribution of responsibility, institutionalized reciprocal
controlling (checks and balances), and the creation of implementation
capacity.
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Figure 3.2 A model of representative democracy
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Stages:
Formation of preferences: Process of opinion formation preceding chain of responsiveness, determined partly by chain of
accountability, partly by exogenous factors.
Mobilization of preferences: Collection, activation, and mobilization of preferences.
Aggregation of preferences: Within this stage we distinguish aggregation by means of elections (votes into seats) and coalition formation.
Implementation of preferences: The aggregated preferences are translated into political decisions; this stage corresponds to the policy-making
process.
Policy output/policy outcome: The policy output reflects the political decisions. The policy outcome consists of the intended as well as the
unintended impacts of the political decisions (influenced by (non-)controllable exogenous constraints).
Information, justification: Answerability; information about political decisions and acts.
Evaluation: Account-holders evaluate the given explanations and justifications of political decisions and acts.
Judgment, sanctions, consequences: Depending on the evaluation, a judgment is made that can be followed by consequences and sanctions.
Links between stages:
1 The preferences are collected and mobilized by different actors in a competitive pluralist system.
2 The mobilized preferences are reproduced in public offices (parliament/government).
3 The policy-making process, which involves not only elected authorities, but all kinds of interest groups,
public officials, and experts, implements the aggregated preferences.
4 Political decisions constitute the policy output of a government. The outcome of these decisions can be
intended as well as unintended.
5 The political elite provides information about the political decisions, policy output and outcomes, and
attempts to justify them.
6 The information and justification provided are evaluated by control agencies (public sphere, institutions).
7 Evaluations lead to positive or negative judgments.
8 The judgments influence the preference formation, which can then lead to sanctions (electoral or otherwise).
Requirements:
Equal participation: Participation must be as widespread as possible and must not be distorted due to social characteristics or
different resources. Unequal participation leads to unequal inclusion of preferences and to a favouritism of
voters over underprivileged non-voters.
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Public sphere: The public sphere consists of (sophisticated) individual citizens, interest groups with different aims and different degrees of
organization (according to the ideas of pluralism and social capital), and free and independent media.
Competition: Competition is understood as a multidimensional process. It implies contestability (conditions of low entry to the electoral
contest), decidability (the transparent distinctiveness of the political offer), availability (a given probability of changes in the
preferences of the citizens), and vulnerability (low degree of an incumbent’s safety of tenure).
Electoral system: The electoral system embraces formal rules that define how votes are translated into seats.
Type of
government:
Depending on the electoral system, governments are formed by single parties or by coalitions of different parties.
Transparency: Transparency embraces formal rules that enforce actors to inform and act in a transparent way as well as a culture of openness,
i.e. the willingness of political actors to inform and act in a transparent way.
Identifiability of
responsibility:
Identifiability of responsibility is provided when each decision can be clearly assigned to one distinct actor.
Checks and
balances:
Checks and balances consist of different institutions and formal rules that aim at controlling other institutions.
Implementation
capability:
Implementation capability is high when there are no or few (legal or illegal) constraints in terms of veto players and/or
circumstances outside the government realm.
Substantive
representation:
Substantive representation is provided when the policy output corresponds to the preferences of the citizens.
Linkage mechanisms:
A Preferences are influenced by various exogenous factors, but the formation of preferences is also an endogenous process. The
quality of this process crucially depends on the quality of the process of deliberation in the public sphere (including equal and
widespread participation).
B Responsive mobilization of preferences is the collection of all existing preferences. This only is possible, when all citizens
participate equally, or when at least all preferences are mobilized in an undistorted way.
C The responsive mobilization of preferences depends on organizations: in order to make their preferences heard, individual
citizens must be organized by collective actors (parties, interest groups, social movements).
D Competition influences preference mobilization in two ways: first, the openness of the system allows for the entry of competing
organizations (contestability); second, the distinctiveness of the political offer (decidability) makes it possible for the citizens to
structure their preferences.
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E Equality of participation guarantees that votes mirror the preferences of all voters.
F The arguments proposed by the political elites should be discussed by a viable civil society articulating different interests and point of views.
G Responsiveness depends on two additional dimensions of competition: vulnerability forces incumbents to adopt preferences and voter availability
enhances the possibility that competitors will attract the voters with new programs reflecting new preferences.
H The degree of responsiveness heavily depends on the electoral system.
I Responsiveness in terms of congruence of citizens’ preferences and their representation depends on the composition and the size of the coalition.
J An active debate in the public sphere influences the political decision making on a daily basis. The idea of ‘dynamic representation’ is based on an
attentive public. It also presupposes the supply by the elite that shapes the deliberation process in the public sphere.
K Even if the decision-making process is responsive„ the policy output depends on the capability of the government to implement the decision. This
capability can be constrained by various (formal and informal) veto-players and socio-economic circumstances. Furthermore, the implementation
depends on the quality of the public administration.
L The congruence between policy output and the preferences of citizens defines the degree of substantive representation that, in turn, feeds back
into the preference formation.
M Information and justification of political decisions and/or acts of representatives can be required by other formal and informal institutions
designed to control the account-holders.
N Answerability implies transparency. At least the justification of decisions must be transparent.
O The media (public sphere) can also require information and justification from the account-holders.
P Whether information and justification is evaluated (or must be evaluated) depends on checks and balances, i.e. control agencies. There must be
opportunities providing horizontal accountability.
Q Evaluation works when there is identifiability of responsibility, i.e. when the decisions and acts can be ascribed to distinct account-holders.
R Whether information and justification is evaluated (or must be evaluated) again depends on the public debate in the public sphere; vertical
accountability depends on the quality of the public judgment.
S Whether evaluation leads to consequences depends on the strength of horizontal accountability, i.e. the formal possibilities of the different
control institutions denoted by ‘checks and balances’.
T An active public sphere can strengthen public (and electoral) accountability ensuring that negative evaluation really lead to sanction and
consequences (in terms of replacement of government by means of elections).
U Sanctions can lead to electoral consequences, i.e. negatively evaluated incumbents are thrown out of the office. This depends heavily on the four
aspects of competition.
V Information on sanctions and their consequences for account-holders is provided by the public sphere.
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62 Models for Democracy
Extensions of the model for representative democracy
The model for representative democracy constitutes the core of any
model of democracy under contemporary conditions. To become
empirically more realistic, this model should, however, be extended
in at least three directions. Today, policy-makers are ‘accountable to a
plethora of different forums, all of which apply to a different set of
criteria’ (Bovens 2007: 455). Thus, at the national level, the electoral
channel is not the only possible channel of representation. First of all,
in some countries, it is complemented by a direct-democratic chan-
nel. Second, everywhere the electoral channel is accompanied by an
administrative channel, which links the policy-makers directly to var-
ious interest groups in a society and extends policy making to various
unaccountable agencies. Third, there is the channel of protest politics
that introduces the so-called advocacy democracy (Cain et al. 2003),
which extends accountability to various social movement organizations,
that is, organized forms of civil society. As is noted by Bovens (2007:
457), ‘in reaction to a perceived lack of trust in government, there
is an urge in many Western democracies for more direct and explicit
accountability relations between public agencies, on the one hand, and
clients, citizens and civil society, on the other hand’. Representation via
direct-democratic procedures (initiatives, referendums, recall), interest
groups, or protest politics provides alternative mechanisms allowing for
additional accountability relations. Rosanvallon (2006: 16) would call
these alternative mechanisms forms of ‘counter-democracy’ or ‘democ-
racy of distrust’, which are getting increasingly important because of
the generalized lack of confidence in the functioning of contemporary
societies.
In the representative model, the possibilities for the citizens to sanc-
tion those who govern are fundamentally limited by two key aspects
of the model (Kriesi 2005). On the one hand, the initiative remains
on the side of those who govern. Since the crucial mechanism of regu-
larly repeated elections works retrospectively, it does not give the voters
the possibility to force their representatives to execute the policies for
which they have been elected. On the other hand, the crucial control
mechanism is rather imprecise, because the government is responsi-
ble for a multitude of political decisions and the citizens only have
the opportunity to sanction the multipack of decisions, not any sin-
gle decision. By contrast, in a representative democratic regime which
is complemented by elements of direct democracy, these two restrictive
conditions are partly removed: (a) groups of voters can launch initiatives
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Marc Bühlmann and Hanspeter Kriesi 63
which put certain issues on the political agenda and require a vote
by all the voters; and (b) single decisions of those who govern can be
challenged by referenda.
We should note, however, that, as Budge (1996: 56) points out,
the ‘passage from expressing opinions and advice to actually voting,
through a simple adaptation of existing means of consultation, would
seem more a change of degree than of kind, on a broad view of cur-
rent developments’. The difference between the two types of democracy
is all the more limited, because direct democracy is also likely to be
mediated by political organizations and their representatives. As Budge
(1996: 43) points out, too, even the Athenian Assembly probably cre-
ated something like a crude party system. The Swiss example illustrates
that, under conditions of contemporary ‘party democracies’ and with
an appropriate institutional design, direct-democratic procedures are
guided and controlled by political parties and related political organiza-
tions. In fact, the intermediary form of ‘party-based direct democracy’,
where the representative institutions do not disappear but are only mod-
ified by combining them with direct-democratic elements is nothing
else but the ‘semi-direct democracy’ that has been institutionalized in
Switzerland for more than a century. While parties and other intermedi-
ary organization are still mobilizing citizens in direct-democratic cam-
paigns, there are nevertheless two key differences which distinguish the
representative model from the one augmented by a direct-democratic
channel. The first key difference is that the citizens vote directly on spe-
cific issues, that is, their preferences are directly aggregated to a vote on
a given policy and the question of whether or not the elites are respon-
sive to the voters no longer applies. The second key difference is that
the elites can be held responsible for the outcome of the vote only in the
indirect sense that they mobilized their citizens in the direct-democratic
campaign. When the voters decide directly on a given policy, the voters
are themselves responsible for the decision. As Trechsel (2010) argues,
they are responsible, as the highest organ of the state, to themselves. He
suggests that the accountability relationship created in such a situation
departs from the classic, vertical vision and is best described as a form of
‘reflexive accountability’.
The administrative channel provides direct access to policy-makers
for a large number of interest groups. It is also distinguished from the
electoral channel by some key features. First, and most importantly,
the representatives of interest groups are not elected by the voters
and they are not accountable to the public at large, but only to their
own, often highly specialized, constituency. Second, the interest groups,
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64 Models for Democracy
much more than the main actors representing the individuals’ prefer-
ences in the electoral channel, are focused on specific interests which
they represent in issue-specific domains. Third, in spite of their large
number, interest groups do not equally represent all possible interests
in a society. Some interests, especially those of large groups in the pop-
ulation, are not capable of organizing (Olson 1965) or not capable of
conflict (‘konfliktfähig’, Offe 1970). As Schattschneider (1975 [1960]: 30,
69) has famously observed, organization is the mobilization of bias, and
‘the flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus of interest
groups sings with a strong upper-class accent’ (p. 34f.). Taken together,
these characteristics of interest groups imply that interest representation
in the administrative channel is likely to be much less responsive to the
public at large than representation in the electoral channel.
Interest groups mainly intervene in the implementation stage of
the chain of responsiveness. In general, they can count on a stable
constituency which they represent in the policy-making process on a
routine basis. In Europe, the ‘logic of influence’ (their insertion into
policy-related network arrangements) tends to have priority over the
‘logic of membership’ (their interaction with their members and the rep-
resentation of their members’ interest) for them (Schmitter and Streeck
1981). They are typically part of policy communities where they interact
on an ongoing basis with legislators and public officials with a shared
interest in the same public-policy problem. These policy communities
form more or less open networks and are typically structured into ‘advo-
cacy coalitions’ confronting each other and keeping each other in check
(Baumgartner et al. 2009: Chapter 3). They are characterized by low
visibility and they are, to some extent at least, ‘decoupled’ from repre-
sentative bodies, and more accountable to ‘peers’ (the other participants
in these networks) than to the voters (Papadopoulos 2002). Still, the
electoral channel has an influence on policy making, because legisla-
tors and government officials are also part of these networks. Moreover,
elections may change the incremental policy process – by increasing the
opportunities for policy change that did not exist under the previous
government, by reversing policies that had been adopted by previous
governments, and by shifting the agenda (Baumgartner et al. 2009:
Chapter 5).
Increasingly, collectively binding policy decisions are also taken by a
number of other actors who are even more removed from the citizen
public than interest groups – courts, independent regulatory authori-
ties (IRAs) such as central banks or regulatory boards, or, in the context
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of new public management, more client-oriented government services.
Judicialization and delegation to unaccountable administrative enti-
ties are aspects of a continuing expansion of what Mény (2002) has
called the ‘constitutionalist element’ of democracy, inherited from the
liberal approach to government. These tendencies limit the obliga-
tions of the incumbents to report on their acts to the citizens and
the possibilities for the voters to respond with electoral sanctions. This
degradation of democratic accountability takes place outside of the
public purview and regardless of whether or not the representatives
behave responsively. Summarizing these trends, Papadopoulos (2007)
arrives at the pessimistic conclusion that there is an increasing divorce
between ‘front-stage’ (electoral) and ‘back-stage politics’ (administrative
politics), which implies a decline of accountability of the representa-
tive process in established democracies. In a more optimistic mode,
Thatcher (2001) suggests that several forms of accountability have been
developed for IRAs in particular – the use of controls by elected offi-
cials such as appointments, and, more importantly, mechanisms of
answerability which require such agencies to explain their actions and
to face questioning.
Protest politics, finally, provide a channel of mobilization for orga-
nizations which do not have direct access to the electoral or the
administrative channel. This channel opens up the possibility for polit-
ical participation for a large number of citizens. This form of politics
is focused on the mobilization stage in the chain of responsiveness,
because the subsequent stages tend to be inaccessible for the actors
involved. Accordingly, the appeal to the public constitutes the crucial
element of the action repertoire for the organizations engaged in protest
politics. Challengers who do not have routine access to the decision-
making arenas or to the established media have to attract the attention
of the media for a specific issue. They mainly do so by staging protest
events. The reports in the media about these events are designed to
unleash a public debate and reinforce the position of the minority
actors in the corresponding policy communities within the decision-
making arena (Gamson 1988: 228; Gamson et al. 1992: 383; Hamdan
2000: 72).
By creating controversy, where there was none before, protest opens
up access and legitimacy among journalists for speakers of the move-
ment and allied sponsors among the decision-makers in the correspond-
ing policy communities (Gamson and Meyer 1996: 288). Indirectly,
protest always creates political opportunities for established political
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actors. This holds in the negative sense – protest may serve as a pre-
text for repression; as it does in a positive sense – the cause may be
taken over by some elite actors (Tarrow 1994: 98). In the final analysis,
the goal of creating public attention is to divide the elite and to rein-
force the opposition among the decision-makers (Wolfsfeld 1997: 27).
As Tarrow observes, protest is most successful when it provides a polit-
ical incentive for elites within the decision-making arena to advance
their own policies and careers.
For Rosanvallon (2006: 68–71), the protest politics of new social
movements is a typical example of what he calls ‘surveillance democ-
racy’. These movements are involved in the three aspects of this type of
counter-democracy – monitoring, denunciation, and rating. He argues
that they tend to operate like watchdog committees or whistle-blowers
in the policy domains (environmental politics, consumer protection,
health politics) they focus upon. Like rating agencies, they work by nam-
ing, blaming, and shaming. They point out problems, and try to force
public authorities to act upon them. Contrary to interest groups or polit-
ical parties, they do not have representation functions and they do not
want to take power.
The modal action repertoire in Western European protest politics has
become quite moderate and the respective social movement organi-
zations have professionalized and institutionalized (Koopmans 1996;
Kriesi 1996). Since the early 2000s, non-electoral political participa-
tion in Western Europe most likely takes the form of donating money
(i.e. ‘check-book’ activism), signing petitions, or of ‘deliberately buying
certain products for political, ethical or environmental reasons’ (Teorell
et al. 2007b: 340). Social movement scholars summarize these trends
by the term the ‘movement society’ (Meyer and Tarrow 1998) – a term
which serves to suggest that political protest has become an integral
part of representation in contemporary democracies; that protest behav-
ior is employed with greater frequency, by more diverse constituencies,
and is used to represent a wider range of claims than ever before; and
that professionalization and institutionalization may be changing the
social movement into an instrument of conventional politics. As protest
becomes a part of everyday politics, we assist in the ‘normalization
of the unconventional’ (Fuchs 1991). At the same time, social move-
ment organizations become rather like interest groups. Paradoxically,
as unconventional forms of participation become increasingly accepted
and political systems become more open to unconventional forms of
mobilization, these forms are likely to become more moderate and less
prominent.
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Conclusion
Administrative politics and protest politics extend the number of
stakeholders to whom government is to be responsive and accountable,
way beyond the electorate of the representative or direct-democratic
channels. In a multi-level institutional setting such as the one we see
emerging in Europe today, the number of stakeholders whom respon-
sible governments have to take into account is multiplied even more:
governments of other nation-states, and supranational organizations
have to be taken into account as well. At the level of the EU in par-
ticular, the problems of accountability are compounded by the ‘lack of
politics’: at the EU level, we have, as Schmidt (2006) put it, ‘policy with-
out politics’, that is, a decision-making system that is weakly responsive
in terms of elections, parties, and the conventional procedures of rep-
resentative democracy. Instead of representative democracy, we have
an ‘agencification’, an increasing delegation to ‘non-majoritarian’ insti-
tutions (institutions which are not directly accountable to voters or
their representatives), and an ‘informalization’, the creation of informal
structures and opportunities to influence decision making which largely
bypass representative democratic procedures (Lord and Pollak 2010:
981). In such a setting, as Mair (2009) has observed, the parties who rou-
tinely govern are exposed to the increasing tension between their role as
representatives of the national citizen publics, and their role as responsi-
ble governments. As representatives of the national citizen publics, they
are expected to be responsive and accountable to their voters; as respon-
sible governments, they are expected to take into account the increasing
number of principals constituted by the many veto players who now
surround government in its multi-level institutional setting. Moreover,
governments who act ‘responsibly’ are not only limited by the con-
straints of the multi-level institutional setting, but also by the weight of
prior policy commitments, a weight which, by definition, grows heavier
year by year.
The question is whether these other forms of responsiveness or
accountability are functional equivalents to the electoral responsive-
ness or accountability of the classic democratic model (Curtin et al.
2010: 938). The complex setting that results from the extension of
the representative model to bring it closer in line with the reality of
contemporary governance structures holds out the promise of ‘new pos-
sibilities for mutually suspicious clusters of actors to compete to hold
one another to account, whilst opening up new possibilities for legal and
administrative accountability, as well as external accountability’ (Lord
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68 Models for Democracy
and Pollack 2010: 984). However, to the extent that these new possi-
bilities are not linked to the electorate, they are not democratic in the
proper sense of the five criteria formulated by Dahl and presented at the
beginning of this chapter.
Note
1. See Roy P. Basler (Ed.) 1953–1955. The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln,
vol. 7: 22. Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
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4
Varieties of Democracy
Daniel Bochsler and Hanspeter Kriesi
The normative principles of democracy can be combined in different
ways in theory, and in practical implementations. As Kohler-Koch and
Rittberger (2007: 3) have pointed out, different strands in democratic
theory do not differ with respect to the basic normative assump-
tions about democracy’s essence, but in their emphasis on different
dimensions of democracy. They are all variations on a general theme.
Similarly, the different existing democracies constitute various attempts
to implement these general underlying normative assumptions. They
have implemented these principles through various formal institu-
tional arrangements and informal practices and procedures. In this
chapter, we shall conceptualize and empirically measure this variety
within established democracies, using the Democracy Barometer1 –
an empirical tool that has been developed in the framework of the
National Competence Centre for Research (NCCR) Democracy. Our
analysis is mainly exploratory, an attempt to map out largely unex-
plored terrain. As we shall show, the existing democracies differ
considerably in the way they implement the basic principles. Fur-
thermore, there are trade-offs involved in the implementation of the
democratic principle: even though normatively desirable, in the real
world it is impossible to maximize all its aspects evenly. Institutional
designers have to make some hard choices when trying to make
democracy work.
Probably the most famous attempt to put some order into the vari-
ety of existing democracies is Lijphart’s (1999) ‘Pattern of democracies’.
As he suggests, ‘the enormous variety of formal and informal rules
and institutions that we find in democracies can be reduced to a
clear two-dimensional pattern on the basis of the contrast between
majoritarian and consensus government’ (Lijphart 1999: 301). This
69
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70 Varieties of Democracy
famous typology is based on a limited number of ten indicators for
36 established democracies, and extends and updates an earlier, sim-
ilar attempt (Lijphart 1984). Lijphart’s measurement approach, which
we shall follow here, relies not only on formal institutional rules, but
also takes into account the way these institutions are used in a given
country (the informal institutions). At the heart of his approach are the
‘institutional rules and practices’. Based on his theoretical concept of
power-sharing, Lijphart expected that democracies can be distinguished
as being either the consensus or the majoritarian type. His empiri-
cal results demonstrate, however, that the differences between the 36
countries are more nuanced than expected, and he distinguishes two
different ways of sharing or dividing power – between actors within the
central executive and legislative, versus power-sharing between different
institutions.
Lijphart’s two-dimensional conceptual map of democracies has been
very influential, but it has been by nomeans the only typology proposed
for sorting out the empirical variety of democracies. In another attempt
to bring some order into the bewildering institutional variety, Lane and
Ersson (1996) came up with a much more complex variety of possi-
ble empirical configurations than Lijphart. In their comparison of the
institutional characteristics of the establishedWestern European democ-
racies with the emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe,
they used no less than five dimensions along which the established
democracies were shown to vary. They concluded that there is a gen-
eral variability of institutional conditions, which hardly allows for any
systematic differences.
Indeed, the result of the empirical search for a few underlying dimen-
sions of democracy is heavily contingent on the details of the empirical
analysis. Thus, it depends on the set of analytical concepts we have
in mind at the outset of our search, on the set of indicators we have
at our disposal for the operationalization of each concept, on the
set of countries we include in our analysis, and on the time period
covered.
Like Lane and Ersson, we shall start our analysis of the variety of
democracies from a more differentiated set of conceptual dimensions,
we shall make use of a more ample set of indicators than Lijphart, and
we shall analyze a somewhat different set of 50 countries for the period
of 1990–2007. The sample includes established democracies (all coun-
tries which are evaluated full democracies both by Freedom House and
by the Polity IV index), and is limited only by the availability of data in
the Democracy Barometer.2
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Five dimensions of democracy
Starting from Lijphart’s two dimensions, we move toward a more com-
plete picture of democracy. To be sure, the operationalization of a
full-fledged account of democracy is limited by the availability of appro-
priate indicators in our dataset, and by the existing empirical variance
among democracies. Thus, for lack of reliable data we are not intro-
ducing a separate dimension referring to the situation of the media,
although the media constitute a key condition for political commu-
nication today. We can, however, extend Lijphart’s two-dimensional
framework to a five-dimensional configuration of democracy.
Our first addition concerns the distinction between liberal and
illiberal democracies. Modern democracies are liberal democracies.
Although the liberal principle may constrain the democratic princi-
ple, the institutionalization of the liberal principle constitutes a crucial
requirement for the chain of accountability. It provides the basis for
transparency, checks and balances, a functioning public sphere and the
citizens’ capacity to attribute responsibility. The dimension of direct
versus representative democracy introduces the participatory element
of democracy and takes into account the direct-democratic channel
in addition to the central representative democracy. Finally, the dis-
tinction between inclusive versus exclusive democracies refers to one
of Dahl’s (2000) five key criteria mentioned in the last chapter, and
reflects whether or not the citizenry is fully included in democratic
decision-making.
Lijphart’s two dimensions: Consensus vs. majoritarian
and federal vs. centralized democracies
The two dimensions in Lijphart’s scheme reflect the degree to which
power is concentrated in governments. The first dimension refers to the
degree of shared responsibility in governments and legislatures, the sec-
ond one to the division of power between different institutions (Lijphart
1999: 5). The indicators of his first dimension are directly or indirectly
linked to two crucial institutions (Lijphart 1999: 303): proportional rep-
resentation and a parliamentary system of government. Indeed, the
electoral system constitutes the crucial formal element that is closely
related to three other elements of this first dimension – the concentra-
tion of power in the executive (one party vs. coalition government),
the relationship between the executive and the legislative (executive
dominance vs. legislative dominance), and the party system (two vs.
multi-party system).
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Lijphart’s first dimension closely resembles the trade-off between the
proportional and the majoritarian visions of democracy, documented
by Powell (2000), which is exclusively based on how the two basic
electoral systems work. Powell shows that each vision arrives at real-
izing the goals it sets itself, at the cost of neglecting the goals of the
competing vision. On the one hand, the majoritarian vision values the
concentration of power, which enables the elected representatives to
carry out their promises (mandates) and clarifies the responsibility for
government actions (transparency and vertical accountability). On the
other hand, proportional representation is valued by its adherents for its
ability to allow for authorized representation, that is, for proportionate
policy-making influence of each group of voters. The vision of propor-
tional democracy most closely resembles Dahl’s (1956) pluralist idea that
democracy is not majority rule, but the ‘rule of minorities’, who, propor-
tionately represented, are forced to cooperate with one another to find
majority support.
The second dimension in Lijphart’s scheme refers to horizontal
accountability, that is, the division of power between institutions of gov-
ernment, the ‘checks and balances’ of the US Constitution. Empirically,
however, it essentially boils down to a federalism–centralism dimension.
Liberal vs. illiberal democracies
Modern democracies combine the liberal and the democratic princi-
ples, they are liberal democracies. We consider the active involvement
of citizens in the public debates preceding the vote and its necessary
guarantees – based on liberal rights and freedoms – as the baseline of
what we call a democracy today.
Citizens require protection from the government’s arbitrary decisions,
as well as from each other. Liberalism sought to restrict the power of the
monarch and of the Church. Its goal was freeing the polity from reli-
gious control and freeing civil society from political interference (Held
2006). Liberalism upholds the values of freedom of choice, reason, and
toleration. The liberal principle guarantees basic rights of the citizens –
freedom of speech, freedom of association, protection of property rights,
religious freedom, as well as equality before the law. According to the
liberal principle the power of the state has constitutional limits, the
modern state has to speak the language of law and the entire machinery
of the state ought to be controlled by the law. The rule of law implies the
submission of the state under the legal strictures. Constitutionalism, the
division of power, checks and balances, and an independent judiciary
in particular ought to guarantee the lawfulness of the state’s actions.
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Democracies combine the liberal freedoms with a strong and vivid civil
society. Civil society is, on the one hand, the embodiment of the free-
dom of association, in practice, filled by organizations of citizens which
are not under direct state control. On the other hand, it serves as the
intermediate body between the political institutions and the citizens,
and hence creates the space for the public control over politics, and
articulation of needs and demands.
Modern democracies combine this liberal principle with the demo-
cratic principles of popular equality (‘one man one vote’), popular
sovereignty (‘government of the people, by the people, for the people’),
and the majoritarian principle, which is the baseline of most democratic
decisions. As we have pointed out in the previous chapter, liberal and
democratic principles are not necessarily compatible. The liberal princi-
ple limits the democratic principle to the extent that the citizens may
exercise their popular sovereignty only within the constraints imposed
by the legal order. ‘Madisonian democracy’, as Dahl (1956) has called
a democracy that puts a heavy accent on the liberal principle, seeks to
protect the liberties of certain minorities (of status, power, and wealth).
In Dahl’s (1956: 32) view, Madison went about as far as it was possible in
his quest for preventing the ‘tyranny of the majority’, while still remain-
ing within the bounds of what we call democracy. On the other hand,
the democratic principles limit the liberal principle to the extent that
the legal order can be arbitrarily modified by democratically legitimated
political decisions. As the American diplomat Richard Holbrooke said
about Yugoslavia in the 1990s: ‘Suppose elections are free and fair and
those elected are racists, fascists, separatists’.3 Dahl (1956) has called a
democracy where the majority has unlimited power, a ‘populist democ-
racy’, and he formulated a series of objections against the attempt to
maximize popular sovereignty and political equality at the expense of
all other political goals.
Where the citizens do not have strong liberal values, the conflict
between the two principles is particularly acute. Zakaria (2007) paints a
very bleak picture about the current relationship of the two sets of prin-
ciples: they are, he maintains ‘coming apart across the globe. Democracy
is flourishing; liberty is not’. We would like to suggest that the lack of
liberalism is above all a problem in emerging democracies, that is, in
countries that have only recently made their transition to democracy.
Their lack of liberalism is an indication that it takes time to develop the
characteristics of an established democracy. Even Zakaria (2007: 56f.)
concedes that we should not judge the new democracies ‘by standards
that most Western countries would have flunked even 30 years ago’.
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We would like to add that not even all Western countries are capable of
living up to these standards today.
Direct vs. representative democracies
As we have pointed out in the previous chapter, modern democracies are
representative democracies. Elections of the political decision-makers
at regular intervals constitute the key institution of representative
democracy today (Manin 1995: 18; Powell 2000: 3). While Lijphart’s
dimensions have focused on the procedures and the outcome of
elections – the electoral system and the format of the party system –
the role of the citizen is not covered by his approach. Universal suffrage
constitutes the legal foundation of citizens’ representation, but in prac-
tice, good representation also requires high and equal participation in
the elections. Although we will not be able to demonstrate this aspect of
the general model, we would like to add that elections are instruments of
democracy only to the extent that they give the citizens influence over
policy making, that is, to the extent that governments have the capac-
ity to act on the citizens preferences, and to the extent that they are
accountable and responsive to the preferences of the citizens, considered
as political equals (Dahl 1971: 1).
Even if representative forms of democracy dominate today, direct-
democratic forms of political participation have not entirely disap-
peared. As we have also suggested in the previous chapter, the electoral
channel coexists with direct-democratic forms of government in sev-
eral countries, and the latter are, indeed, increasingly introduced in
newly emerging democracies. In particular, the new democracies in
Central and Eastern Europe typically have introduced direct-democratic
instruments.
In his recent contribution to the theory of democracy, Hendriks
(2010) combines Lijphart’s distinction between majoritarian and con-
sensus (non-majoritarian) democracies with the distinction between
direct (self-governing) and indirect (representative) forms of democ-
racy. The resulting four combinations he calls ‘pendulum democ-
racy’ (the classic Westminster case), ‘consensus democracy’ (the
classic consociational case), ‘voter democracy’ (the combination of
majoritarian and direct forms of democracy), and ‘participatory democ-
racy’ (the combination of consensual and direct forms of democracy).
Voter democracy refers to ‘unmediated popular rule’. Citizens partic-
ipate by casting their votes in plebiscites, either in town meetings
or in referendums. California-style referendums illustrate this type.
Participatory democracy in Hendrik’s view refers to a very demanding
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form of democracy. In this version of democracy, decision making
involves ‘a process of engaging in thorough, preferably transforma-
tive, and usually lengthy deliberations to seek consensus’ (p. 28).
In Hendrik’s view (p. 137), Swiss democracy is a combination of ele-
ments from voter democracy and consensus democracy. Demanding
less than Hendriks with respect to deliberation, one might, however,
argue that the Swiss democracy illustrates precisely the combination of
direct-democratic elements with a consensus democracy which is char-
acteristic of Hendrik’s participatory democracy, and which distinguishes
it crucially from California-style referendums.
There have been some conceptual attempts to connect Lijphart’s two
models of democracy with direct democracy. Consensual democracies
are often conceptualized as systems which rely on compromises between
different political groups, as each of them has the possibility of veto-
ing unpopular decisions. In this vein, Hug and Tsebelis (2002) show
that direct-democratic institutions introduce a new veto player into the
political system – the median voter of the population. This argument
has allowed Vatter (2009) to link them theoretically and empirically to
the Lijphart model, showing that referendums create an incentive for
the extension of the governing coalitions. Neidhart (1970) long ago
argued that the risks arising from optional referendums and popular
initiatives can be limited by co-opting all those forces into the govern-
ing coalition who are capable of efficiently threatening with the use of
these instruments. Vatter’s empirical analysis based on 23 of Lijphart’s
36 countries and a modified list of 12 indicators confirms this hunch. He
finds three dimensions: in addition to Lijphart’s two original dimen-
sions, he uncovers a third dimension for direct democracy. As expected
by his theoretical argument, the concentration of power in the cabinet
turns out to be closely associated with this dimension (and not with the
executive-party dimension as in Lijphart’s analysis).
Inclusive vs. exclusive democracies
A last crucial criterion for democracy is the inclusion of all, or at
any rate most, adult permanent residents in the democratic process
(Dahl 2000: 37f.). Before the 20th century, this criterion was unaccept-
able to most advocates of democracy. Women were generally excluded
from political rights, as were various classes of the population that
were considered unfit, that is, incompetent to participate. Today, some
countries still effectively deny the right to vote to some parts of their
population by requiring voters to register and by making access to reg-
istration procedures complicated. Most importantly, however, in an age
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76 Varieties of Democracy
of globalization more or less important parts of the resident populations
in democratic countries are of foreign origin and, in most of them, they
do not enjoy full citizenship rights in their country of residence.
With the construction of the nation-states, civic, political, and social
rights have become intimately linked to membership in a national com-
munity, to national citizenship. Or, as Wimmer (2002: 57) has observed,
‘the national idea has become the central principle according to which
modern society structures inclusion and exclusion, not only in the
sphere of culture and identity, but also in the legal, political, military
and social domains’. While foreign residents have acquired civic and
social rights (Soysal 1994), they are still denied full political rights in
most democracies.
Measurement
As already pointed out, we are using the Democracy Barometer to
operationalize our five dimensions of democracy. We have defined 19
indicators. Appendix 1 provides an exact definition for each one of them
in terms of the original measures contained in the Democracy Barome-
ter. For each indicator, the country values correspond to the average of
the yearly values for the period 1990–2007. Taking averages over a more
extended period provides us with a more stable assessment of the kind of
democracy that has been implemented in a given country. Appendices 2
and 3 present the statistical distribution and the correlation matrix of
our 19 indicators.
Consensus vs. majoritarian democracy. We are using five indicators for
Lijphart’s key dimension. Three of them (effective number of parties,
electoral proportionality, and proportionality of electoral system) are
closely linked to the distinction between proportional and majoritarian
electoral systems. The remaining two (wage coordination and union
density) refer to the integration of interest groups into the political
system, which is also part of Lijphart’s first dimension. Our indicators
measure the proportionality of elections, as we do not have suitable
indicators for executive dominance, nor for cabinet composition, which
are part of Lijphart’s attempt to distinguish between consensus and
majoritarian democracy, for the set of countries that we are analyzing.4
We would like to suggest, however, that the key characteristics of this
dimension can be captured without these two types of indicators.
Lijphart has been criticized for his inclusion of interest groups in his
first dimension. Thus, several authors (Armingeon 2002: 88; Keman
and Pennings, 1995; Roller 2005: 111f.) proposed to reduce the first
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Daniel Bochsler and Hanspeter Kriesi 77
dimension to purely party-related characteristics. In this respect, we
prefer to follow Lijphart, because one can make a strong argument
in support of the institutional complementarity between consensus
democracy in the party system and corporatist-like arrangements in
the interest-group system, on the one hand, and between majoritarian
democracy in the party system and pluralist-like arrangements in the
interest-group system, on the other hand (e.g. Hall and Soskice 2001).
Federal vs. centralized. For Lijphart’s second dimension, we have three
indicators at our disposal. Following Vatter (2009), we distinguish
between two different aspects of federalism and decentralization – one
representing the constitutional division of territorial power and one the
fiscal division of territorial power – and add bicameralism as a third indi-
cator, which is also used by Lijphart.5 With respect to judicial review –
also part of the federalism–centralization dimensions with Lijphart and
Vatter –, we expect it to be positively associated with the liberalism
dimension and negatively with the direct-democracy dimension. The
liberal principle includes an emphasis on checks and balances, especially
on an independent judiciary. By contrast, direct-democratic procedures
may have ‘populist’ tendencies, which limit the possibilities of judi-
cial review, since they attribute decisive competences to the people as
sovereign.
Liberal vs. illiberal democracies. In addition to the indicator for judicial
review, we have six indicators for this dimension. They measure equality
before the law, property rights, freedom of the press, government capac-
ity, the existence of a powerful civil society, unconventional political
participation, and representation of women. While the first three may
seem obvious indicators for this dimension, the remaining four need
some additional comments. ‘Government capacity’ is intended to mea-
sure the submission of the state under the law. ‘Effective unconventional
participation’ is both an indicator of the effective use of the freedom to
associate, and of the effective use of freedom of speech. The ‘adequate
representation of women’ is also an indicator of equality before the law
and of the freedom to associate, but it is probably less exclusively linked
to this dimension, since it also measures the equality of participation
(i.e. it has a link to the representation vs. direct-democracy dimension)
and the equality of representation (i.e. it also has a link to the consensus
vs. majoritarian democracy dimension).
Representative vs. direct democracy. We are operationalizing this dimen-
sion with turnout and equality of electoral participation (for representa-
tive democracy), and the frequency of national referendums (for direct
democracy).
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78 Varieties of Democracy
Inclusive vs. exclusive.We only have a single indicator for the inclusive-
ness of the democracies, the share of registered voters among the adult
population.
The overall configuration
The overall distribution of values provides us with a first rough idea of
the characteristics of our sample of 50 countries. This sample consists
of rather centralized and unicameral democracies, with a high degree
of inclusion, proportional electoral systems, and hardly any democra-
cies with direct-democratic elements. The sample is inclusive, as only
four countries (Estonia, Luxembourg, South Africa, USA) count less than
80 per cent of their voting-age population in their voting registers. Most
countries also have very low degrees of disproportionalities, with val-
ues below or around 10 (on a scale from 0 to 100), including even
majoritarian democracies, such as Australia (10.0) or the US (3.5). The
US example confirms that very proportional election outcomes can even
be reached under plurality rule, if minor parties hardly win any votes.
There are only a few exceptions with higher disproportionality rates,
notably France (19.3), Turkey (18.1), the UK (15.8), and Canada (13.1).
With regard to the practice of direct democracy, Switzerland is a clear
outlier, with 16 yearly referendums, followed only by Italy with six
referendums per year (measured by five-year averages). Most countries
had no, or hardly any, referendums at the national level. Finally, two-
thirds of our countries have a unicameral parliament, and three-quarters
are unitary (non-federal) states.
Just like our predecessors, we have performed an exploratory factor
analysis, in order to uncover the underlying dimensions of our 19 indi-
cators. The result of this analysis is presented in Table 4.1. The overall
configuration corresponds to our expectations. There are, indeed, no
less than five dimensions for the characterization of the 50 democra-
cies. These five dimensions correspond to our five theoretically defined
dimensions.6 With few exceptions, the indicators turn out to be asso-
ciated with the theoretical dimensions as expected by our conceptual
discussion. Some of them are related to more than one dimension,
which is, however, not quite unexpected either. Thus, union density
is both associated with the consensus–majoritarian dimension, which
covers the main aspects of consensus democracy, but also with the
liberal–illiberal and the federal–centralized dimension. Wage coordina-
tion is not only associated with the consensus–majoritarian dimension,
but even more closely with the inclusiveness dimension, suggesting
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Table 4.1 Results of exploratory factor analysis: n=50
Variable Factor 1
liberal–
illiberal
Factor 2
federalist–
centralized
Factor 3
consensus–
majoritarian
Factor 4
representative–
direct
democratic
Factor 5
inclusive–
exclusive
Uniqueness
Equality before law 0.94 0.16 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.081
Governing capacity 0.97 −0.02 0.08 0.03 −0.01 0.058
Property rights 0.91 −0.05 −0.11 0.03 0.13 0.149
Non-conventional participation 0.66 −0.16 0.17 0.02 −0.05 0.504
Freedom of press 0.83 0.10 0.18 −0.07 −0.19 0.228
Women representation 0.61 −0.12 0.41 0.17 0.17 0.384
Judicial review −0.42 0.07 0.15 0.39 −0.25 0.579
Unitary (no territorial division) 0.01 0.83 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.315
Single chamber (no bicameralism) 0.21 0.77 −0.03 0.13 0.07 0.339
Fiscal centralization −0.33 0.55 0.22 0.02 −0.18 0.507
Effective number of
parliamentary parties
0.00 −0.12 0.34 −0.40 0.29 0.626
Proportionality (effective
magnitude)
−0.10 0.19 0.58 −0.09 0.40 0.456
Disproportionality (Gallagher
index)
0.17 −0.05 0.79 −0.03 0.01 0.339
Wage coordination 0.12 −0.11 0.31 0.00 0.66 0.440
Union density 0.37 0.32 0.50 0.22 0.08 0.465
Equality of participation 0.13 −0.01 −0.03 0.75 0.15 0.400
Turnout 0.31 0.19 0.33 0.38 0.00 0.615
Referendums/direct democracy 0.05 −0.31 −0.01 −0.64 0.10 0.483
Inclusion −0.11 0.38 −0.08 0.11 0.59 0.472
Eigenvalue rotated solution 4.79 2.10 1.85 1.55 1.26
Note: Shaded areas in this table refer to the highest loadings of the factor analysis
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80 Varieties of Democracy
that electoral and corporatist inclusiveness are, indeed, complemen-
tary. The representation of women is associated with the liberal and
the consensus–majoritarian dimensions. Probably the biggest exception
to our expectations refers to the negative association of judicial review
with the liberal dimension. While its trade-off with direct democracy
was to be expected, its negative association with the liberal dimension
is something, we shall look into more closely below.
Given that one of the five dimensions – direct democracy – is so
closely associated with a specific country – Switzerland, we have rerun
our analysis excluding the Swiss case. It turns out that the overall con-
figuration does not change very much if the Swiss case is excluded.7
However, the indicators for direct democracy and turnout become less
closely associated with the fourth dimension, which means that this
dimension becomes more of an equal participation dimension.
The positioning of the democracies
in the five-dimensional space
The fact that we have uncovered no less than five underlying dimen-
sions to the democratic space means that we can regroup the variety
of democracies in quite different ways. We shall present some of the
possible classifications in order to show the different configurations of
democracies.
Let us start with a focus on the liberal–illiberal dimension. The charac-
teristic of this dimension is that it does not involve any trade-offs. The
more liberal a democracy is according to our measurement, the better
it implements the basic preconditions for accountability. Thus, liberal
democracies are clearly superior to illiberal ones. We shall combine
the liberal dimension with the two dimensions of Lijphart’s typology
in order to see how the democracies as defined by Lijphart fare in
terms of the liberal–illiberal dimension. Figure 4.1 presents the combina-
tion of the consensus–majoritarian with the liberal–illiberal dimension.
In this figure, we divide the space created by the combination of these
two dimensions into four quadrants, which correspond to four types
of democracies – liberal–consensus democracies, liberal–majoritarian
democracies, illiberal–consensus democracies, and illiberal–majoritarian
democracies. The terms are to be understood in a relative sense. All of
these countries are democracies, but some are more consensual or liberal
than others.
What immediately strikes the eye is the greater liberalism of the long-
established democracies in Western Europe and in the Anglo-Saxon
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Figure 4.1 Liberal vs. illiberal and consensus vs. majoritarian democracies
world. Young democracies of Latin America (Peru – PER, Columbia –
COL, Venezuela – VEN, Mexico – MEX) and of South-eastern Europe
(Bulgaria – BGR, Romania – ROU, Croatia – HRV) are less liberal than the
democracies with a longer historical record. The same is the case, to a
more limited extent, for the democracies of Southern (Spain – ESP, Italy –
ITA, Portugal – PRT, Cyprus – CYP, Malta – MLT) and Central Europe
(Hungary – HUN, Czech Republic – CZE, Poland – POL, Slovenia – SVN),
and of Africa (South Africa – ZAF).
Among the liberal democracies, we find a clear separation between
the Anglo-Saxon, majoritarian group of countries (Great Britain – GBR,
USA, Canada – CAN, Australia – AUS, New Zealand – NZL), and the con-
sensus democracies of Scandinavia (Denmark – DNK, Finland – FIN,
Iceland – ISL, Norway – NOR, and Sweden – SWE) and the north-
west of the European continent (Belgium – BEL, Germany – DEU,
Luxembourg – LUX, the Netherlands – NLD). The most liberal democra-
cies turn out to be Denmark and Finland on the consensus side, and
Australia, Canada, and New Zealand on the majoritarian side. All of
these countries are characterized by very high values for equality before
the law, governing capacity, and property rights. What distinguishes
them is unconventional participation (higher on the majoritarian side)
10.1057/9781137299871 - Democracy in the Age of Globalization and Mediatization, Hanspeter Kriesi, Daniel Bochsler, Jörg Matthes,
Sandra Lavenex, Marc Bühlmann and Frank Esser
Co
py
rig
ht
 m
at
er
ia
l f
ro
m
 w
w
w
.
pa
lg
ra
v
ec
o
n
n
ec
t.c
om
 - 
lic
en
se
d 
to
 U
ZH
 H
au
pt
bi
bl
io
th
ek
 / 
Ze
nt
ra
lb
ib
lio
th
ek
 Z
ür
ic
h 
- P
al
gr
av
eC
on
ne
ct
 - 
20
13
-0
3-
29
82 Varieties of Democracy
and women’s representation (higher on the Scandinavian side). Sur-
prisingly, two traditional consensus democracies, Switzerland (CHE)
and Austria (AUT), turn out to be on the margin between consensus
and majoritarian countries. This is because our consensus–majoritarian
dimension measures the formal institutions (electoral system and its
direct consequences), rather than the functioning of the government,
and many Swiss and Austrian institutions are proportional only within
limits.
The rather illiberal democracies tend to be less clearly divided on the
consensus dimension. Many of them tend toward the middle ground.
Only Turkey (TUR) with weak trade unions, and a unique 10 per cent
legal threshold for national elections, which over long stretches results
in a dominant majority party system, appears as by far the most
majoritarian country of our dataset. South Africa, whose institutions
have been deliberately designed with the consensus model in mind,
constitutes the proportional extreme. In South Africa, the transitional
constitution of 1993 imposed the formation of grand coalition govern-
ments (all parties with more than 5 per cent of the vote had to form a
‘Government of National Unity’). The result was a consensual decision-
making process (Lijphart 1998: 144). Under the final constitution,
South Africa has a proportional electoral system and very proportional
electoral outcome, although it has a very low effective number of par-
liamentary parties and a high concentration of the parliamentary seats
(in the hands of the African National Congress (ANC)). This suggests
that Lijphart’s key dimension is mainly relevant for the long-established
democracies, while it has less purchase for the characterization of the
emerging democracies.
Next, we combine the liberal with the federal–centralized dimension,
as illustrated in Figure 4.2a and b. The countries are regrouped on both
sides of the liberal–illiberal divide. We find that the group of illiberal
countries usually has a highly centralized administration (measured by
fiscal centralization), and we find a negative trend between the two
dimensions (r=−0.34), with Brazil (BRA), Argentina (ARG), India (IND)
and Turkey being among the few exceptions (Figure 4.2a). Once we
exclude these four countries, the negative trend is accentuated. Taking
all three indicators of centralization and decentralization into account
(Figure 4.2b), we find that many of the fiscally centralized countries in
fact do have a federal or decentralized structure for their state adminis-
tration, but tend not to provide the lower levels of administration with
sufficient funds (Falleti 2005).
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Figure 4.2 (a) Liberal vs. illiberal democracies and fiscal centralization (b) Liberal
vs. illiberal and federalist vs. centralized democracies
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84 Varieties of Democracy
In Figure 4.2b, we observe a clear contrast between post-communist
countries and others. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe all
belong to the illiberal–centralized field, whereas most young democra-
cies in Latin America, South and South-east Asia (India and Philippines –
PHL), and South Africa belong to the illiberal, but federal–decentralized
group of countries, with the notable exceptions of Costa Rica (CRI) and
South Korea (KOR). On the liberal side, Germany, Switzerland, Australia
and the US are the highly federal countries, Belgium and Canada among
the decentralized democracies, too. All the other democracies in this
sample are more or less centralized.
Using our attempt to operationalize the two dimensions of Lijphart’s
typology, we are also able to reconstruct his two-dimensional concep-
tual map. Figure 4.3 presents the results in three parts. The first image
in Figure 4.3 reconstructs Lijphart’s map for the 24 countries which are
included both in his and our own sample, using his data for the period
1971–1996. The second image reconstructs the map for the same 24
countries, but now using our data and our model for the year 1995,
which overlaps with Lijphart’s period. The third image corresponds to
the reconstruction of the same map, but for all the 50 countries in our
sample, using our data and our model for the 1995–2007. Overall, the
three images are very similar, and we measure almost the same underly-
ing dimensions, as correlation tests show.8 Hence, the two dimensions
are quite robust: even if we modify the set of indicators, the period
covered or the set of countries included, the resulting configurations
of countries turn out to be rather stable.
Although the overall configurations are remarkably similar, some
countries have a somewhat different position in our space for 1990–2007
than in Lijphart’s space for 1971–1996. This may point to differences in
measurements, but it is certainly also a result of institutional change.
Thus, Italy has become both more federal and more majoritarian in our
configuration for 1995–2007, which is a reflection of the regionalization
and the adoption of a new electoral system which have taken place in
Italy in the meantime. Japan has made a similar shift toward a more
federal and more majoritarian position, again as a result of a change in
its electoral system from a rare system with some proportional features
(single non-transferable vote) to a mixed system in 1994. Switzerland,
to mention a third example, no longer is an extreme case, which is
a consequence of the slightly different set of indicators that we rely
upon. As already mentioned, we measure the proportional features of
the system, and do not have indicators for the consensus-oriented gov-
erning style (large coalitions, etc.). Austria becomes more centralized,
10.1057/9781137299871 - Democracy in the Age of Globalization and Mediatization, Hanspeter Kriesi, Daniel Bochsler, Jörg Matthes,
Sandra Lavenex, Marc Bühlmann and Frank Esser
Co
py
rig
ht
 m
at
er
ia
l f
ro
m
 w
w
w
.
pa
lg
ra
v
ec
o
n
n
ec
t.c
om
 - 
lic
en
se
d 
to
 U
ZH
 H
au
pt
bi
bl
io
th
ek
 / 
Ze
nt
ra
lb
ib
lio
th
ek
 Z
ür
ic
h 
- P
al
gr
av
eC
on
ne
ct
 - 
20
13
-0
3-
29
85
AUS
AUT
BEL
CAN
CRI
DNKFIN FRA
DEU
ISL
IRL
ITA
JPN
LUX
MLT
NLD
NZL
NOR
PRT
ESP
SWE
CHE
GBR
USA
–
2
–
1
0
1
2
Fe
de
ra
l–
ce
nt
ra
liz
e
d
–2 –1 0 1 2
Consensus–majoritarian
(a)
AUS
AUT
BEL CAN
CRI
CZE
DNK
FIN
FRA
DEU
ISL
IRL
ITA
JPN
LUX
MLT
NLD
NZL
NOR
PRT
ESP
SWE
CHE
GBR
USA
Ce
nt
ra
liz
at
io
n–
de
ce
nt
ra
liz
at
io
n
–
2
–
1
0
1
2
–2 –1 0 1 2
Consensus–majoritarian
(b)
Figure 4.3 Lijphart’s typology – consensus–majoritarian vs. federalist–
centralized democracies (a) Replication of Lijphart with his own data 1971–1996,
n=24 (b) Replication of Lijphart with our data 1995, n=24 (c) Replication of
Lijphart with our data, 1990–2007, N=50
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Figure 4.3 (Continued)
Iceland and Belgium, due to their large (and, in the case of Belgium
very regionalized) party systems and low disproportionality, more pro-
portional. France moves to the majoritarian end, due to very high
disproportionality of the two-round majority electoral system, and low
union density. The 26 democracies that were not covered by Lijphart
are spread out along the centralization–decentralization dimension, but,
as we have already pointed out, they vary less on the consensus–
majoritarian dimension, which leads to a crowded center space. Overall,
the democracies not covered by Lijphart are slightly more majoritarian
than his original cases.
With our five dimensions, we can also reconstruct Hendrik’s (2010)
fourfold typology empirically. Figure 4.4 presents the configuration
we obtain if we combine the consensus–majoritarian dimension with
the direct-democracy dimension. The resulting configuration sets
Switzerland apart. As we have suggested in our conceptual discussion,
it is this country that most closely resembles Hendrik’s ‘participatory
democracy’. In the other countries, direct-democratic elements are
much less developed, but apart from Luxembourg and Italy, sev-
eral new democracies are also rather on the direct-democratic side
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Figure 4.4 Hendrik (2010): consensus–majoritarian and direct–representative
democracies
(especially Poland, Slovenia, and several Latin American democracies).
The specificity of the Swiss case becomes even more apparent when
we combine the direct-democratic dimension with the federal one, as
is illustrated in Figure 4.5. It is the combination of direct-democratic
institutions with federalism which sets Switzerland apart from all the
other countries. The Latin-American countries Brazil, Venezuela, and
Columbia adopt a similar combination of federalism and direct democ-
racy, but in a much less pronounced way, while old federal cases (USA,
Germany, Austria, Canada) do not have any direct-democratic elements
at the national level.
Finally, let us also briefly discuss our last dimension – inclusiveness,
which refers to the inclusiveness of voting rights, and wage coordina-
tion, as a measure of inclusion of the labor unions in policy making.
Figure 4.6 illustrates the combination of federalism and inclusiveness.
Surprisingly, the relationship between the two dimensions is curvilinear:
both highly federal and highly centralized countries are less inclusive
than countries of average centralization. The most exclusive democra-
cies are the US, Australia, and South Africa on the federal side, and
Estonia, Luxembourg, and Lithuania on the centralized side. In the
US and in South Africa, registration for voting still poses a problem
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Figure 4.5 Representative–direct and federalist–centralized democracies
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Figure 4.6 Federalist–centralized democracies and inclusiveness. Curvilinear
relation at the 95% significance level
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for some groups of voters. In Europe, the most exclusive countries are
Estonia, where large parts of the ethnic Russian and Ukrainian minori-
ties do not have citizenship rights, Luxembourg, where due to a large
number of immigrants, the voting population is fairly restricted, and
Lithuania, with an unequal labor market (similar to other countries in
the region, Estonia and Poland).
Trade-offs
As we have seen, there are different visions of democracy, which cannot
all be implemented at one and the same time. This means that there are
trade-offs between the democratic ideals that can be attained by real-
world democracies. We have already pointed to one of these trade-offs
in our previous discussion.
The key insight that there are trade-offs between various aspects of
the democratic ideal has been clearly put into evidence by the studies of
Lijphart (1999) and Powell (2000), who have, each one in his own way,
tried to focus on the dilemmas faced by democratic institutional engi-
neering. The key trade-off which they have put into evidence is the one
involved in our second dimension, which we have modeled based on
their reasoning – the trade-off between vertical accountability and what
Powell calls ‘effective authorized representation’. Majoritarian democ-
racy maximizes vertical accountability, while consensus democracy
maximizes effective representation.
The indicator of disproportionality (the so-called Gallagher index,
measuring the extent to which the parliament’s composition mirrors
the vote distribution for parties), which we take as our measure for
effective representation, correlates very closely (r=−0.87) with the
consensus–majoritarian dimension (see Table 4.1), which is indicative
of the trade-off in question. Figure 4.7 illustrates the trade-off for our
50 countries. Note that this figure very closely resembles Powell’s (2000:
235, Figure 10.1) illustration of the trade-off between majoritarian and
proportional processes. While disproportionality is closely related to
the proportional–majoritarian dimension, two majoritarian countries
do slightly better on this trade-off: The US has a fairly low degree of
disproportionality, because there are very few votes cast for small parties,
whereas in India, the regional differentiation of the party system leads to
more proportionality. The US proved to be exceptional in Powell’s anal-
ysis, too. However, the other exception in Powell’s study – Germany – no
longer appears to be exceptional according to our data, since it turns out
to be much more consensual than according to Powell’s measurements.
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Figure 4.7 Proportionality of representation and consensus–majoritarian
democracies. Correlation: −0.87
Powell also introduced a measure for the politicians’ responsiveness
to their voters’ preferences by comparing the median voters’ position
on the left–right scale with the corresponding position of the median
legislators. In his analysis, the proportional vision of democracy proved
to be unambiguously more responsive than the majoritarian vision.
In other words, vertical accountability can only be increased at the cost
of decreasing responsiveness. We can confirm this relationship, using
the Democracy Barometer’s indicator for responsiveness (issuecongr),
which is constructed in line with Powell’s indicator. Figure 4.8 provides
the illustration. The correlation between the consensus–majoritarian
dimension and issue congruence has the expected sign, but is not signif-
icant for the whole sample of 50 countries (r=−0.17). However, once we
remove two outliers, it becomes quite substantial (r=−0.34) and highly
significant. The two outliers include an ‘over performer’ (Canada),
whose politics are highly responsive in spite of its majoritarian system,
and an ‘underperformer’ (South Africa), whose politics are less respon-
sive than we would have expected on the basis of its position on the
consensus dimension.
We also find the expected clear-cut trade-off between direct and
representative democracy; a trade-off between effective and equal
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Figure 4.8 Issue congruence and consensus–majoritarian democracies. Correla-
tion: −0.17; after exclusion of South Africa and Canada: −0.34
participation in the representative channel and the number of national
referendums. As has been argued by Swiss scholars (Linder 1994:
132–134), elections are less important in a system like the Swiss one,
where the voters do not provide their representatives with a general-
ized credit of support for the duration of a legislative period, but where
they can withdraw their support selectively in specific direct-democratic
votes in the course of a legislative period. In a related argument, Franklin
(2004: 92–98) credits the low electoral turnout in Switzerland to the lack
of accountability in the Swiss system, where elections have not changed
the composition of the government since the formation of the grand
coalition between the four major parties in 1959.9 The link between
Franklin’s argument and the effect of direct-democratic institutions is
provided by Vatter’s argument discussed earlier, which maintains that
direct-democratic institutions provide an incentive for the extension of
government coalitions to all major parties.
This trade-off is illustrated by Figure 4.9. Our indicator for
direct democracy is highly negatively correlated with this dimension
(r = −0.73). The size of this correlation is largely attributable to the
Swiss case, but even if we leave out this outlier, the negative correlation
is still important (r=−0.38) and significant. In the paradigmatic Swiss
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Figure 4.9 Direct democracy and representative democracy. Correlation without
CH: −0.39
case, strong direct-democratic influence, indeed, goes together with very
low electoral participation and, correspondingly, very high electoral
political inequality. For both of these indicators, Switzerland has the
lowest values in this sample. As Linder (1994: 134) has observed, it seems
that we cannot have it both ways. Maximum influence in both vota-
tions and elections are impossible to realize in the same political system.
We are therefore limited to looking for ‘optimal’ voters ‘influence’.
There are some other, less well-known trade-offs involved in our con-
ceptual map of democracy as well. One concerns the liberal dimension:
quite surprisingly, there is a trade-off between the extent to which
democracies have implemented the liberal principle and judicial review.
We had expected judicial review to be part of the liberal–illiberal dimen-
sion, but, as already pointed out, it actually is negatively correlated
with this dimension (r=−0.43). The reason is that the new democra-
cies, which tend to have difficulties with the implementation of the
liberal principle, also tend to have institutionalized procedures for judi-
cial review, while some of the established democracies do not know
such procedures. The most extreme case is, of course, the UK, where
parliament is sovereign and the judiciary has no effective option for
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Figure 4.10 Liberal–illiberal democracies and judicial review. Correlation: −0.43,
without outliers: −0.27
controlling political decisions. Similarly, in Switzerland the Supreme
Court’s authority is heavily curtailed by the direct-democratic proce-
dures, which attribute sovereignty to the electorate (and which is also
the reason why judicial review is positively associated with the repre-
sentative democracy, see Table 4.1). The Netherlands and New Zealand
also belong to the group of established democracies with only limited
procedures of judicial review. Once we remove these four outliers, the
relationship between the liberal dimension and judicial review weakens,
but remains negative (r=−0.27) (Figure 4.10).
Conclusion
In this chapter, we have made an attempt to map out the variety of
existing democracies. Our exploratory analysis has shown that there
are, indeed, quite different ways to implement the democratic princi-
ples, each of which has its own advantages and disadvantages. This is
all trivial. Most importantly, this idea of multiple versions of the demo-
cratic ideal challenges the existing indices of the quality of democracy.
All of these rank countries on a single scale from more to less demo-
cratic. They assume that there is a unidimensional model of democracy,
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so that all aspects of democracy can be related to a single scale. The most
well-known of these indices, which are habitually used by researchers to
measure the quality of democracy of different countries, are the Free-
dom House and the Polity IV index. These indices have, for example,
been used by most of the studies of democratization which we have pre-
sented in Chapter 2. The Democracy Barometer also allows assessment
of the quality of democracies on a unidimensional scale. Contrary to
the established indices, which rate all the countries in the world, the
Democracy Barometer has, however, been designed to provide a more
detailed assessment of the world’s best democracies, which reach the
top values on the scales of the established indices.10
The question is, of course, how these unidimensional scales of democ-
racy relate to our five-dimensional space of democracy. We have empiri-
cally tested this question by predicting the average scores of the various
countries for the period 1990–2007 on the three indices – Freedom
House, Polity IV, and Democracy Barometer – by their values on our five
dimensions. The Freedom House index provides a value for all of our
50 countries, Polity IV for 47 of them (excluding Iceland, Luxemburg,
and Malta), and the Democracy Barometer assesses a subset of these 50
countries – the sample of the 30 ‘best democracies’.11 Table 4.2 presents
the results, using straightforward OLS-regressions.12
As it turns out, the quality assessments of all three indices is above
all a function of the implementation of the liberal principle. Their
scale values most heavily depend on the countries’ scores on the
liberal–illiberal dimension. In the case of Freedom House, the sign is
negative, because the Freedom House scale assigns higher values to non-
democratic regimes. This result is very interesting. On the one hand,
it is not surprising at all, since the liberal–illiberal dimension is the
one that does not include any trade-offs. In other words, the indices
measure mainly the one dimension which allows for a clear ranking
in terms of the fundamental principles. On the other hand, with two
exceptions, these indices have very little to say about the comparative
advantages of the varieties of democracy in terms of the other four
dimensions. The first exception concerns the consensus–majoritarian
dimension. Both the Democracy Barometer and the Freedom House
scores confirm Lijphart’s (1999) contention that consensus democracies
are ‘better’, that is, ‘kinder and gentler’ than majoritarian democra-
cies. Both indicators suggest that for the 50 countries included in the
analysis (Freedom House scores), and the 30 countries of the blueprint
sample of the Democracy Barometer, consensus democracies turn out
to be significantly ‘more democratic’ than majoritarian democracies.13
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Table 4.2 The quality of democracy as assessed by the Polity IV, Freedom
House, and Democracy Barometer, explained by our five dimensions, unstan-
dardized regression coefficients and t-values, for average values during the period
1990–2007
Polity IV (b/t) Freedom
Housea (b/t)
Democracy
Barometer (b/t)
Liberal–illiberal 1.148∗∗∗ −1.408∗∗∗ 14.019∗∗∗
(6.05) (−11.84) (5.49)
Federal–centralized 0.253 −0.470∗∗∗ −0.102
(1.23) (−3.67) (−0.05)
Consensus–
majoritarian
−0.095 0.291∗ −5.162∗
(−0.46) (2.25) (−2.74)
Direct–representative −0.298 0.159 1.129
(−1.40) (1.19) (0.62)
Inclusive–exclusive −0.26 0.377∗∗ 3.414
(−1.19) (2.82) (1.60)
Constant 8.937∗∗∗ 3.504∗∗∗ 56.509∗∗∗
(47.77) (30.06) (23.65)
Adjusted R2 0.43 0.77 0.62
N 47 50 30
Significance levels: ∗ = 0.05,∗∗ = 0.01,∗∗∗ =0.001.
aContrary to the other two indicators, the Freedom House indicator has low values for
democratic systems, and high values for non-democratic systems.
The second exception regards the third and the fifth dimension. For
the countries included in our sample, Freedom House tends to rate
more centralized and rather exclusive models of democracy as better
democracies.
We would like to conclude by pointing out that the exercise in this
chapter is only a beginning. Next, we should explore the correlates of
the variety of democracies. Except for the liberal dimension, which has
essentially been operationalized by the established indices, and except
for Lijphart’s (1999) discussion of the determinants of consensus democ-
racy, this is a largely open task. We should also explore the validity and
reliability of our five dimensions: are they, indeed, the key dimensions
along which existing democracies tend to vary, and are they stable over
time and over different country samples? We do not maintain that we
have found the definite set of dimensions, but our results suggest that
there is definitely more variation than that which is captured by the
existing indices (Freedom House and Polity IV), or by the dominant
(Lijphart’s) typology.
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96Appendix 1: Definition of the 19 indicators
Indicator Description Names in the Democracy
Barometer
Consensus–majoritarian
Effective number of
parliamentary parties
Effective number of parliamentary parties enpp
Electoral proportionality Reversed Gallagher Index, which essentially compares the distribution of seats in
parliament with the distribution of votes for the different parties
gallagindex
Proportionality of the
electoral system
We take the log of the minimum of mean district magnitude (meandistrict) and legal
electoral thresholds (dpi_thresh). The log takes into account the decreasing marginal
importance of additional seats in the electoral district. Following Lijphart (1994), we
also convert legal electoral thresholds into the equivalent of mean district
magnitude, to account for electoral systems that are restrictive due to high legal
thresholds.
elsystem = logn
(min{meandistrict,
100/dpi_thresh})
Wage coordination Index of degree of coordination of wage bargaining, from 1 (bargaining at company
level) to 5 (economy-wide bargaining) (Visser 2011)
wcoord
Union density Union membership as a percentage of wage and salary earners union
Federalist–centralized
Constitutional division of
territorial power
Federalism nonfed
Bicameralism Non-bicameralism nonbicam
Sub-national fiscal autonomy Mean of two measures of fiscal decentralization: sub-national expenditures as a
percentage of the total national expenditures (subexp), and sub-national revenues as
a percentage of the total national revenues (subrev)
subexp, subrev
Liberal–illiberal
Equality before the law Mean of two indices measuring effective impartiality of the legal system (impcourts)
and the integrity of the legal system (integrlegal)
impcourts, integrlegal
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Freedom of press Mean of two indices of informational openness, measuring the legal environment of
press freedom (legmedia) and the lack of effective political control of the media
(polmedia)
legmedia, polmedia
Effective property rights Mean of the legal protection of private property (propright) and a measure of de
facto protection of personal security and private property (secprop)
propright, secprop
Government capacity An index we created from a combination of indicators for conditions of efficient
implementation – a public service independent from political interference (publser),
bureaucracy quality (bureau) and effective implementation of government decisions
(govdec), as well as indicators for the absence of corruption (bribcorr, corruption
perception index (CPI)) and the willingness for transparent communication (transp)
(see Appendix 4).
publser, bureau, govdec,
bribcorr, transp
Effective unconventional
participation
An index we created from a combination of indicators for freedom of association
(memhuman, memenviron), which measure membership in humanitarian and
environmental/animal rights organizations respectively, and effective and equal
non-institutionalized participation (petitions, and a summary indicator of different
forms of inequalities in non-institutional participation, par_eqpa3) (see Appendix 4).
memhum, memenviron,
petitions, par_eqpa3
Adequate representation of
women
The proportion of female representatives in the lower house of parliament as a
percentage of all seats
womrep
Judicial review Mean of two measures of the possibility that courts can review the constitutionality
of laws (judrev) and whether the judiciary has the final say over all laws (powjudi)
judrev, powjudi
Direct–representative
Turnout The participation rate as a percentage of the registered electorate in parliamentary
elections of respective or previous years (parlvote)
parlvote
Equality of electoral
participation
A summary index composed of four indicators, measuring inequalities in turnout
with regard to education, income (repturnined), gender, and age (repturngeag)
Returnined, repturngeag
Frequency of national
referendums
The number of national referendums voted in a given year (ref_nat). We rely on the
logarithm of the number of national referendums (increased by 1) to take into
account the declining marginal importance of additional referendums.
ref_nat
Inclusive–exclusive
Inclusion The registered voters as a percentage of the voting age population regprovap
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98Appendix 2: 19 indicators for 50 advanced democracies, averages 1990–2007
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Argentina ARG 12.8 34.0 34.9 24.0 28.7 29.2 23.8 2.4 −10.7 49.6 33.4 0.6 78.3 5.1 50.0 0.0 1.0 29.4 99.3
Australia AUS 88.4 87.5 94.7 75.9 83.3 33.7 6.8 0.0 −10.0 27.8 28.6 0.9 95.2 2.2 100.0 0.0 0.0 39.9 86.9
Austria AUT 83.8 74.8 100.2 48.2 59.8 51.8 18.0 3.0 −1.9 75.0 38.3 0.7 82.2 1.4 50.0 1.0 2.0 53.1 92.2
Belgium BEL 62.9 55.8 81.0 71.0 84.4 44.1 86.1 2.0 −3.6 84.7 53.4 0.7 91.4 0.0 50.0 0.2 1.0 70.6 92.4
Brazil BRA 18.4 37.2 30.6 52.0 37.2 10.8 88.7 2.9 −3.7 58.2 30.2 0.3 79.5 15.7 75.0 0.0 0.0 38.0 97.9
Bulgaria BGR 20.3 23.4 9.1 20.1 31.8 31.0 14.7 2.0 −7.0 31.3 41.1 0.7 68.1 1.2 97.2 2.0 2.0 76.3 108.3
Canada CAN 85.5 86.9 93.7 70.1 73.4 39.8 10.0 0.0 −13.1 0.0 31.2 0.7 64.7 1.4 75.0 0.0 2.0 2.8 89.6
Chile CHL 50.4 65.7 81.7 30.1 43.2 27.8 49.1 0.7 −6.9 38.9 16.4 0.4 88.1 10.3 25.0 2.0 0.0 86.5 84.2
Colombia COL −28.1 32.1 17.2 26.2 −5.7 32.8 36.5 1.6 −6.4 32.9 6.4 0.6 42.1 14.1 98.6 1.1 0.0 55.4 87.0
Costa Rica CRI 28.7 38.9 31.3 33.2 72.0 34.6 11.1 2.1 −5.2 31.6 15.4 0.7 73.4 1.4 100.0 2.0 2.0 95.2 100.5
Croatia HRV 41.6 22.1 3.3 43.7 −5.4 25.4 14.1 2.6 −10.8 47.9 62.1 0.8 68.4 1.1 100.0 2.0 1.2 82.8 106.8
Cyprus CYP 54.6 52.9 57.9 41.0 59.2 8.3 23.7 1.2 −2.5 25.0 70.4 0.6 91.3 0.0 100.0 2.0 2.0 94.1 84.3
Czech
Republic
CZE 39.1 40.9 52.7 49.7 60.1 17.6 25.4 2.9 −7.0 40.3 45.5 0.7 75.6 1.4 100.0 1.5 1.0 69.3 101.1
Denmark DNK 94.0 96.1 96.9 61.4 87.7 65.7 37.2 2.4 −1.6 56.9 74.3 0.8 85.2 5.4 75.0 2.0 2.0 31.7 96.8
Estonia EST 40.9 53.5 41.6 33.6 64.0 26.1 43.8 2.2 −5.6 1.7 29.3 0.6 65.4 2.2 100.0 2.0 2.0 61.6 77.9
Finland FIN 91.0 97.2 98.8 51.8 79.9 75.8 43.5 2.6 −3.4 68.1 75.9 0.7 66.8 1.4 50.0 2.0 2.0 45.7 103.7
France FRA 61.0 61.5 67.0 51.7 64.8 25.6 13.2 0.0 −19.4 25.0 8.8 0.5 64.4 4.1 50.0 2.0 1.0 68.2 85.6
Germany DEU 80.3 70.5 91.3 51.6 72.6 58.0 21.2 2.4 −3.3 75.0 26.3 0.8 79.5 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 36.5 92.5
Greece GRC 40.6 36.6 61.5 68.8 36.3 11.1 4.6 1.7 −7.1 75.0 29.5 0.4 77.0 0.0 50.0 2.0 2.0 94.3 110.0
Hungary HUN 49.3 45.2 55.9 19.4 52.4 15.3 14.8 0.9 −11.5 25.0 29.5 0.4 67.8 6.2 100.0 2.0 2.0 70.9 91.9
Iceland ISL 86.5 87.7 91.1 53.9 87.9 49.0 26.1 2.1 −2.0 52.4 88.9 0.7 86.1 0.0 75.0 2.0 2.0 56.6 101.5
India IND 36.2 26.5 49.2 40.7 26.8 12.9 39.7 0.0 −7.7 26.4 10.6 0.7 58.8 15.5 50.0 0.0 0.0 29.8 105.4
Ireland IRL 84.5 80.4 86.0 39.3 69.8 25.7 17.9 1.4 −5.3 94.4 43.4 0.7 66.0 17.0 100.0 2.0 2.0 72.0 104.9
Israel ISR 58.2 64.3 69.6 36.6 37.4 17.2 60.2 4.3 −2.2 25.0 24.8 0.8 71.5 1.1 50.0 2.0 2.0 81.6 108.2
10.1057/9781137299871 - Democracy in the Age of Globalization and Mediatization, Hanspeter Kriesi, Daniel Bochsler, Jörg Matthes, Sandra Lavenex, Marc Bühlmann and Frank Esser
C
o
p
y
r
i
g
h
t
 
m
a
t
e
r
i
a
l
 
f
r
o
m
 
w
w
w
.
p
a
l
g
r
a
v
e
c
o
n
n
e
c
t
.
c
o
m
 
-
 
l
i
c
e
n
s
e
d
 
t
o
 
U
Z
H
 
H
a
u
p
t
b
i
b
l
i
o
t
h
e
k
 
/
 
Z
e
n
t
r
a
l
b
i
b
l
i
o
t
h
e
k
 
Z
ü
r
i
c
h
 
-
 
P
a
l
g
r
a
v
e
C
o
n
n
e
c
t
 
-
2
0
1
3
-
0
3
-
2
9
99
Italy ITA 48.2 36.8 56.3 42.2 57.4 19.7 50.7 1.0 −8.4 69.4 36.0 0.5 8.3 31.0 75.0 1.0 1.0 67.5 104.4
Japan JPN 61.0 57.0 87.6 40.5 66.7 11.5 25.8 1.2 −10.0 62.5 22.0 0.6 61.7 0.0 50.0 2.0 1.0 29.3 99.8
Lithuania LTU 38.1 29.1 12.1 39.4 63.1 23.4 27.5 1.7 −10.0 1.4 13.5 0.5 58.1 1.3 100.0 2.0 2.0 65.8 91.5
Luxembourg LUX 84.4 77.5 89.5 75.5 83.3 38.9 28.4 2.7 −4.1 27.8 43.4 0.3 88.8 1.4 50.0 2.0 2.0 81.1 67.3
Malta MLT 62.2 54.2 59.5 34.7 57.9 10.5 0.5 1.6 −1.5 0.0 64.5 0.7 96.1 1.4 100.0 2.0 2.0 99.3 99.9
Mexico MEX 12.0 33.0 31.4 41.1 4.3 26.4 9.3 2.9 −5.4 63.3 21.0 0.7 59.1 0.0 75.0 0.0 0.0 54.0 91.5
Netherlands NLD 89.1 85.4 84.7 109.6 73.1 58.7 40.5 4.6 −1.1 75.0 23.3 0.8 78.3 1.4 0.0 2.0 1.0 69.0 96.4
New
Zealand
NZL 88.3 93.3 89.8 85.9 86.0 42.1 14.3 2.5 −7.6 6.9 26.9 0.8 83.5 10.5 25.0 2.0 2.0 84.4 93.7
Norway NOR 87.3 84.8 93.3 57.5 84.4 80.8 36.1 2.3 −3.4 81.9 55.9 0.7 76.8 1.4 75.0 2.0 1.0 57.5 98.3
Peru PER 7.1 22.1 6.3 32.3 −8.3 24.9 29.5 2.7 −5.8 21.8 6.6 0.7 76.8 0.4 75.0 2.0 1.0 77.9 91.1
Philippines PHL −1.6 27.3 34.6 22.9 29.1 21.8 15.4 0.0 −6.2 21.0 17.0 0.8 68.3 3.5 75.0 1.0 0.0 89.1 83.4
Poland POL 40.9 33.1 32.5 19.8 47.9 22.6 39.5 2.7 −9.4 0.0 32.0 0.3 47.3 6.2 50.0 2.0 1.0 67.0 102.0
Portugal PRT 58.8 51.5 67.5 15.7 70.2 24.4 7.3 2.4 −5.3 50.0 21.3 0.6 64.5 2.2 100.0 2.0 2.0 84.5 112.9
Romania ROU 25.0 23.4 0.4 18.2 15.6 13.8 26.0 1.9 −5.8 36.0 51.7 0.5 69.0 9.2 75.0 2.0 1.2 75.6 100.9
Slovakia SVK 38.8 34.6 28.4 48.9 29.7 27.9 40.6 3.3 −5.8 59.7 38.8 0.8 77.6 10.0 100.0 1.5 1.8 86.0 99.1
Slovenia SVN 58.4 40.9 39.8 30.7 56.4 22.9 53.9 2.4 −3.7 66.7 40.0 0.4 72.6 2.7 50.0 2.0 2.0 80.3 101.3
South
Africa
ZAF 27.6 42.2 23.5 26.8 37.5 39.6 2.8 3.3 −0.3 49.8 35.3 0.5 83.0 0.0 100.0 1.3 0.0 57.1 72.1
South
Korea
KOR 36.2 42.1 78.8 46.2 47.8 9.7 11.1 2.0 −10.2 58.0 12.1 0.4 63.2 0.0 100.0 2.0 2.0 56.4 100.3
Spain ESP 56.7 57.3 67.0 21.9 67.8 46.8 9.6 1.9 −6.2 58.3 15.8 0.6 74.9 1.4 25.0 1.0 1.0 49.9 104.0
Sweden SWE 87.4 84.3 79.2 85.7 82.9 81.3 29.3 2.5 −1.8 56.9 79.6 0.8 83.4 2.7 50.0 2.0 2.0 43.8 96.1
Switzerland CHE 79.0 85.7 90.6 58.8 81.8 36.6 51.2 2.2 −3.2 58.3 21.3 0.1 45.0 80.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 15.4 83.4
Thailand THA 24.4 35.1 69.7 40.3 17.7 8.5 34.4 2.9 −11.1 46.3 3.2 0.8 67.4 6.3 75.0 2.0 1.0 87.5 99.1
Turkey TUR 25.3 34.3 58.6 8.2 −29.2 5.3 19.5 1.9 −18.1 73.1 12.8 0.8 83.5 0.0 50.0 2.0 2.0 12.4 94.1
United
Kingdom
GBR 87.1 77.6 80.5 59.2 59.9 29.5 3.9 0.0 −15.8 0.0 31.9 0.7 67.5 0.0 0.0 2.0 2.0 73.6 96.9
United
States
USA 78.0 74.0 85.9 80.5 78.5 23.8 0.4 0.0 −3.5 0.0 13.5 0.7 59.4 0.0 75.0 0.0 0.0 22.3 72.9
Venezuela VEN −16.0 16.0 10.3 41.5 8.3 19.7 26.1 1.9 −7.2 41.0 16.4 0.4 48.6 14.6 100.0 0.0 0.6 97.5 85.6
Overall
mean
51.3 54.1 59.1 45.6 51.4 30.8 27.3 2.0 −6.6 43.1 33.4 0.6 72.5 5.9 69.4 1.4 1.3 62.5 94.9
shaded: imputed values
10.1057/9781137299871 - Democracy in the Age of Globalization and Mediatization, Hanspeter Kriesi, Daniel Bochsler, Jörg Matthes, Sandra Lavenex, Marc Bühlmann and Frank Esser
C
o
p
y
r
i
g
h
t
 
m
a
t
e
r
i
a
l
 
f
r
o
m
 
w
w
w
.
p
a
l
g
r
a
v
e
c
o
n
n
e
c
t
.
c
o
m
 
-
 
l
i
c
e
n
s
e
d
 
t
o
 
U
Z
H
 
H
a
u
p
t
b
i
b
l
i
o
t
h
e
k
 
/
 
Z
e
n
t
r
a
l
b
i
b
l
i
o
t
h
e
k
 
Z
ü
r
i
c
h
 
-
 
P
a
l
g
r
a
v
e
C
o
n
n
e
c
t
 
-
2
0
1
3
-
0
3
-
2
9
100
Appendix 3: Correlations between the 19 indicators
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Equality before law 1.00
Governing capacity 0.90 1.00
Property rights 0.84 0.88 1.00
Non-conventional
participation
0.62 0.64 0.57 1.00
Freedom of press 0.82 0.79 0.72 0.56 1.00
Representation of women 0.55 0.66 0.45 0.47 0.54 1.00
Eff number of
parliamentary parties
−0.04−0.01−0.01 0.08 0.04 0.08 1.00
Proportionality (district
magnitude)
−0.04−0.03−0.13 0.06−0.10 0.25 0.33 1.00
Disproportionality
(Gallagher index)
0.20 0.25 0.11 0.22 0.32 0.42 0.27 0.49 1.00
Wage coordination 0.13 0.11 0.24 0.08 0.02 0.31 0.28 0.38 0.26 1.00
Union density 0.46 0.38 0.21 0.22 0.38 0.46 0.11 0.17 0.44 0.21 1.00
Equality of participation 0.16 0.19 0.16 0.15−0.02 0.26 −0.26 −0.01 −0.01 0.03 0.15 1.00
Turnout 0.37 0.30 0.31 0.25 0.27 0.20 0.04 0.11 0.26 0.20 0.47 0.32 1.00
Referendums/direct
democracy
−0.01 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.05−0.06 0.33 −0.05 0.07 0.12−0.14−0.47−0.34 1.00
Judicial review −0.37−0.39−0.41−0.34−0.19−0.24 −0.24 −0.05 0.07−0.10 0.10 0.17−0.01−0.26 1.00
Unitary (no territorial
division)
0.14 0.04−0.02−0.16 0.03−0.01 −0.12 0.23 −0.06−0.06 0.25 0.04 0.15−0.32 0.00 1.00
Single chamber (no
bicameralism)
0.33 0.19 0.16 0.01 0.23 0.06 −0.15 0.17 −0.06−0.05 0.40 0.09 0.22−0.31 0.05 0.66 1.00
Fiscal centralization −0.25−0.34−0.35−0.16−0.14−0.26 −0.06 0.18 0.13−0.14 0.05−0.02 0.15−0.21 0.20 0.51 0.27 1.00
Inclusion 0.01−0.17−0.07−0.21−0.09−0.07 0.07 0.21 −0.07 0.32 0.18 0.22−0.03−0.08−0.01 0.27 0.35 0.15 1.00
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Appendix 4: Factor analyses for specific indices
a) Government capacity
Variable Factor1 Uniqueness
publser 0.86 0.26
govdec 0.83 0.31
bureau 0.74 0.45
bribcorr 0.96 0.08
cpi 0.95 0.10
transp 0.69 0.52
EW 4.28
b) Non-conventional political participation
Variable Factor1 Uniqueness
memhuman 0.63 0.61
memenviron 0.64 0.59
par_eqpa3 0.62 0.61
petitions 0.64 0.59
EW 1.60
Notes
1. http://www.democracybarometer.org.
2. Average Freedom House scores below 1.5 and Polity IV scores above 8 for
the period 1995–2005, more than 250,000 inhabitants. Imputing only two
indicators for a restricted number of countries, we have a complete dataset
for 50 countries: the indicator for direct democracy (directd) is fully available
for 35 countries, and imputed for the other 15 cases; the indicator for wage
coordination is available for 49 countries, and imputed for one country.
3. Cited by Zakaria (2007: 17).
4. Lijphart’s choice of indicators for these two concepts has been heavily criti-
cized. With respect to executive dominance, Tsebelis (2002: 111) has pointed
out that Lijphart attributed ‘impressionistic’ values to no less than 11 of his
36 countries for his indicator of this concept. Vatter (2009: 134) uses an
improved indicator based on Siaroff (2003) and Schnapp and Harfst (2005).
We did not use this indicator, however, because it is available for less than
half of our set of countries, and only for a limited period of time. Vatter also
criticizes Lijphart’s use of minimal winning one-party cabinets, since his cat-
egory of single-party cabinets includes both single-party minority cabinets
(which are linked to consensual patterns of decision making) and single-
party majority cabinets. He proposes an improved version of this indicator,
which is, however, again not (yet) available for a sufficient number of our
cases.
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102 Varieties of Democracy
5. We dropped Lijphart’s indicator for central bank autonomy, which is not
inherently linked to the federalism–centralization dimension. In fact, in
Vatter’s (2009: 143f.) analysis, this indicator is more closely associated with
Lijphart’s first dimension.
6. In a factor analysis, the relative importance of a resulting dimension is
measured by the so called Eigenvalue of the dimension, which is reported
in the last row in Table 4.1. Among other things, the relative importance
of a dimension depends heavily on the number of indicators used for its
operationalization. It is, therefore, not very surprising that the liberal dimen-
sion, for which we had more indicators at our disposal than for the other
dimensions, turns out to be the most important one; and the inclusive-
ness dimension, for which we had just one suitable indicator, the least
important one. Substantively, however, all five dimensions are of equal
importance to us.
7. Compared to Table 4.1, the Eigenvalues of four dimensions change only
little, whereas the Eigenvalue of the representative–direct-democracy dimen-
sion drops substantially: 4.8/4.9, 2.1/1.9, 1.6/1.7, 1.6/1.0, 1.1/1.2.
8. Lijphart’s two dimensions correlate at 0.77 and 0.84, respectively, with the
corresponding dimensions from our model, when we use the data for 1995
for the set of 24 countries. The correlations are 0.71 and 0.83 respectively, if
we replace the data for 1995 with the means for the entire period 1990–2007,
and include the 50 best democracies.
9. Since Franklin’s book has been published, the composition of the Swiss gov-
ernment has again been changed after the elections in 2003 and after a party
split in 2008.
10. The Democracy Barometer shows how democratic the 30 best democra-
cies are, NCCR Newsletter No. 8, February 2011, Die Vermessung freier
Gesellschaften – Das Demokratiebarometer bietet ein differenziertes Bild
WZB Mitteilungen, Heft 131, März 2011.
11. Democracy Barometer scores measuring the quality of democracy are avail-
able for 30 countries, with a value of 1.5 or below on the combined Freedom
House Scores and a Polity IV Score of 9 or above during the whole time span
between 1995 and 2007.
12. One might argue that OLS-regressions are not appropriate for predicting the
Freedom House and Polity IV values. In their case, the data are largely right-
censored, given that the countries in the subset of the 30 best democracies
reach the maximum value on the respective scales or fall only slightly short
of it. In order to check for this sensitive issue, we have rerun our analy-
ses for these two scales using censored-normal regression. Substantively, the
results are largely identical with the ones presented in Table 4.2, although the
variance explained is much more limited (Pseudo-R2 =0.26 in both cases).
13. Note: majoritarian democracies have high values on the consensus–
majoritarian dimension. Centralized and inclusive democracies have high
values on the federal–centralized and the inclusive–exclusive dimension.
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Part II
The Challenges of Globalization
and Mediatization
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5
Globalization and the Vertical
Challenge to Democracy
Sandra Lavenex
Modern democracy has emerged in parallel with the consolidation of
the Western nation-state. This process was characterized by the rela-
tive congruence of state and boundary formation, nation building, and
cultural standardization. Like its forerunners, the direct-democratic city
republics of ancient Greece, the modern model of majoritarian repre-
sentative democracy was based on the existence of a clearly delimited
demos. In a representative democracy, the demos is composed of a
shared sense of identity, a common public sphere, and a high level
of political structuring through political parties and other intermediary
organizations (see also Chapter 3).
From the perspective of international relations, the current
de-bordering of societal and political transactions associated with the
term globalization contributes as much to the external diffusion of
democracy as it yields the internal decomposition of this historical pro-
cess of democratic-state formation. On the one hand, an ever-growing
array of national and international political actors and institutions are
active in the promotion of democracy beyond the Western world. Espe-
cially since the demise of the communist bloc, democracy has been
heralded as the only legitimate form of government and has become
a global point of reference at the national as well as the international
level.
At the same time as democracy is being promoted as a global norm
abroad, it is being deprived of some of its fundamental tenets ‘at home’.
From the perspective of the Western democratic states, the contem-
porary challenges of internationalization and Europeanization may be
regarded as yielding the ‘third transformation’ of democracy that is
‘associated with a great increase in the scale of the political system’
beyond the nation-state (Dahl 1994: 21, see also Blatter 2009; Grande
105
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106 Globalization and the Vertical Challenge to Democracy
2000; Schimmelfennig 2010; Zürn 2000). The spatial reconfiguration of
the political system is driven by the contiguous and yet uneven forces
of (inherently partial) societal denationalization and political reorder-
ing. Whereas societal denationalization undermines the territorial scope
of national policies political reordering, expressed in increasing inter-
national cooperation and the emergence of supranational polities,
progresses at a slower pace – and yields new perils for the exercise
of democracy. Robert Dahl has conceptualized these transformations
as a fundamental dilemma between effectiveness and participation, or
between ‘the ability of the citizens to exercise democratic control over
the decisions of the polity versus the capacity of the system to respond
satisfactorily to the collective preferences of its citizens’ (Dahl 1994: 21).
This chapter deals with the challenge of globalization with regard
to the vertical transformation of democracy in the democratic world.
Globalization is thereby conceptualized in terms of internationalization
and Europeanization of politics – that is the extension and the shift of
political processes beyond the nation-state toward supranational poli-
ties, notably the EU, and international organizations. The second aspect
of globalization, the horizontal spread of democracy to authoritarian
states, is the subject of Chapter 6. In order to highlight the plurality
of theoretical perspectives on the question of vertical transformation of
democracy, we first introduce three ideal types of international polity
formation: the intergovernmental organization, the federal superstate,
and the multilevel polity, each posing different challenges to democracy.
Whereas the first two models vindicate the statist notion of representa-
tive democracy by either emphasizing the enduring primacy of the state
(intergovernmentalism) or advocating its merging into a larger polity
(federalism), the notion of multilevel governance underlines on the
one hand the persistent and fluid interlinkages between domestic and
supranational levels of governance and, on the other hand, the diffu-
sion of authority away from the traditional representative institutions
toward decentered, functionally specific, and non-majoritarian insti-
tutions (Hooghe and Marks 2003). Embracing this transformationalist
concept of multilevel politics, we then link up with the representative
model of democracy presented in Chapter 3 and discuss the chal-
lenges posed by multilevel internationalization and Europeanization.
Five problems are distinguished: congruence, inclusion, transparency,
accountability, and responsiveness. Based on this review, we will make
the case that the extent to which internationalization poses a challenge
to democracy depends very much on the way international politics are
anchored in domestic democracy. Concurring with Dahl, and providing
evidence from various empirical research projects, we argue that in order
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Sandra Lavenex 107
to avoid ‘the danger [ . . . ] that the third transformation will not lead
to an extension of the democratic idea beyond the national state but
to the victory in that domain of de facto guardianship [ . . . ] democratic
institutions within countries would need to be improved’ (Dahl 1994: 33,
emphasis added).
The vertical transformation of democracy
At the same time as democracy has lost its ideological competitors, it
is being challenged and transformed from within. Three developments
contribute to this internal transformation: the denationalization of soci-
etal interactions and the incumbent limits of unilateral state action; the
turn toward regulatory politics; and vertical integration in supranational
polities.
The most fundamental trend is the growing interconnection of soci-
eties across national borders, which leads to an increasing incongruence
between social and political spaces. The transnational scope of soci-
etal problems challenges the problem-solving capacity of the territorial
nation-state. No state is any longer capable of effectively regulat-
ing transnational issues, such as environmental protection, financial
stability, or human migration, alone. National policies, while inher-
ently insufficient, are furthermore affected by the positive or negative
externalities of other states’ regulatory approaches.
Partly as a consequence of the transnationalization of societal prob-
lems, partly also because of the increasingly complex nature of many
regulatory issues, a second trend that is often associated with glob-
alization is a change in the nature of governance and the shift
from the interventionist to the regulatory state (Majone 1994, 1996).
This shift goes along with a move from value-based, politicized pol-
itics within majoritarian, elected representative bodies toward more
technocratic, science- and expert-based practices in non-majoritarian,
non-elected bodies such as independent regulatory agencies and, espe-
cially at the international level, transgovernmental networks (Benz and
Papadopoulos 2006; Gilardi 2008; Slaughter 2004). Politics in interna-
tional institutions, in particular the EU, possess a particularly strong
inclination toward the regulatory approach (Kohler-Koch and Rittberger
2008: 10; Majone 1996).
The third trend is partly a response to the first two and relates to the
vertical integration of political systems in supranational polities through
European integration and global governance. The internationalization
of politics is not per se the cause of a hollowing-out of democracy. It is
rather the consequence of the incapacity of domestic political systems
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108 Globalization and the Vertical Challenge to Democracy
to respond satisfactorily to the demands of their citizens, and thus the
attempt to regain effective problem-solving capacity over transnational-
izing social spaces. As in the horizontal relations between states, also this
vertical reconfiguration of the political space is increasingly invoking
the standards of democracy as constitutive norms. The more powerful
international institutions become, the greater is the need for democratic
legitimation of their decisions or, put differently, ‘as state competences
dwindle, [ . . . ] democratic substance seems necessarily to be draining
away’ (Zürn 2000: 91). Notwithstanding some indications of the rise
of a ‘global civil society’ (Anheier et al. 2001; Pasha and Blaney 1998;
Scholte 2001), political internationalization involves two main trade-
offs for democracy (Dahl 1994; Schimmelfennig 2010): it diminishes the
scope of citizen participation and influence in the political process and
threatens to undermine collective identity and public spirit.
Models of international polity formation
The extent to which vertical political integration challenges democracy
depends on the underlying understanding of internationalization as a
process of polity formation beyond the state. Three models or ideal types
are distinguished: the intergovernmental model, the federal model, and
the multilevel model. The first two models reflect a ‘methodological
nationalism’ insofar as they either assert the democratic sovereignty
of the nation-state (intergovernmentalism) or postulate a domestic
analogy, by which the model of representative democracy that we
know from the modern area is being projected on the international
level (federalism). The third model is more transformationalist, as
it denies the possibility of conceiving vertical democratization along
the standards developed for national democracy. Instead, it postulates
the parallel and intertwined existence of national and transnational
communities, rights, and institutions, including a horizontal diffusion
of political spaces beyond representative, territorially or demos-based
settings.1
The intergovernmental model
The intergovernmental model conceives of international institutions
as functional regimes designed by states to address certain problems
that they cannot resolve when acting alone. From this point of view,
vertical integration is the solution to states’ loss of problem-solving
capacity due to societal denationalization: ‘Since such interstate arrange-
ments are crucial for citizens to achieve security, welfare, and other
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Sandra Lavenex 109
legitimate public purposes, refusing to delegate some authority to mul-
tilateral institutions represents a self-defeating and arbitrary restriction
on national democratic deliberation’ (Keohane et al. 2009: 4; see also
Moravcsik 1998).
From this perspective, internationalization hardly poses serious chal-
lenges to democracy. This is because the main sources of international
institutions’ action and legitimacy are the ‘democratically elected gov-
ernments of the Member States’ (Moravcsik 2002: 612). The supra-
national level’s own legitimacy is based on its ability to produce
substantive outcomes in line with the principle of Pareto optimal-
ity (Scharpf 1999b). In this light international institutions may even
enhance domestic democracy by increasing capacities to achieve impor-
tant public purposes (Keohane et al. 2009: 2). This means however that
only decisions that no one will find unprofitable and that will make at
least one party better off, are capable of generating legitimacy (Scharpf
1999b).
Protagonists of the intergovernmental perspective further argue that
while it may be true that multilateral institutions, like the EU, involve
less participation, it would be wrong to judge them according to the
same criteria as for their member-states. This is because of the lim-
ited and delegated nature of their mandate. Accordingly, international
institutions would be ‘simply specializing in those functions of modern
democratic governance that tend to involve less direct political partici-
pation’ (Moravcsik 2002: 606); that is, more technocratic issues. In these
areas, delegation to non-majoritarian institutions is seen as a necessity
of our time: ‘depoliticisation of European policy making is the price
we have to pay in order to preserve national sovereignty largely intact’
(Majone 1998: 7). As long as the competences accorded to international
institutions remain limited to non-redistributive and regulatory issues,
a working system of checks and balances anchored in domestic political
systems warrants the democratic legitimacy of international institutions
(Majone 1998: 28; Moravcsik 2002: 605). Since international institutions
are being set up by states, joined voluntarily by states, and controlled
by states, from an intergovernmentalist point of view, democracy is
‘saturated’ (Offe and Preuss 2006: 176). The question of the pouvoir con-
stituant and the delimitation of the demos is relegated to the national
level. Insofar as the system of checks and balances works and that
international organizations as ‘agents’ do not overstep the principals’
permissive consensus, ‘there is no normative need for distinct mecha-
nisms of legitimation for international organizations’ (Offe and Preuss
2006: 176).
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110 Globalization and the Vertical Challenge to Democracy
The federal model
Whereas the intergovernmentalist perspective makes hardly any dis-
tinction between classic international organizations active in a neatly
delimited issue area and more ambitious integration projects such as the
EU, the federal model implies comprehensive forms of internationaliza-
tion. Historically, federalism has been associated with the conventional
processes of state building and national integration. In contrast to
the intergovernmental model, which conceives of international orga-
nizations as instrumental supplements to states, federalism denotes a
particular way of bringing together previously separate, autonomous, or
independent territorial units to constitute a new form of union (e.g.
Riker 1976). This ‘coming together-federalism’ (Stepan 1999) is thus
based on a federal bargain in which pre-existing political units decide to
pool sovereignty in order to attain particular goals linked to security and
economic well-being. This emphasis on a voluntary union of states and
peoples is based on the principle of subsidiarity, meaning that political
decisions should be taken at the lowest possible level.
According to Michael Burgess (2009: 30) this voluntary union is
rooted in notions of ‘mutual respect, recognition, reciprocity, tolerance,
consent and equality’. The federalist approach is therefore gradualist in
the sense that it proposes that the evolving authority of supranational
institutions goes along with the creation of some sort of suprana-
tional demos as an integrated pouvoir constituant as well as all other
mechanisms of legitimation that we know from the nation-state.2 The
model of representative democracy that started to take shape with the
early modern city-states is thereby extrapolated to the larger unit. This
supranational polity would draw on genuine direct legitimation and
comply with fundamental democratic principles of due process and
equal respect for all (Eriksen and Fossum 2007: 16). Among other things,
its direct legitimation must be based on the granting of fundamental
rights, the representation of the political community and its minorities,
and fair procedures of will-formation guaranteeing citizens’ participa-
tion and influence. This emphasis on the opportunities for political
participation goes along with the assumption of an integrated civic-
institutional infrastructure, including the media system, the creation of
political parties and other intermediary organizations, and the strength-
ening of electoral and parliamentary components. Whereas comparative
analyses of state-level federations have shown that federalism can have
demos-constraining effects by institutionalizing ethnic or other divides
in the political partition of competences (Stepan 1999), as a model of
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polity formation, the federalist approach suggests the parallel evolution
of political structures and political communities as a gradual vertical
shift.
This understanding goes along with an encompassing view on the
process of internationalization. In contrast to the model of function-
ally limited international regulatory institutions postulated by the
intergovernmentalist perspective, federalism understands supranational
polity building as a deeply political and constitutional process involving
not only regulatory policy, but also distributive and redistributive ones.
Whereas limited regulatory delegation can be legitimized to some extent
on the basis of its output efficiency, judgments over values and the allo-
cation of wealth presuppose a collective will and a level of solidarity that
substantiates the need for parallel demos-formation.
The multilevel model
The multilevel model of internationalization takes to some extent
an intermediate position between the two other models because it
postulates the co-evolution of domestic and supranational structures
rather than opting either for the primacy of the state or full-fledged
supranational integration. From a conceptual perspective, however, it
departs from the latter’s methodological nationalism as it proposes a
transformationalist understanding of democracy and, more generally,
the polity. The basic claim of the multilevel approach is the need to
consider both the national (including sub-national) and supranational
levels in their complex interlinkages in the assessment of international-
ization. Furthermore, this approach concedes that this internationaliz-
ing polity is an evolutionary entity that takes different forms from the
classic representative model of democracy.
As pointed out by Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, the emergence
of multilevel polities involves two types of governance and institutions
that coexist and each propose different views on democracy (Hooghe
and Marks 2003). The first type of governance (‘type I governance’) has
parallels with the federalist model in the sense that it refers to the dis-
persion of authority to general-purpose, non-intersecting, and durable
institutions. Comparable to the vertical separation of power in a fed-
eral state, the internationalizing polity is system-wide, the functions are
bundled, and the levels of government are multiple but limited in num-
ber (Hooghe and Marks 2003: 263). The core institutions of government
are the ones we know from the liberal democratic model, the execu-
tive, the legislature, and the judiciary. These institutions are based on an
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112 Globalization and the Vertical Challenge to Democracy
integrated and encompassing political community, which shares a com-
mon identity as well as a public sphere and intermediary institutions
that together account for collective self-government (Hooghe and Marks
2003: 240). When it comes to vertical type-I integration beyond the
state, from a democratic perspective, two challenges stand out. Firstly,
vertical differentiation occurs unevenly since the executive branch
crosses levels of governance much more easily whereas the territorial
reach of parliaments and courts remains limited. As a consequence,
internationalization leads to a one-sided empowerment of the executive
branch and weakens the influence of directly elected representatives in
parliament (Putnam 1988). Secondly, this challenge to parliamentary
actors is exacerbated by the boundaries of the demos, which are the
slowest ones to adapt to the process of vertical democratization. Thus,
whereas, as in the EU, supranational parliaments can be institutional-
ized and empowered, their democratic legitimacy stands and falls with
the development of intermediary organizations, a public sphere, and a
common sense of political identity. A crucial problem from the point
of view of democracy is that the development of a transnational public
sphere does not keep pace with the vertical transformation of political
institutions. This is all the more so since type-I governance is not limited
to functional areas but has an encompassing scope, including resolving
conflicts about values and (re)distributive issues.
The most strongly transformative aspect of the multilevel gover-
nance approach rests in the acknowledgment that internationalization
does not only engender shifts in the vertical diffusion of authority
across levels of government but even more so in the horizontal dis-
persion of authority. This comes along with ‘type II governance’, in
which jurisdictions are task specific, intersecting, and flexible (Hooghe
and Marks 2003; Kohler-Koch and Rittberger 2008: 8). Such type-II
structures, while existing at all levels of government, are typical of
international institutions or regimes. They are functionally specialized
within one or a few policy areas; their functional differentiation leads
to partially overlapping, intersecting memberships; they are polycentric
and lack an overarching hierarchical order; and have flexible designs,
that is, are less formally institutionalized than type-I governance sys-
tems. With reference to the EU, Philippe Schmitter has introduced the
term ‘condominio’ to describe ‘dispersed overlapping domains’ having
‘incongruent memberships’ that ‘act autonomously to solve common
problems and produce different public goods’ (Schmitter 1996: 136).
Typical examples of type-II institutions in the EU system are regula-
tory agencies, specialized policy networks, or comitology committees.
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These non-majoritarian institutions have been studied in recent years
under the label of ‘new modes of governance’ or ‘network governance’
(Héritier 1999).
From the perspective of democratic theory, the emergence of type-II
governance beyond the state constitutes different challenges than
those associated with the vertical transformation of type-I gover-
nance. As in a federalist model, type-I governance presupposes the
congruence between the political institutions and the demos. Type-II
governance, in contrast, relies on functionally specific types of par-
ticipation. According to Hooghe and Marks (2003: 241), ‘the former
is designed around human (usually territorial) community; the latter
is designed around particular tasks or policy problems’. In the inter-
national realm, and insofar as states constitute the membership of
type-II institutions, type-II governance bears some resemblance to the
intergovernmentalist model presented above. Discussions of the chal-
lenge for democracy therefore replicate to some extent the postulates
associated with the intergovernmentalist model. This refers especially to
the emphasis put on output legitimacy (Majone 1998). From the point
of view of participation, authors have also underlined that network gov-
ernance in specialized settings has the advantage of being more open for
the inclusion of new actors and ideas (Héritier 1999: 275), and in partic-
ular experts and stakeholders. Moreover, and in line with the argument
for delegation used by proponents of the intergovernmental model, will-
formation and decision making within such institutions is seen to have
more deliberative traits and lead to more efficient outcomes (Joerges
and Neyer 1997). The problem is however that without universal rep-
resentation, network governance necessarily leads to selective inclusion
and participation. Furthermore, given the somewhat secluded setting of
these fora, the relations between actors are weakly exposed to public
scrutiny, and to the scrutiny of the representative bodies (Papadopoulos
2007).
As pointed out by Hooghe and Marks (2003: 268), ‘type II gover-
nance is generally embedded in type I governance, but the way this
works varies’. Thus, it can be said that the coupling or nesting of
non-majoritarian, task-specific, networked, and functional agencies in
the representative, encompassing, hierarchical, and territorially bound
type-I institutions is strongest where type-I institutions are strong, that
is, at the national level. An intermediary pattern of less tightly nested,
but more loosely coordinated coupling exists in the EU, while at the
international level international organizations and regimes hardly find
a type-I equivalent but rely on their loose and imperfect coupling
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Table 5.1 Multilevel model of internationalization
Type-I governance Type-II governance
Logic of differentiation Vertical (hierarchical) Horizontal (polycentric)
Functional scope Encompassing Specialized
Membership scope Territorial Functional
Degree of
institutionalization
Durable Flexible
Decision-making style Voting/majoritarian Deliberative/consensual
Community base Demos Stakeholders/civil society
Source: Adapted from: Hooghe and Marks (2003)
with type-I governance at the level of the member-states. Table 5.1
summarizes the main elements of the multilevel model.
The flexibility and integrative potential of the multilevel governance
model, which combines elements of both the intergovernmental and
federal model, substantiate its usefulness for analyzing challenges to
democracy across different types of international institutions, including
more encompassing, truly hybrid ones like the EU as well as function-
ally specific (purely type-II) international regimes. Based on this model,
the next section discusses five challenges to democracy in the process of
internationalization.
Challenges to democracy
There is no general consensus on the questions how far, or in
what terms, and through which mechanisms, globalization challenges
democracy. For sure, this question depends on the extent and the form
of internationalization studied as well as on the ingredients and types
of democracy that are being challenged or transformed. The multi-
level governance approach provides a useful heuristic framework for
naming and differentiating these different dimensions since it pays
tribute to both representative and functionalist modes of governance
and accounts for various scopes of internationalization, without either
vindicating or reaffirming the (nation) state model.
Linking up with the system theoretical approach outlined in
Chapter 3, challenges to democracy may arise at all stages of the gover-
nance process, that is, at the input and output level of the political sys-
tem. From the perspective of multilevel governance, five challenges can
be identified to democracy: the problems of congruence, inclusiveness,
transparency, accountability, and responsiveness.
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The problem of congruence
The most fundamental challenge to democracy posed by the spatial
reconfiguration of the political system is the problem of congruence,
meaning the matching between the rulers and the ruled (see also
Chapter 3). Since democracy, in its very essence, means self-government
of the people, this problem emerges when government is no longer con-
gruent with the people. Internationalization as the transfer of political
authority to supranational institutions transcends the territorial demar-
cation of national demoi and necessarily involves the question of the
new demarcation of ‘the people’. This applies as much to the boundaries
of the political community which is empowered to participate in the
political process as to the boundaries of the political community which
is affected by political decisions. The emergence of multilevel gover-
nance dissociates the exercise of political rule from the basis of consol-
idated national demoi. The result is the persistent existence of multiple
demoi and multiple, contested conceptions of a potentially arising,
overarching supranational demos. In the face of pervasive multilevel
governance the question therefore is: how far can international poli-
ties draw on a nascent supranational demos in order to legitimate their
actions? And what role do national demoi play in the multilevel system?
The most pessimistic view on this question is pronounced by what
Joseph Weiler and collaborators have called the ‘non-demos’ camp
(Weiler et al. 1995). This view largely corresponds to the federalist per-
spective on internationalization. It postulates the need for extrapolating
full congruence to the supranational level in the sense of the creation
of a supranational demos in order to preserve democracy. In this view,
the demos is composed of a political community sharing the purpose of
self-government and united through a strong collective identity, public
sphere, and political infrastructure.
The reasoning behind the claim for the reconfiguration of the demos
is that ‘Only when all those who are affected by a decision perceive
themselves to be part of a common, all-encompassing political iden-
tity is it possible to differentiate between majority rule which can be
consented to and the rule of strangers which will then be considered
illegitimate’ (Kielmansegg 2003: 57; see also Scharpf 1996: 3). As indi-
cated in the quote, this reasoning presupposes decision making by
majority rule, and implies decisions over values which have distribu-
tive effects. The more internationalized governance moves beyond mere
technocratic regulatory issues and affects value judgments, and themore
these entail winners and losers, the more pressing the demos question
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116 Globalization and the Vertical Challenge to Democracy
becomes. The supranational measures developed to fight the financial
crisis that took off in 2007 and the subsequent dept crisis in several
European countries are probably some of the most salient and worry-
ing instances of this problem Caught between the doxa of neoliberal
austerity and calls for Keynesian growth stimuli, the series of suprana-
tional reforms to stabilize ‘Euroland’ not only disclosed the profound
economic choices underlying the common currency: the mobilization
of multi-billion bail-out funds and the progressive communitarization
of the debt represent an unprecedented transfer from the wealthier to
the more troubled parts of Europe and give new weight to the question
of solidarity among European peoples.
Notwithstanding the new urgency of the congruence principle in light
of these recent events, the question of how far a supranational demos
is emerging in Europe has been studied for some time. According to
Follesdal and Hix (2005: 17), ‘[r]ather than assuming that a European
“demos” is a prerequisite for genuine EU democracy, a European demo-
cratic identity might well form through the practice of democratic
competition’. In this context, an increasing number of scholars call for
a greater politicization of the EU (Hix 2008; Offe and Preuss 2006: 181f,
see also Hooghe and Marks 2009). Measures that have been proposed
to promote politicization and to forge a supranational identity are the
direct election of the Commission President by EU citizens or national
parliaments (Hix 2002), the strengthening of the EU’s international
action and identity (Decker 2002), the crafting of a European citizen-
ship (Weiler 1999: 329ff), the creation of a European public sphere
(Risse 2003, 2010; Trenz 2010), and the integration of political parties
(Klingemann 2005; Mair 2007).
For instance, newer research on the integration of national electorates
and party systems in the EU has analyzed the conditions under which
a European-wide democratic citizenship may emerge. On the basis of
data on election results, survey data, and party manifestos for the years
1970–2008, Daniele Caramani and his team have analyzed the degree
to which the ideological positions of political parties of the same family
in Europe converge over time, how far voting behavior becomes more
homogeneous, and the extent to which the EU party system remains dis-
tinctive from the national party systems and their alignments. Uniform
electoral swings could be detected for the green and populist party fam-
ilies, but less so for left–right parties and regionalists (Caramani 2011a).
On the other hand, analysis of electoral data for national elections
shows increasingly homogeneous voting distributions for parties of a
same family across national electorates, indicating an incipient party
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system institutionalization at the European level (Caramani 2011b).
A similar result was corroborated in an analysis of the ideological con-
vergence within party families at both the elite and electorate level,
especially on an economic left–right dimension (Camia and Caramani
2011).
While not fully negating the desirability of a supranational demos,
the multilevel governance approach postulates, first, that given the
‘incomplete’ nature of internationalization, national demoi retain a
legitimating potential of their own. This idea has gained attention from
a normative, philosophical perspective with the notion of demoicracy.
This notion conceptualizes multinational polities as being constituted
both by multiple demoi (the statespeoples or political communities of
the member-states) and by individuals who, at least for the foreseeable
future, do not yet constitute an integrated demos. From this understand-
ing, demoicracy is the association of a plurality of democratic peoples
who consciously recognize each other and are interlinked as a polit-
ical community through political institutions and political processes
(Besson 2006; Bohman 2005; Cheneval 2008, 2011; Nicolaidis 2004).
In institutional terms, the notion of demoicracy is compatible with the
multilevel governance model in that it postulates a dual representation
requirement: citizens and statespeoples must be equally represented and
share political rights across decision-making bodies and levels (Buess
et al. 2011; Cheneval 2008, 2011; Cheneval and Schimmelfennig 2012).
These rights include general principles of accountability, participation,
and transparency, which are discussed later in this chapter.
Secondly, as argued above, multilevel governance transcends the
nation-state analogy by emphasizing next to the representative/electoral
model of type-I governance also the importance of functionally
differentiated/networked forms of governance (type II). From this
perspective, the congruence problem takes a different shape since
type-II governance, through its delegated nature, its functional (techno-
cratic) specialization, differentiated membership, and more horizontal,
consensus-based deliberative style does – as long as it is confined to
these clearly circumscribed tasks – not entail majoritarian decisions
and distributive effects. The relevant questions here are not per se the
congruence with a delimited demos but rather the other elements chal-
lenged by internationalization discussed later, that is, the inclusiveness
of decision making, the transparency of the proceedings within these
institutions, their accountability toward type-I institutions, including
national demoi as well as toward relevant stakeholders, and, finally,
their responsiveness to social demands, that is, output efficiency.
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The problem of inclusion
The question of congruence between the ruled and the rulers auto-
matically involves the question of inclusion and participation in the
political process referred to in Chapter 3 as the public sphere. Interna-
tionalization constitutes a challenge with regard to citizens’ inclusion
because, with the widening scope of the polity, the distance to the
individual citizen increases, the chain of representation becomes more
abstract and often departs from the universal model of participation via
elections. A widely made statement in this context is that international-
ization strengthens the relative governmental influence of the executive
branch (Moravcsik 1993; Wolf 2000). This occurs most notably to the
detriment of legislatures which are less strongly represented at the inter-
national level. Again, the financial crisis of the past few years is a
salient example of far-reaching decisions being taken outside directly
elected parliaments by executive fora with selective membership such
as the G20 or the ‘Troika’ composed of the European Commission, the
European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. Apart
from lacking representativeness, these bodies and intergovernmental
settings more broadly lack a direct link to the people and bear the risk
of insulating politics from their political base. As famously pointed out
by Robert Putnam (1988), government representatives assume a gate-
keeper function in international negotiations since they are the only
participants who participate in both the international and the domes-
tic arena simultaneously. This gatekeeper function strengthens their
position vis-à-vis other negotiators but also vis-à-vis their domestic con-
stituency and in particular the legislature which has no direct access to
the international fora.
Research on the role of legislatures in the international realm has
focused on two aspects: the parliamentarization of decision making at
the international level and the enhancement of the role of national
legislatures in international policy making. Research on parliaments
in the EU shows the problems in realizing either options. Elections
to the EU-level parliament have been called ‘second order elections’
(Reif and Schmitt 1980). Accordingly, they cannot be seen as genuine
European elections since the competitors are national parties, in nation-
ally segmented electoral competitions in which voters’ choices are
significantly affected by domestic politics (see also Marsh 1998). More-
over, although the European Parliament has gained considerable powers
over the years (Rittberger 2005), national governments have proven
reluctant to authorize co-decision in all policy areas or to determine
the EU-level core executive. National parliaments, in turn, successfully
10.1057/9781137299871 - Democracy in the Age of Globalization and Mediatization, Hanspeter Kriesi, Daniel Bochsler, Jörg Matthes,
Sandra Lavenex, Marc Bühlmann and Frank Esser
Co
py
rig
ht
 m
at
er
ia
l f
ro
m
 w
w
w
.
pa
lg
ra
v
ec
o
n
n
ec
t.c
om
 - 
lic
en
se
d 
to
 U
ZH
 H
au
pt
bi
bl
io
th
ek
 / 
Ze
nt
ra
lb
ib
lio
th
ek
 Z
ür
ic
h 
- P
al
gr
av
eC
on
ne
ct
 - 
20
13
-0
3-
29
Sandra Lavenex 119
affect the positions of national governments in negotiations over EU
treaty changes (e.g. Finke 2009). However, the permanence and gen-
eral nature of decision-making powers of EU institutions means that
national parliaments lose their sovereignty over legislative output in
integrated policy areas (e.g. Schmidt 1999). One of the main reasons
why governments have to include parliaments in decision making –
namely the anticipation of ratification problems – thus disappears.
Parliaments can reduce the challenge to their inclusion to some extent
by participating in the formation of governmental negotiation strategies
at EU level. Yet, only a few legislatures have implemented the institu-
tional procedures necessary for such effective control of government
representatives like the right to issue a binding negotiation mandate
to the government (e.g. Raunio 2005; Winzen 2012). Moreover, even if
such procedures exist, their utility is negatively affected by transparency
and accountability problems (see below). Other forms of parliamentary
participation outside the framework of legislative–executive relations
have so far been of little relevance for EU decision making (e.g. Raunio
2009). What is more, in most countries, EU affairs play only a marginal
role in the relationship between national parliamentarians and their
voters (Winzen 2010: 8–11).
The hypothesis that internationalization strengthens the government
vis-à-vis other members of the domestic constituency has also been stud-
ied with regard to the impact on social partners, that is economic inter-
est groups or employers’ associations and labor unions. A comparison
between four countries (Austria, Belgium, Ireland, and Switzerland) and
five policy areas reflecting different degrees of Europeanization (unem-
ployment, compensation policy, freedom of movement, occupational
pensions, electricity liberalization) led to mixed results. The results tend
to confirm the hypothesis that Europeanization weakens not only the
legislative arena but also corporatist concertation (Afonso 2012; Afonso
and Papadopoulos forthcoming; Afonso et al. 2010; Fontana 2011).
At the same time, however, the effects of Europeanization could not
be systematically isolated from a more general trend toward a decline
of corporatist deals in Western societies, and important differences
between the different countries and political systems could be detected.
The question of how to include non-state actors in international-
ized decision-making processes is also at the center of the debates on
the democratic legitimacy of non-majoritarian and non-representative
type-II governance fora. Although independent agencies such as EU reg-
ulatory agencies or the European Central Bank also retain some link to
the representative bodies of the underlying constituency, for example,
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through the delegation of (domestically legitimated) state representa-
tives to their management boards, the literature on the democratic
legitimacy of such new modes of governance tends to focus less on
the idea of universal representation which underpins parliamentary
democracy. Instead, the focus is often on the question of how far civil
society actors and relevant stakeholders are able to access the process of
will-formation and decision making. The notion of ‘associative democ-
racy’ has come to challenge the model of representative democracy
in identifying direct access by organized civil society as an alternative
to participation via elections and political parties in the international
realm (Cohen and Rogers 1993; Hirst 1993).
In the EU, interest-group participation has deliberately been encour-
aged as a compensation for the weakness of representative democracy
(Kohler-Koch 2007). This tendency is particularly salient in research on
independent EU agencies in their relations to citizens, civil society orga-
nizations, and interest groups, as well as corporations as ‘stakeholders’
(Skogstad 2003). Empirical research however shows that only very few
EU agencies are subject to mandatory requirements concerning the
participation of citizens (organizations) or of stakeholders in general
(Barbieri and Ongaro 2008). These findings have been corroborated
by Christensen and Nielsen (2010) who point out that most agen-
cies feature weak or, mostly, no representation of stakeholders on their
management boards. Their data show that, especially, agencies with
some decision-making authority are less likely to have stakeholders
represented. Access to the decision-making process is equally problem-
atic. Agency meetings are usually not held in public and thus are not
accessible for stakeholders without an explicit invitation. Only the man-
agement board of the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) holds,
as a general rule, its meetings in public and may authorize consumer
representatives, other interested parties, or citizens to observe some
of its proceedings (Vos 2005). Given these limits to formal inclusion,
some authors, especially Vos (2000, 2005), have suggested that citizens’
and stakeholders’ involvement may be facilitated by the formation of
agency networks: ‘The creation of agency networks involving all inter-
ested parties could hence in principle contribute to “a Europe closer to
the citizen” ’ (Vos 2005). But how inclusive and accessible for citizens
and stakeholders these networks really are still needs to be scrutinized,
as Vos (2000) herself concludes.
The idea that the inclusion of non-state actors in decision making
may contribute to democratization is also salient at the international
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level in the debates on the legitimacy of international organizations.
The intensifying discourse on the democratic deficit of international
governance and the mobilization of transnational civil society groups
such as Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and social move-
ments have led to the gradual opening up of international organizations
and negotiation frameworks to such actors. While United Nations (with
the exception of the Security Council) organizations were relatively early
in their accreditation of NGOs (Weiss and Gordenker 1996), others, such
as the World Trade Organization (WTO), took more time to move away
from the exclusive ‘club-model of multilateralism’ (Keohane and Nye
2001). Recent analyses of civil society involvement in the WTO show
that inclusion is largely discretionary and lacks clear rules (Schneller
2010; Schropp 2009; see also Van den Bossche 2008). This contrasts
with multilateral environmental negotiations where NGOs enjoy sys-
tematic access (Hjerpe and Linnér 2010). The democratic potential of
such inclusion is however debated. Whereas standard accounts tend to
emphasize the rational, functional contribution of NGO involvement
for information provision, more critical studies portend that govern-
ments often include NGOs in their delegation as a symbolic step in
order to enhance their own legitimacy (Böhmelt 2011). Also, scholars
have observed a so-called democracy–civil society paradox concerning
the inclusion of non-state actors in international governance. Accord-
ingly, although generally democracy is positively correlated with sup-
port for international environmental agreements, the impact of NGOs
on states’ cooperative behavior in global environmental governance is
weaker for democracies than for non-democratic regimes (Bernauer et al.
2013).
In sum, the problem of inclusion in internationalized political pro-
cesses applies both to the participation of directly legitimated, universal
representatives of a political community (parliamentarians) and sec-
torally organized non-state actors and stakeholders who act in the name
of civil society. This inclusion works at two levels: through the direct
involvement of these ‘universal’ and ‘stakeholder’ representatives at the
international level in EU and international decision-making processes
and at the national level in their relations to the governments. Although
international organizations can prescribe some general rules on these
actors’ involvement and provide fora for their inclusion, in practice, the
extent to which citizens’ representatives can influence international pol-
itics depends very much on the extent of their democratic inclusion ‘at
home’ – that is at the national level.
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The problem of transparency
A second problem associated with the internationalization of politics
is the transparency of decision-making processes. In a narrow sense,
transparency refers to access to information that is, the possibility
of obtaining information about ongoing decision-making processes
(Héritier 2003). In a broader sense, the transparency of the inner work-
ings of how authoritative decisions are made is a prerequisite for the
inclusion of relevant actors (see above) and the accountability of the sys-
tem (see below). Therefore, the safeguarding of transparency is a crucial
prerequisite for all types of governance.
It is a matter of fact that internationalization diminishes the trans-
parency of the political process. The reasons are manifold: transnational
problems often bear a high level of complexity, many actors (gov-
ernments but also other) are relevant for the problems’ solution, and
decision-making processes take place in less accessible, often exclusive,
sometimes little-formalized settings, thereby obscuring the proceedings
of the decision-making process. The incumbent problems with regard
to transparency have been prominently elaborated by Putnam (1988) in
his concept of two-level games. The notion of two-level games prob-
lematizes the gatekeeping function of government representatives in
international governance. Since in classical international negotiation
settings government representatives are the only actors who participate
in both the national and the international settings simultaneously, they
possess a considerable information advantage over other actors which
they can use strategically in order to pursue their favored policy options.
The challenges imposed with regard to transparency include internal
and external aspects. Internally, transparency refers to the possibility
for participating actors to share all relevant information. This problem
is salient in the vertical interaction between domestic constituencies
and delegated actors, such as for the flow of information between
national governments representing their countries in the EU Coun-
cil of Ministers and their respective national parliaments. National
parliaments require information on EU-level decision-making processes
to participate in the formation of governmental negotiation strategies
and to hold them accountable for the implementation of these strate-
gies. Monitoring EU policy making is generally difficult for parliaments
because it often takes place in informal networks or in formal but
closed low-level working groups to which governments have access but
parliaments not (e.g. Papadopoulos 2003, 2007; Sprungk 2010). More-
over, national parliaments arguably need to devote more resources to
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monitoring a given EU-level decision than a similar national-level deci-
sion. Besides the substance of the decision and the domestic political
situation, they have to take into account the adequacy of EU-level
action, the strategic context of EU-level negotiations, and they may
have to understand elements of the policy justified by problems in other
countries. Parliaments, thus, face challenges of access to and in the
processing of information. The two problems have partly been met by
domestic parliamentary adaptation involving, initially, the creation of
specialized EU-affairs committees and, since the early 1990s, the diver-
sification of monitoring instruments to include access to documents,
governmental reporting obligations and the involvement of sectoral
parliamentary committees (Winzen 2012). There are, however, substan-
tial cross-national differences and, it is argued, even the best adapted
parliaments such as Denmark or Finland still face information deficits
(Raunio 2005; Raunio and Wiberg 2008).
The multiplication of political arenas engendered by the development
of vertical (type I) and functional (type II) multilevel governance exac-
erbates the opaque nature of internationalized settings. This has often
been stated with regard to the EU, where a multitude of more or less
formal comitology committees, agencies, and policy networks, as well
as informal consultations have come to complement the formal leg-
islative process (Benz and Papadopolous 2006). Here, the problem of
transparency has mainly been studied with regard to the horizontal
relations between such new non-majoritarian settings and the repre-
sentative bodies of the EU (the Parliament and the Council, see for
example Geradin 2005; Geradin and Petit 2004; Vos 2005). In the case
of EU regulatory agencies, for instance, the problem of transparency
has been addressed through the inclusion of Members of the European
Parliament (MEPs) in the agencies’ governing bodies, the management
boards. However, only a few agencies actually reflect this possibility, and
some studies show that even when MEPs are represented in the manage-
ment board their communication and coordination with the European
Parliament (EP) or a specific EP committee is rather low (Groenleer 2009;
Vos 2005). Surprisingly, even the fact that recent agencies are funded
under the co-decision procedure does not imply that they all have
MEPs on their management boards. Alternatively, some other mecha-
nisms have been installed to secure the flow of information between
the Parliament and the regulatory agencies. In recent years, the Parlia-
ment has started debating some agencies’ annual reports and inviting
the executive directors to comment on the latter (Curtin 2007; Geradin
2005: 233).
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The problem of internal transparency also exists in international orga-
nizations. Given the intergovernmental nature of these organizations,
the issue here is not one of horizontal communication and open-
ness between different institutions participating in a decision-making
process, such as in the complex EU polity. Rather, problems of inter-
nal transparency occur between the negotiators themselves within a
formally shared decision-making arena. The practice of informal negoti-
ations, such as in so-called green rooms or other informal consultations
among small groups of powerful actors, is wide-spread in the inter-
national realm and precludes the full involvement of weaker actors,
even if, formally, they share equal voting rights in the final decision
(Payne and Samhat 2004). It can be said that actor heterogeneity and
in particular large asymmetries in institutional and negotiation capaci-
ties constitute as much a challenge for the transparency of international
negotiations as they tend to bias information toward smaller and more
homogeneous groups of leading countries, thereby granting them con-
siderable negotiation advantages (Held 2006: 61; Payne and Samhat
2004: 106).
The diffusion of arenas for deliberation and decision making in the
international realm also poses challenges to the external transparency of
the political process. This challenge is particularly strong with regard to
such (type II) institutions that lack formal representative actors in charge
of communicating and ensuring transparency between decision-making
levels and in particular between the rulers and the ruled. It pervades,
however, international politics more broadly given the weakness of links
between representative actors active in supranational settings (such as
members of the European Parliament) and their voters and the under-
developed status of the public sphere (see above). As a consequence,
international actors have been active to boost their legitimacy through
various transparency initiatives targeted at the wider public such as, for
instance in the EU, providing greater access to EU documentation for cit-
izens, the media, and interest groups (Héritier 2003) as well as through
the internet and the development of e-government (Hüller 2010) –
with the consequence that this may in practice engender problems of
information overload for the respective actors.
The example of the EU regulatory agencies can be taken as illustrative
of the challenges facing the transparency requirement for international
organizations more broadly. In contrast to the EU core legislative insti-
tutions (Commission, Council, Parliament) which, by way of Article 255
of the ‘old’ European Community Treaty, were legally bound to provid-
ing citizens with the general right to access their documents, no legal
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equivalent existed for the regulatory agencies – as is the case also for
international organizations more generally. The question of how far
agencies should communicate and publish the documents produced in
the regulatory process was therefore in a legal limbo (e.g. Vos 2005:
130). The question was clarified in Regulation No. 1049/2001 regarding
public access to European Parliament, Council, and Commission docu-
ments, which explicitly extended transparency provisions to EU agency
documents (Curtin 2007; Geradin 2005). Access to agencies’ documents
further improved with the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, which
in Article 15 (formerly 255) now explicitly includes agencies in the list
of EU institutions subject to transparency requirements. Nevertheless,
these formal requirements cannot resolve the fact that the work of such
regulatory agencies, as well as of many international organizations, is
conducted in a very technical fashion that is not readily accessible to
the common citizens.
The problem of accountability
The problems of inclusion and transparency in internationalized set-
tings also have implications for a third challenge to democracy, the
problem of accountability (see Chapter 3). The principle of account-
ability refers to decision-makers’ obligation to justify their acts and
decision-takers’ right to judge or sanction this behavior (Bovens 2007:
450). According to Robert Keohane (2006: 78), ‘an accountability rela-
tionship is one in which an individual, group or other entity makes
demands on an agent to report on his or her activities, and has
the ability to impose costs on the agent’. In a representative democ-
racy, a variety of institutions guarantee the citizens’ control over their
governments, including recurrent universal elections. As pointed out
prominently by Manin et al. (1999: 29), however, the idea that ‘if elec-
tions are freely contested, if participation is widespread, and if citizens
enjoy political liberties, then governments will act in the best interest
of the people’ is contestable. The reason is that government holders,
once elected, may want to pursue objectives that differ from those of
the citizens. In order to safeguard the principle of accountability, Manin
et al. (1999: 47ff.) therefore suggest a number of institutional safeguards,
such as that voters must be able to assign clearly responsibility for gov-
ernment performance, to vote out of office parties responsible for bad
performance, and that there is an opposition in charge of ensuring the
monitoring of the government and of informing the citizens. In inter-
nationalized systems, these accountability mechanisms are generally
absent. As a consequence the questions ‘what constitutes an abuse of
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power, and why?’ and ‘who is entitled to hold power-wielders account-
able, and why?’ are very difficult to answer in internationalized systems
(Keohane 2006: 76f).
Arguing for a Madisonian view on accountability as a general sys-
tem of checks and balances, proponents of a more intergovernmentalist
vision of internationalization have proposed that the limited scope
of powers delegated to international institutions constitutes as such a
source of accountability. According to Andrew Moravcsik (2002), power
in the EU is constrained through the substantial legal constraints which
limit its mandate to basically technocratic and regulatory issues, the lack
of fiscal competences, as well as the procedural rules of the decision-
making process. These limits, which are also underlined by advocates of
the EU as a regulatory state (Majone 1996) would constitute a security
against abuses of power and thus a sort of substitute for accountabil-
ity. The accuracy of this view depends, of course, on the scope of
internationalization and on the question of how far domestic con-
stituencies really control the scope of international governance. This
applies to both the chain of accountability within representative insti-
tutions and between representative institutions or their constituencies
and non-majoritarian bodies.
The caveats to accountability within representative institutions in a
multilevel constitution can be illustrated by the case of the EU’s par-
liamentary system. European integration challenges the principle of the
accountability of executives to directly elected parliaments in three ways
(seeWinzen 2010). First, national parliaments cannot hold governments
accountable for legislative output in integrated policy areas because any
given government is only one among several decision-makers and may
even have been outvoted. Second, the European Commission, the EU
institution closest to a federal government, does not take office on the
basis of a policy program approved by parliament and, thus, cannot
be held to account for the implementation of this program. Moreover,
the powers of the European Parliament to dismiss the Commission
from office resemble more an impeachment process than a withdrawal
of confidence familiar from parliamentary democracies. The powers of
appointment and dismissal of the European Parliament have increased
over time but national governments are still dominant in the selection
of personnel. Third, the Council of Ministers collectively exercises exec-
utive authority in several policy areas but cannot be held accountable
or sanctioned as a collective actor either by the European Parliament or
by any national parliament. The European Parliament as co-legislator
does not fulfill the requirements of an accountability forum (cf. Bovens
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2007), while national parliaments stand in a relationship to their respec-
tive government only and not to the Council as a whole. The hybrid
character of the EU, partly a more conventional international orga-
nization with powerful governments and an international secretariat,
and partly a type-1 multilevel polity with majority voting, a directly
elected parliament, and a federal government thus gives rise to gaps in
accountability.
From the perspective of national parliaments, European integration
has transformed the substantial focus of delegation and accountabil-
ity to national governments. The fact that any given government is
only one among many actors in EU-level decision making means that
national parliaments cannot hold their governments to account with
respect to legislative output. The substantial focus of delegation and
accountability instead shifts toward the representation of national pref-
erences at EU level. Bergman (2000) thus speaks of the ‘next step of
delegation and accountability’. Parliaments can sanction governmen-
tal failure to represent parliamentary preferences at EU level with the
whole range of instruments conventionally at their disposal in domes-
tic politics including questions, interpellations, critical plenary debates,
or, most severely, the withdrawal of confidence. However, due to the
sometimes low salience of EU decision making, these tools have actually
been used to only a limited extent. This notably applies to the with-
drawal of confidence and all instruments counting on publicity, such as
plenary debates. While parliaments could benefit from more nuanced,
EU-specific sanctions, it is difficult to conceive of proper instruments
and no member-state parliament currently has such mechanisms in
place (Winzen 2010, 2012).
The lack of an institutional framework preserving the principle of
accountability is even more glaring in non-representative, executive
(type II) bodies (Papadopoulos 2007, 2010). The multiplication of exec-
utive networks and independent agencies exacerbate the diffusion of
responsibility since ‘it is hard to identify those who are responsible for
decisions’ (Papadopoulos 2010: 1034). The second challenge stems from
the dissociation between type-I and type-II governance, or, according
to Papadopoulos, the uncoupling of governance network from repre-
sentative institutions: ‘If decisions are prepared by policy networks the
legislative function of parliaments is affected; if they are implemented
by them, it is their control function that is weakened’ (2010: 1034).
Whereas state officials are accountable to their political superiors who, at
the end of the long chain of delegation, can be subject to electoral sanc-
tion, the same cannot be said for international public officials working
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for international organizations’ secretariats, the European Commission,
or an EU agency. This problem also applies to other members of policy
networks such as experts, who, by definition, must be unaccountable,
or NGOs and economic actors, who are accountable to their constituen-
cies or shareholders, but not to the wider public. Given these limits to
external accountability, some authors have argued that, as horizontal
modes of coordination, regulatory agencies or policy networks exhibit
a different kind of internal accountability or ‘peer accountability’
(Goodin 2003). Accordingly, participants in non-representative institu-
tions would not be accountable to an external public or external politi-
cal institutions but to one another. The underlying understanding is that
actors in such institutions follow a deliberative style of decision mak-
ing which favors common action based on a ‘logic of appropriateness’
rather than a selfish ‘logic of consequentiality’ (March and Olsen 1989).
However, as Papadopoulos (2010: 1040) points out, ‘only if policy net-
works are sufficiently representative and pluralist can this mutual and
soft form of accountability operate to the profit of the common good’.
The case of EU agencies is again illustrative of the caveats involved in
the attempt to realize the principle of accountability in practice. As with
regard to provisions concerning inclusion of representative actors or
transparency rules, divergent practices co-exist within the EU. A case
in point are the procedures by which such agencies are created and the
rules for appointing the executive director. Thus, it is only recently that
the European Parliament has been granted co-decision over the creation
of new EU agencies, alongside the Council of Ministers (Geradin 2005;
Pollak and Riekmann 2008; Yataganas 2001). For some newer agencies,
the Parliament has gained the option to hear the executive director
before he is formally appointed by the management board or the Coun-
cil. The Parliament can then issue advice on the proposed candidate, but
does not have the power to veto his appointment (Groenleer 2009).
Another important mechanism of accountability is the power of the
Parliament, together with the Council, to vote on the agencies’ annual
budgets. This right could in theory be used to push agencies toward
more transparency to increase parliamentary scrutiny of their activities
(Geradin 2005; Kreher 1997; Vos 2000, 2005). Additionally the Parlia-
ment also enjoys the power of discharge for the implementation of
agencies’ budgets (Vos 2005). But until today, no case is known in which
the Parliament has used its financial power to actively influence the
behavior or the work program of an EU agency (Groenleer 2009).
Apart from these budgetary powers, therefore, once an agency has
been set up, control over its workings lies in the first place in the hands
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of the member-states. This is due to the appointment (usually formally
by the Council) of member-states’ representatives on the management
boards (with the exception of the EFSA, Geradin 2005; Groenleer 2009).
Again, however, the question of how these representatives are then held
accountable at the national level shows significant variation, which
deserves further research (Buess et al. 2011 and Buess 2012).
Given the inherent limits of representative channels of accountabil-
ity, the EU’s evolution from a primarily regulatory economic body
toward a deepening political union has gone along with the introduc-
tion of direct-democratic instruments and in particular the conducting
of national referenda on European issues. Countries whose citizens have
voted against a particular treaty or policy have negotiated opt-outs from
particularly controversial fields such as, for instance, economic and
monetary union, or justice and home affairs in the case of Denmark’s
1992 negative referendum on the Treaty of Maastricht. The deeply polit-
ical and distributive implications of the fiscal pact designed to stabilize
the EU’s monetary union have heightened the salience of the use of
referenda in public debates. In the UK, the rule that any new transfers
of sovereignty toward the EU shall be submitted to a referendum was
enshrined in national law in 2011.
The problem of responsiveness
The question of how far internationalized decision making responds to
citizens’ needs and priorities is the fifth and last problem discussed in
this chapter. The search for responsiveness constitutes both the reason
for internationalization and an important yardstick for measuring its
legitimacy. As mentioned earlier, transborder cooperation and the set-
ting up of international institutions is a response to states’ increasing
difficulties in addressing transnational societal problems. The capacity
to do so, that is, the efficiency of policy outputs, is thus central to the
legitimation of multilevel governance. Output efficiency involves both
the capacity to address the expectations and preferences of the political
subjects and to produce and implement effective policy solutions. The
assessment of this yardstick depends of course on the scope of inter-
nationalization and the nature of the tasks delegated to international
bodies, as well as the degree of their politicization.
For the proponents of an intergovernmentalist view of international
institutions, output legitimacy is crucial since other criteria related to
inclusion and participation are basically reserved for the nation-state.
According to Fritz Scharpf, the supranational level’s own legitimacy
is based on its ability to produce substantive outcomes in line with
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the principle of Pareto optimality, which states that only decisions
that no one will find unprofitable and that will make at least one
party better off, are capable of lending legitimacy to these decisions
(Scharpf 1999: 237). Liberal institutionalist explanations of interna-
tional cooperation have an in-built bias for such a line of argumentation
since they explain the very motive of cooperation by its expected
absolute gains (see for example Keohane et al. 2009). Empirical stud-
ies have also shown that membership in international organizations
enhances the states’ problem-solving capacities, in particular in develop-
ing countries. The mechanisms through which domestic responsiveness
is strengthened include technical cooperation, know-how diffusion, and
the maintenance of public concerns such as environmental protection
or sustainable development on the agenda of governments (Ruoff 2009).
As already pointed out by Robert Dahl (1994), however, there tends to
be a trade-off between output efficiency and input legitimacy in inter-
national governance. Furthermore, the possibility of determining or
recognizing Pareto optimality vanishes with the degree to which inter-
national institutions move away from purely regulatory and techno-
cratic issues toward genuinely political questions involving judgments
about values and distributive problems (i.e. Hirst and Thompson 2009;
Rieger and Leibfried 2003; Scharpf 1999). In his seminal work on the EU,
Fritz Scharpf has argued that regional integration develops a dynamic
that threatens to undermine the output legitimacy of EU policies over
time. The reason is that initially limited cooperation in market-making
policies, which may well have welfare-enhancing effects in the short
run creates ‘spillover’ problems over time. These spillover problems that
stem from new interdependencies in turn call for European answers in
new, more sensitive fields in which member-states’ interests no longer
converge and where the permissive consensus for integration is missing.
The result is a growing problem-solving gap: whereas internationaliza-
tionmay be at the first step responsive to domestic needs it may generate
new problems which states are no longer able to solve domestically but
where effective common solutions at the international level are blocked
by political conflicts among member governments (Scharpf 2003).
The current turmoil affecting the common currency and to some
extent also the broader global financial crisis are indicative of the
long-term and unintended effects of short-term liberalization steps and
of the difficulty in regaining control over deregulated market forces.
The pertinence of these crises for the question of democracy and the
responsiveness of internationalized politics stems from the centrality
of financial stability for public policy in general. As Karl Polanyi and
John Ruggie have argued, the ‘golden age of capitalism’ rested upon a
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division of labor between a liberalized economy and the consolidation
of national welfare states, or, in Ruggie’s words, ‘embedded capitalism’.
The deregulation of financial markets that set off in the 1970s has put
this social-democratic bargain under stress. To critical observers, the
denationalization of financial markets and the corresponding neolib-
eral turn have alienated the political class from its democratic base
and have led to a ‘post-democracy’ (Crouch 2004) in which govern-
ments have become more responsive to financial markets and economic
lobbies than to their citizens. ‘In capitalist democracies, governments
depend on the confidence of their voters. But to maintain this confi-
dence they also depend on the performance of their real economies and,
increasingly, on the confidence of financial markets’ (Scharpf 2011: 1).
With the communitarization of monetary policies in the EU, the dif-
ficulty of responsible government is not only the question of how to
reconcile the demand for growth stimuli and Keynesian recipes with
the neoliberal imperatives of austerity dictated by the financial market.
The problem is also that with the monetary union, EU member-states
have effectively deprived themselves of central macro-economic instru-
ments. Taken together, the empowerment of financial markets and the
loss of steering mechanisms put into question the political capacity to
craft solutions that are responsive to citizens’ needs and priorities. At the
same time, these constraints create a pressure for more supranational
integration toward a fiscal and political union.
In light of the problems of congruence, inclusion, transparency, and
accountability discussed above, the question arises to what extent the
expectable losses in output-legitimacy may be met by citizen’s active
support for the proposed solutions, that is, input-legitimacy. Whereas in
earlier national austerity programs, politicians could revert to national
values and a common sense of identity to justify painful retrench-
ments, supranational, technocratic solutions in the fragmented multi-
level EU polity fall short of such legitimizing discourses. In contrast,
they are prone to diffuse accountability and may spur blame-shifting
and open hostility between the donors and recipients of the respec-
tive programs (Scharpf 2011). It is against this background that the
calls for the legitimation of such consequential steps through national
referenda as issued Greece (by the ill-fated former Prime Minister
Georgios Papandreu) and Germany (inter alia by the Federal Constitu-
tional Court) must be understood. Whether the supranational answers
to the financial crisis will spur such democratic responses remains
to be seen, as does the question of whether this eventual demo-
cratic reconquest will back or undermine the corresponding sovereignty
transfers.
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Conclusion
This chapter has argued that there is no simple response to the question
of how far globalization and, more specifically, the internationalization
of policy making challenge the exercise of democratic rule in established
democracies. Clearly, the scope of challenges to democracy constituted
by internationalization depends very much on the extent to which
international politics depart from purely technical, regulatory issues
and touch upon questions of values and/or have distributive impact.
What is more, the assessment of the question of how far this is the
case depends not only on the policy field at stake but first and foremost
on the theoretical perspective that one takes on the models of interna-
tional polity formation. In contrast to intergovernmentalist approaches
that postulate a limited delegation of functional tasks to international
organizations and reserve the sphere of democracy for the nation-state,
and in contrast to federalist visions of a wider process of international
polity building, ultimately calling for the uploading of the domestic
base of democracy, including the demos, to a higher level, the notion
of multilevel politics takes an intermediate position and highlights the
interdependence of international and domestic structures as well as the
interplay between representative and expert fora in the preservation of
democracy.
Focusing on the EU as the most progressed case of internationaliza-
tion, our brief discussion of the manifestation of problems of inclusion,
transparency, accountability, and responsiveness has highlighted sig-
nificant variation in the ways that national level institutions adapt to
the multilevel polity in terms of preserving democratic principles. For
instance, when it comes to the inclusion of national parliaments in
international politics, analyses show that only a few legislatures in the
EU have implemented the institutional procedures necessary for effec-
tive control of government representatives. The same could probably be
demonstrated for international affairs more broadly. In settings that lack
direct parliamentary representation, the question of inclusion is usually
extended to the role of civil society groups and stakeholders. While it
is true that international organizations follow very different approaches
with regard to civil society participation, it has also been shown that
the actual impact of such private actors on governments’ behavior is
to a significant extent shaped by the opportunity structures provided
by their domestic political systems. Cross-national variation also exists
with regard to the transparency requirements attached to international
proceedings or the ways in which state representatives active in decision
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making are held accountable to their domestic constituency. True, the
problem of accountability is exacerbated by the difficulty of attribut-
ing clear responsibilities to individual players in complex negotiation
structures. Nevertheless, it can be argued that, theoretically, national
parliaments would have a wide range of instruments at their disposal
to sanction governmental failure that are also used in domestic pol-
itics, like questions, interpellations, critical plenary debates, or, most
severely, the withdrawal of confidence (Winzen 2010). The same is true
in type-II institutions that lack the direct ties to the representative are-
nas. In fact, the technocratic prerogative of political independence that
underpins the creation of regulatory agencies does not preclude the need
for clear chains of accountability toward the democratically legitimated
organs, that is, in the EU the European Parliament and the national
parliaments. The literature on the democratic deficit of EU regulatory
agencies has nearly exclusively focused on horizontal mechanisms of
control between the Council, the Commission, the Parliament, and the
agencies. This limited perspective on the supranational level neglects
the fact that member-states themselves have direct access to holding EU
agencies accountable through the delegation of national representatives
to the agencies’ management boards. The ways in which these national
delegates are held accountable at the national level, and by which insti-
tutional means, indicate great variation and need to be studied more
closely (Buess 2012). These observations just underline the pertinence
of Robert Dahl’s analysis when he argued that ‘in order to maintain the
vitality of the democratic process, democratic institutions within coun-
tries would need to be improved. Stronger democratic institutions would
provide whatever democratic control may be possible over the author-
ity delegated to transnational decision makers and thus help to prevent
delegation from becoming in effect a total and permanent alienation of
control’. (Dahl 1994: 33, see also Schmitter 2000: 106)
The multilevel perspective on the challenges posed by globalization
also helps us to think beyond institutional questions regarding the
institutional interplay between domestic structures and international
ones in democratic rule. Beyond institutional matters, this perspec-
tive allows us to look in a different manner at what was identified as
the most basic challenge to democracy: the increasing incongruence
between internationalizing political spheres and primarily national
demoi. In contrast to intergovernmentalists, who think of democracy
and political community as prerogatives of the nation-state, and in con-
trast to federalist visions, which tend to forecast a parallel shift in polit-
ical competences and allegiances, the multilevel approach underlines
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134 Globalization and the Vertical Challenge to Democracy
the enduring coexistence, at least for the foreseeable future, of primar-
ily national demoi and a nascent, at best incomplete, supranational
demos. The notion of demoicracy, developed in political philosophy,
embraces such a multilevel perspective on the question of congruence.
Formulated in the context of a democratic theory of multilateralism, this
notion suggests a solution to the congruence problem based on the dual
and equal representation of democratic statespeoples (the political com-
munities of the member-states or demoi) and individuals (European or
global citizens) in internationalized settings (Cheneval 2008, 2011). The
main challenge to democracy, from this perspective, is to devise political
institutions and rules that observe the overarching common good while
respecting the domestic limits to internationalization (Nicolaidis 2012).
The challenges to democracy exposed by the current financial and fis-
cal crisis in Europe and beyond may be read as precisely an exercise
in defining the domestic limits of financial deregulation and mon-
etary communitarization between more national control and greater
supranational empowerment. This differentiated view on the political
community mirrors the transformative idea embedded in the notion
of multilevel governance and opens new perspectives on the question
of how to think of institutional and identity-building processes in the
context of internationalization.
Notes
1. Eriksen and Fossum (2007) draw a similar distinction between a ‘delegated
democracy’ (here: intergovernmental model), a ‘federal democracy’ (here:
federal model) and a ‘cosmopolitan democracy’. By distinguishing between
either minimal supranational delegation and the full-fledged analogy of the
federal-state model, their typology does not consider transformative notion
of a multilevel (post-national) polity. We do not consider the visionary model
of cosmopolitan democracy due to its radical departure from the notion of
representative democracy and its anchoring in deliberative understandings
of democracy that depart from the basic model of democracy presented in
Chapter 3.
2. On the notion of gradualism in democratic theory see Bohman (2007: 20f).
Such a gradualist understanding of democratization in the EU can be found,
for example, in the writings of Dahl (1999), Follesdal and Hix (2005), and
Scharpf (1999).
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Globalization is not only a challenge to established democracy, it is
also driver of democratization beyond the confines of Western liberal
democracy. Following the adoption of the first democratic constitutions
in the late 18th and 19th century, the spread of democracy came in
three waves (Huntington 1991). The first began in the early 19th cen-
tury with the extension of the right to vote to a large proportion of the
male population in the US, and continued until the 1920s. A second
wave began after World War II and covered Western Europe as well as
Japan. In the 1970s the third wave started with the end of the dictator-
ships in Portugal and Spain, and spread to Latin America in the 1980s,
Eastern Europe in the 1990s, and some African and Asian nations includ-
ing South Africa and Indonesia – and, most recently, the revolutionary
movements in Northern Africa.
The advancement of democracy through the world has not been
linear and has seen many setbacks. Moreover, many of the new democ-
racies see deficiencies in their institutional framework and civil-society
basis. Accounts of the waves of transitions that occurred prior to the
1990s gave clear primacy to domestic factors in explaining the turn
toward democracy. Whilst there is a general consensus that domestic
factors are uppermost in explaining long-term prospects for democrati-
zation, in recent years, and much under the impression of the historical
role of the EU in sustaining democratic change after the demise of
the communist bloc, scholars have started to study more closely the
external sources of democratization (Burnell and Youngs 2010). Indeed,
the international system has been described as the ‘missing variable’
in democratization studies (McFaul 2010). These external sources of
democratization have been broadly studied in two ways. Scholars have,
on the one hand, examined how far globalization contributes to the
135
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136 Globalization and the Horizontal Promotion of Democracy
diffusion of democratic movements and reforms across countries and
regions as a phenomenon of non-purposefully induced contagion (e.g.
Gleditsch and Ward 2006). This aspect has already been discussed in
Chapter 2. The purposeful promotion of democratic reforms by interna-
tional actors constitutes the second focus of current research and is the
aspect linked to globalization analyzed in this chapter. International-
relations perspectives on the role of international actors parallel the two
main approaches in the domestic explanation of democratization: struc-
tural approaches which stress the transformatory power of progressing
modernization, and agency-based theories which underline the choices
of ruling elites. Accordingly, international actors have sought to induce
political transformation through two, sometimes parallel, strategies:
‘linkage’ and ‘leverage’ (Levitsky and Way 2006).
According to the first strategy, linkage, international actors give eco-
nomic aid and promote societal interchange in order to tackle the
prerequisites of democracy and give support to the forces of democ-
ratization in society. ‘Leverage’, in contrast, is a strategy to induce
power-holders to give up authoritarian rule in exchange for other
(significant) benefits, such as, in the European case, accession to the
EU. In recent years, and with the intensification of transgovernmental
contacts between states as well as between the EU (and other inter-
national organizations) and countries of the ‘non-democratic world’,
a third channel of external democracy promotion has taken shape.
Labeled as the ‘governance’ model of democracy promotion (Lavenex
and Schimmelfennig 2011), this approach involves the transfer of demo-
cratic governance principles related to accountability, participation, and
transparency in the context of functional cooperation between admin-
istrative actors. While not tackling the reform of political institutions
as such, nor the socio-economic prerequisites of democracy, this ‘third
way’ prepares the legal–administrative basis of democratic governance
and constitutes an important element in processes of transition.
This chapter discusses these three models of external democracy pro-
motion and the conditions for their effectiveness. It puts a particular
focus on the EU as external democracy promoter in its neighborhood,
but the instruments discussed can be and are also used by other inter-
national actors. With regard to the EU, its impact has been particularly
strong when it could exert leverage through the carrot of membership
(Schimmelfennig et al. 2006). As argued by Milada Vachudova (2005),
in the process of eastern enlargement the EU, by defining democracy
and respect for human rights as conditions for membership, exerted
both active leverage toward candidate states and passive leverage toward
potential applicant states. Beyond the countries with a membership
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perspective, however, the EU’s leverage has not only been circumscribed
by the lack of incentives: internal inconsistencies and the overriding pri-
ority given to the stabilization of its neighborhood have impeded any
consistent application of threats and carrots toward ‘friendly’ authori-
tarian regimes, especially at the EU’s Mediterranean borders (Del Sarto
and Schumacher 2011).
Beyond the circle of candidate countries, the EU’s traditional
approach at democracy promotion has been linkage via aid and trade
as well as support for democratically oriented domestic groups. How-
ever, these linkage policies have either been too moderate or ineffective
to show any significant effect.
Thus, in the absence of a consequential policy of conditionality and
of effective linkage strategies, EU impact on democratization beyond
enlargement has remained modest and well below the threshold of
rousing democratic revolutions. This more modest impact has worked
through a complex network of transgovernmental functional cooper-
ation established in EU external relations that promotes democratic
governance norms at the level of public administrations, even in the
absence of direct regime change.
The distinctions between these three models of external democracy
promotion and their different scope conditions should not hide the
fact that the three models are complementary and mutually beneficial.
In fact, a too narrow emphasis on either only leverage or governance
can even have adverse effects by, for example, introducing formal
institutions like free elections without securing socio-political and eco-
nomic development, or, in the case of the governance model, making
the public administration, and with it the ruling elites, even stronger
in relation to the population. Therefore, it seems that a successful
external democracy promotion should combine political pressure for
sustained democratization with support to democratic forces in society
and cooperation at the level of public administrations. In any case, the
success of externally induced democratization strategies, as argued also
in Chapter 2, will always and to a very large extent rest on the domestic
predispositions for democratic change in the respective countries.
Models of external democracy promotion1
The two traditional models of external democracy promotion, linkage
and leverage, have their roots in the main theories of democratization
developed in the 1960s and 1980s. The notion of linkage links up with
Seymour Martin Lipset’s emphasis on the importance of domestic socio-
economic prerequisites for democracy. Only in a wealthy society can a
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138 Globalization and the Horizontal Promotion of Democracy
situation exist in which ‘the mass of the population could intelligently
participate in politics and could develop the self-restraint necessary to
avoid succumbing to the appeals of irresponsible demagogues. A soci-
ety divided between a large impoverished mass and a small favored
elite would result either in oligarchy [ . . . ] or in tyranny’ (Lipset 1959:
75).2 In this logic, democratic change can be externally supported by
improving the socio-economic base.
The leverage approach, in contrast, is largely compatible with the lit-
erature on democratic transitions that focuses on political processes and
choices of state leaders in explaining regime change (e.g. O’Donnell
et al. 1986; Przeworski 1991). These actor-oriented approaches argue
that regime transitions are not determined by structural factors, but
shaped by principal political actors’ interests and strategies in a given
setting. As Shin (1994: 141) expressed it, democracy ‘is no longer
treated as a particularly rare and delicate plant that cannot be trans-
planted in alien soil; it is treated as a product that can be manufactured
wherever there is democratic craftsmanship and the proper zeitgeist’.
Political change can therefore be externally induced through offering
ruling elites attractive benefits, provided that these benefits are not
surmounted by the corresponding costs of compliance.
The third model of external democracy promotion, governance, has
no precursor in the analysis of the domestic forces of democratization
and has its intellectual roots in the institutionalist literature on modern
forms of political steering and policy making, including the vanishing
distinction between domestic and international spheres in the process of
governing (Jachtenfuchs 2001; Mayntz 2005). Accordingly, internation-
alization and external actors may impact on democratization by altering
the principles upon which governance is based, that is, by promoting
principles of accountability, participation, and transparency.
These models of external democracy promotion target democratiza-
tion processes at different levels, and, although sharing the common
end-goal of democratic government, they differ with regard to their
envisaged outcomes, the channels through which influence is exerted,
as well as the instruments applied. This chapter introduces the main
characteristics of the three models before we turn to the EU’s role as an
external democracy promoter.
Leverage
The leverage model is the most direct democratization strategy as it
is targeted at the polity as such, including the electoral regime, the
division of powers between state organs, and respect for individual
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rights and civil liberties. The intended outcomes are democratic insti-
tutions guaranteeing vertical (electoral) and horizontal accountability
as well as the rule of law. The actors primarily addressed by these
policies are the governments themselves who will be incentivized to
introduce political reforms. The channel of democracy promotion is
therefore intergovernmental. The vector of influence is top-down and
operates basically through the manipulation of rational cost-and-benefit
calculations of the ruling elites.
In order to produce institutional reform through leverage, the EU and
other international actors use political conditionality. Conditionality
has been conceived of as a bargaining process between the democracy-
promoting agency and a target state (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier
2005b: 12–16). In a bargaining process, actors exchange information,
threats, and promises in order to maximize their utility. The outcome
of the bargaining process depends on the relative bargaining power of
the actors. Informational asymmetries aside, bargaining power is a result
of the asymmetrical distribution of the benefits of a specific agreement
(compared to those of alternative outcomes or ‘outside options’). Gen-
erally, those actors who are least in need of a specific agreement are
best able to threaten the others with non-cooperation and thereby force
them to make concessions.
A prime venue for democracy promotion through leverage is mem-
bership conditionality. Since the enlargements of the 1980s, and most
prominently eastern enlargement, the EU has developed a more ‘exten-
sive and systematic’ conditionality approach than other international
organizations (Pridham 2008). In using conditionality, the EU set the
adoption of democratic institutions and practices as conditions that
the target countries have to fulfill in order to receive rewards from the
EU – such as financial aid, technical assistance, trade agreements, associ-
ation treaties, and, ultimately, membership. States that fail to meet the
conditions are not coerced to introduce democratic reforms but simply
left behind in the ‘regatta’ to assistance and membership.
The leverage model is thus focused on the role of the ruling elites. Its
most general proposition is that the government introduces democratic
changes in state institutions and behavior according to external condi-
tions if the benefits of external rewards exceed the domestic adoption
costs, that is, a loss of autonomy and power for the target govern-
ments. In addition, credibility is an intervening variable. With a given
size of benefits and costs, the effectiveness of leverage increases with
the credibility of conditionality. In a conditionality setting, credibility
refers to the international actor’s threat to withhold rewards in case
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140 Globalization and the Horizontal Promotion of Democracy
of non-compliance with his conditions and the promise to deliver the
reward in case of compliance. This also implies that leverage increases
with the strength and determinacy of its conditions.
The effectiveness of leverage depends also on domestic factors in the
target country, in particular the political costs of democratic reform
for the target governments. Domestic costs are low if meeting the
international actor’s political conditions engenders no or low power
costs for the target government. As highlighted by Schimmelfennig
and Sedelmeier (2005b), this is the case if compliance is not perceived
to endanger the dominance of the ethnic core group, threaten the
integrity of the state, or to undermine the target government’s practices
of power preservation and its institutional power in the state apparatus.
By contrast, domestic political costs are prohibitively high if the exter-
nal demands are seen as threats to the security and integrity of the state
or as tantamount to regime change.
While many authors, especially when studying the EU, have praised
the use of political conditionality as the most effective means of democ-
racy promotion, it should be noted that this policy does little to foster a
civic culture or strengthen intermediary institutions such as civic asso-
ciations or the public sphere. Even if it is successful, leverage might thus
contribute to a formally functioning democracy that is, however, not
necessarily underpinned by democratic culture and civil society. In addi-
tion, some authors have argued that a one-sided focus on conditionality
may undervalue democratization processes that are already taking place
(Ulusoy 2007: 472).
Linkage
The linkage and governance models are more indirect strategies of
democracy promotion. Linkage operates at the level of society and tar-
gets the socio-economic preconditions for democratization, including
economic growth, education, the spread of liberal values, and the orga-
nization of civil society and the public sphere. The envisaged result is a
democratic, ‘civic’ culture and meso-level institutions such as civic asso-
ciations, parties, and a democratic public sphere. Here the interlocutors
are not governments but opposition groups and societal actors more
broadly, we therefore can speak of a transnational channel of democ-
racy promotion. The vector of influence is bottom-up and presupposes
a process of socialization whereby the system is changed from within.
Linkage is based on two pillars: agency-based support for civil soci-
ety and political opposition groups, on the one hand, and more
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structural support through intensified transnational exchanges, on the
other. Support for the agents of democratization can be material or
educational. An international actor may, for instance, give money to
pro-democratic civil-society organizations or parties, or provide them
with infrastructure such as computers, mobile phones, or photocopy-
ing machines. It may also organize meetings, seminars, and conferences
that help these societal organizations to improve their political strategies
and their cooperation. This support can also occur indirectly through
societal contacts including business contacts, work or study abroad,
tourism, longer-term migration, and media exposure, through which
target societies are made familiar with democratic ideas and practices.
To the extent that these contacts convey an attractive social and polit-
ical alternative, they may contribute to value change and inspire more
demand for freedom and political rights in the target countries.
In addition, the external actors may promote the economic devel-
opment of target countries. By increasing trade relations, investment,
and development aid, they can contribute to democracy-conducive
wealth in general. The positive effects of trade, aid, and investment may
increase with diversification in two respects. On the one hand, they are
most helpful if they do not simply benefit small economic elites but
if their benefits are spread out as broadly and evenly as possible across
the population thus contributing to general wealth and higher income
equality. On the other hand, they are most likely to promote democ-
ratization if they strengthen mobile against immobile assets. Rather
than nurturing the agricultural or primary resources sectors, external
actors would therefore have to focus their trade and investment on the
industrial and services sectors.
Finally, linkage involves support for education in the target soci-
eties. By helping to raise the levels of literacy and education in the
target societies – that is, through building schools and universities,
funding educational programs, further educating teachers, welcoming
students – international actors can prepare the ground for successful
democratization in the future.
However, the conditions for effective linkage are not unidirectional.
In order to be possible, and to produce demand for (more) democracy
from below, contacts, exchange, and support activities require a mini-
mum of transnational openness on the part of the target country and of
autonomy for the civil society. Linkage efforts will not reach civil society
if a country is isolated from the outside world and civil society has no
freedom of maneuver.
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Governance
Finally, democracy promotion may also target states’ ordinary legis-
lation, which guides executive action within the different sectors of
public policy – such as environmental policy, market regulation, wel-
fare regimes, or internal security. Like the linkage model, according to
which international actors seek to strengthen democracy through the
promotion of democratic forces in society, the governance model thus
postulates mainly an indirect channel of influence. We call it the ‘gov-
ernance model’ because, rather than focusing on electoral democracy,
it embeds elements of democratic governance in sectoral cooperation
arrangements between an international actor and public administra-
tions in target countries. Its focus are procedural principles of democrat-
ically legitimate political-administrative behavior embedded in sectoral
legislation, including transparency, accountability, and societal partic-
ipation. The primary actors introducing reforms are public officials
working in the administration and ministries. Correspondingly, we
speak of a transgovernmental channel of democracy promotion. Influ-
ence is exerted in formally horizontal networks gathering public officials
from both democratic and non-democratic countries who engage in
processes of policy transfer based on both instrumental rationality and
socialization.
This type of transgovernmental networking is particularly strong in
EU neighbourhood relations and has been coined as ‘external gov-
ernance’ (Lavenex 2004). Its vehicles are the structures of external
governance that have emerged with different associated third countries,
which establish stable horizontal ties between public administrations
in the EU and third countries in individual policy sectors (Lavenex
2008).
‘Democratic governance’ locates the notion of democracy at the level
of the principles that guide administrative rules and practices in the
conduct of public policy. The focus is thus less on specific demo-
cratic institutions such as elections or parliaments but rather on the
principles underlying democracy which are applicable to all situations
in which collectively binding decisions are taken. These principles
include transparency, accountability, and participation. Transparency
refers both to access to issue-specific data and to governmental provision
of information about decision making. Accountability is about public
officials’ obligation to justify their decisions and actions, the possibil-
ity of appeal, and sanctioning over misconduct. This can include both
horizontal accountability between independent state agencies (such as
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investigating committees, or ombudsmen) and vertical accountability
that emphasizes the obligation for public officials to justify their deci-
sions. Finally, participation denotes non-electoral forms of participation
such as involvement of non-state actors in administrative decision and
policy making (Freyburg et al. 2007).
If successful, this model promotes the adoption of democratic gov-
ernance norms in the target sector, be it environment, competition,
immigration, or any other policy field. This model does not necessar-
ily address civil-society actors, nor does it directly affect the overarching
institutional arrangements of the polity. Therefore, democratic gover-
nance promotion may still occur within a generally semi-autocratic
political system – although, as we shall argue, a certain level of political
liberalization and of civil-society empowerment is a necessary condi-
tion for its success. While unlikely to engender by itself more profound
democratic change, democratic governance plays an important role in
preparing the legal administrative ground upon which eventual political
transitions can draw.
Cooperation under the governance model is based on sectoral
(national, European, or international) legislation containing democratic
governance norms and is designed to approximate legal and admin-
istrative standards in the target countries to those of the ‘sender’. Its
effectiveness therefore relies on the codification, that is, the quality and
precision of the democratic governance norms emanating from inter-
national rules. In addition, and in line with studies of policy transfer
and implementation, effectiveness increases the more the sectoral coop-
eration with the international actor is institutionalized. Consistency of
the international actor’s templates with other international legal rules
and the parallel engagement of other international actors should have a
supportive and reinforcing effect on norm transfer.
The positive impact of functional cooperation on democratic gover-
nance may however be offset by some sector-specific factors, such as the
costs of adaptation that a third country faces in the particular sector and
the degree of interdependence with the international actor in the respec-
tive policy. As in the case of leverage, asymmetric interdependence in
favor of the international actor is likely to enhance the effectiveness of
democratic governance promotion.
As with linkage, finally, external influence depends on the open-
ness and autonomy of domestic administrations in the target countries.
The horizontal transgovernmental ties that are at the heart of the
governance model presuppose a certain degree of decentralization of
administrative structures, empowerment of administrative officials, and
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Table 6.1 Three models of democracy promotion
Leverage Governance Linkage
Target Polity Sector Society
Outcome Democratic
institutions
Democratic
governance
Democratic
culture
Channel Intergovernmental Transgovernmental Transnational
Instruments Conditionality Socialization
openness toward contacts and cooperation with the administrations of
international organizations and other countries (Lavenex 2008: 952).
In other words, the effectiveness of democratic governance promotion
increases with the accessibility and autonomy of the administration
of the target country. The autonomy of civil society also plays a (sec-
ondary) role in the governance model, in particular for the application
or implementation of democratic governance norms: the functioning
of transparency, accountability, and, in particular, participation neces-
sitates the existence of an active civil society which demands access to
the decision-making process.
The three models of external democracy promotion are summarized
in Table 6.1.
The next section reviews the findings on the effectiveness of these
three models of democracy promotion, with a particular focus on the
role of the EU.
Effectiveness of EU democracy promotion
Despite its internally deficient democratic nature (see Chapter 5), during
the past two decades, the EU has developed into an agent of interna-
tional democracy promotion. The EU had long conceived of itself as
a community of democracies and recognized the need to strengthen
its own democratic credentials. Some of its external policies – most
prominently its southern enlargement to Greece, Portugal, and Spain –
had also been regarded implicitly and informally as a contribution to
democratization. However, most of its external relations – above all
trade agreements and development cooperation – had been notable for
their apolitical content and the principle of not interfering with the
domestic systems of third countries. It was only in the early 1990s that
external democracy promotion became an explicit, formal, and gen-
eral aim of the EU. In the Treaty of Maastricht (1991), the EU declared
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the development and consolidation of democracy as a goal of devel-
opment cooperation (Art. 130u) and its Common Foreign and Security
Policy (Art. J.1), and the principle of democracy was introduced in all its
external trade and aid agreements.
From its beginnings, EU democracy promotion has been a multi-
faceted policy, including all three models of external democracy pro-
motion highlighted above. Whereas the linkage approach has been a
constant in EU external policies since the early support to democratic
transitions in Latin America (Smith 2002: 122–129), in the 1990s, the
leverage model became dominant; with the governance model starting
to become more prominent in the early 2000s.
Democracy promotion through linkage
The linkage model is the most indirect of the three strategies of exter-
nal democracy promotion, and, given the wide economic and societal
nature of its mechanisms, the broadness of its targets, and its long-
term horizon, is notoriously difficult to assess empirically. On the one
hand, there is statistical evidence that geographic proximity to the EU
is systematically correlated with democracy (Kopstein and Reilly 2000;
Schimmelfennig and Scholtz 2008). This, however, is only a proxy for
a mixed bag of transnational exchanges, contacts, and similarities (and
probably other unspecified influences related to distance). We do not
yet know which kinds of linkages are relevant for democracy promotion
and what the specific EU contribution is.
Empirical studies investigating the linkage model in EU democracy
promotion have focused on the Mediterranean. Cooperation with the
Arab states of the southern Mediterranean and Israel intensified in mid-
1995 with the launch of the new Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, also
referred to as the Barcelona Process, which enshrined a high profile
commitment to democracy promotion. Apart from weakly enforced
conditionality elements (see below), this was mainly to be achieved
through enhanced economic cooperation, including far-reaching trade-
liberalization agendas, as well as societal and cultural interchange
(the so-called second and third baskets of the Euro-Mediterranean
Partnership).
Analyses of the effects of linkage on democratization in the
Mediterranean come to a sobering conclusion. Reviewing democracy
promotion in the context of the Barcelona Process, Jünemann (2003: 7)
observes that while the EU’s bottom-up programs at the level of civil
society were ‘taken up [ . . . ] with great enthusiasm’ by democratic forces
in the target countries, ‘high expectations were soon disappointed
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by the EU’s unexpected reluctance and caution when putting these
programmes into practice’. Studies on EU support in the southern neigh-
borhood point out that EU assistance has remained extremely modest,
focused on a narrow sector of civil society (such as secular organizations
that are approved by, and often connected to, Middle Eastern and North-
ern African partner governments); and privileged non-political commu-
nity services (Gillespie and Whitehead 2002: 197; Haddadi 2002 and
2003; Jünemann 2002; Schlumberger 2006: 45; Youngs 2002: 55–57).
Likewise, Youngs (2001: 193) asserts that ‘the EU did not push hard to
gain access for political aid work’ and was ‘unwilling to risk tension with
recipient governments’. Finally, the domestic conditions for bottom-up
support appear unfavorable in most neighborhood countries because
democratic civil society is weak and lacks autonomy.
While it is true that these analyses do not prove that linkage would
not have been effective if it had been pursued more consistently and
vigorously, they do point out that external support for civil society
in authoritarian countries quickly encounters governmental resistance,
which severely limits the potential of this model of external democracy
promotion. Moreover, recent upheavals in Northern Africa suggest that
the social groups that were most vocal in the calls for regime change had
not necessarily benefited from any EU engagement before and, what is
more, that their claims did not receive direct support. On the contrary,
both in the case of Tunisia and Egypt, Western states and the EU were
for a long time, even during the first days of the ‘revolutions’, important
allies of the ruling dictators.
Democracy promotion through leverage
In the early 1990s, the political integration symbolized in the creation
of the EU coincided with the transformation of Eastern Europe and
these countries’ gradual approximation to the EU. While the EU con-
tinued to give support to democratic transition through economic aid
and targeted action toward civil society, it also embraced a more explicit
and direct approach to democracy promotion by making aid, market
access, and deepened institutional relations from association to mem-
bership conditional on third state’s progress in institutional democracy.
For more than a decade, political conditionality came to epitomize the
EU’s democracy promotion efforts. Democracy, human rights, and the
rule of law became ‘essential elements’ in almost all EU agreements with
third countries, as both an objective and a condition of the institutional-
ized relationship. In case of violation, the EU may suspend or terminate
the agreement also; in practice, it has hardly ever done so (Horng 2003).
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Most notably, the Copenhagen Criteria agreed by the European Council
in 1993 made the consolidation of liberal democracy the principal con-
dition for starting accession negotiations. From the first round of eastern
enlargement negotiations, which opened in 1998 and excluded Slovakia
because of its democracy deficits, to the discussions about the member-
ship prospects of Turkey and the Western Balkans, political conditions
related to the state of democracy have been of central relevance.
A considerable body of research has therefore focused on the leverage
model, that is, the EU’s political accession conditionality, in explaining
the democratic transformation of EU candidate countries. Several com-
parative studies have concurred on two main findings (see, for example,
Kelley 2004; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005a; Vachudova 2005).
First, only the credible conditional promise of membership has proven
a powerful tool in helping Central and Eastern European countries to
consolidate democracy. Socialization strategies or the use of weaker
incentives have generally not been sufficient to bring about democratic
change. Second, even a highly credible membership perspective has not
been effective if meeting the EU’s conditions implied regime change or
threatened the political survival of the third-state government.
Both conditions for successful EU leverage arguably are on the wane,
however. First, the EU is currently unwilling to extend the offer of
membership to countries beyond the current candidates in the Western
Balkans and Turkey. While membership is excluded for the Northern
African and Middle Eastern neighbors, the EU has not been able or will-
ing to commit itself to a conditional accession promise for the European
transition countries of Moldova and Ukraine either. For all these neigh-
boring countries, the EU has designed the European Neighbourhood
Policy (ENP) as an alternative to, rather than a preparatory stage
for, membership. Even in the candidate countries, political accession
conditionality has lost credibility (cf. Kubicek 2011). At any rate, the
potential accession date of most candidate countries will likely be so
far in the future that the incentives of membership lack power in the
present.
Second, the EU’s political conditionality has proven highly incon-
sistent below the threshold of accession conditionality. On the one
hand, political conditionality is strong at a declaratory and program-
matic level. The ENP is based on the EU’s commitment to promote core
liberal values and norms beyond its borders and claims to use polit-
ical conditionality as the main instrument of norm promotion. ENP
strategy documents tie both participation in the ENP as such and the
intensity and level of cooperation to the ENP partners’ adherence to
10.1057/9781137299871 - Democracy in the Age of Globalization and Mediatization, Hanspeter Kriesi, Daniel Bochsler, Jörg Matthes,
Sandra Lavenex, Marc Bühlmann and Frank Esser
Co
py
rig
ht
 m
at
er
ia
l f
ro
m
 w
w
w
.
pa
lg
ra
v
ec
o
n
n
ec
t.c
om
 - 
lic
en
se
d 
to
 U
ZH
 H
au
pt
bi
bl
io
th
ek
 / 
Ze
nt
ra
lb
ib
lio
th
ek
 Z
ür
ic
h 
- P
al
gr
av
eC
on
ne
ct
 - 
20
13
-0
3-
29
148 Globalization and the Horizontal Promotion of Democracy
liberal values and norms (Mayer and Schimmelfennig 2007: 40–42).
In addition, the ‘essential elements’ clause features in almost all legal
agreements between the EU and partner countries in the region.
Implementation is patchy, however. Comparisons of ENP action plans
reveal an incoherent democracy promotion policy and the overrid-
ing importance of the EU’s geostrategic and partner countries’ political
interests (Baracani 2009; Bosse 2007; Del Sarto and Schumacher 2011;
Pace et al. 2009). In a comparative analysis of EU responses to violations
of democratic norms in the post-Soviet area, Warkotsch (2006) shows
that, while the existence of a democracy clause in EU–third country
agreements significantly increases the likelihood of an EU response to
anti-democratic policies, it is not significantly correlated with responses
that go beyond verbal denunciation. Strong sanctions are more likely to
be used against geographically proximate states and less likely against
resource-rich countries. Studies of EU democracy promotion in the
Mediterranean up to the Arab Spring confirm this picture (Del Sarto and
Schumacher 2011; Pace et al. 2009). The EU’s application of political
conditionality in this region has been undermined by its efforts to build
a multilateral partnership in the southern Mediterranean and to pro-
mote peace in the Middle East – otherwise it would risk losing essential
partners for these efforts. At the end of the day, the EU, and particularly
its southern member-states, appeared to prefer stable, authoritarian, and
Western-oriented regimes to the instability and Islamist electoral victo-
ries that genuine democratization processes in this region are likely, in
some cases, to produce (Gillespie and Whitehead 2002; Gillespie and
Youngs 2002; Jünemann 2002; Youngs 2001).
Finally, until the – for many unexpected – 2011 revolutions, domestic
conditions in most neighboring countries stood in the way of effective
political conditionality. Most of the ‘European neighbourhood’ from
Belarus via the Caucasus to Northern Africa was governed by autocratic
states for which complying with the EU’s political conditions would
have been tantamount to regime change. Even in the democratizing
countries of the Western Balkans and Eastern Europe legacies of ethnic
conflict, extreme political polarization, and severe weaknesses in gover-
nance capacity blocked the road to further EU integration (on Croatia,
see Freyburg and Richter 2010).
The Arab revolutions of 2011/2012 have not only disclosed the incon-
sistency of the EU’s approach, they have also changed the domestic
opportunity structures for democratic conditionality. This was recog-
nized by EU Commissioner Stefan Füle, responsible for enlargement and
the ENP, when he stated that even though the ‘EU has always been active
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in promoting human rights and democracy in our neighbourhood’ it is
also clear that ‘it has often focused too much on stability at the expense
of other objectives and, more problematic, at the expense of our [the
EU’s] values’ (Füle 2011: 2). Yet it remains to be seen how far, in the
absence of the carrot of membership, the EU will be able and willing
to offer meaningful incentives to uphold the fragile democratization
process in its southern neighborhood.
Democratic governance promotion
Whereas the use of the leverage model of democratization via political
conditionality has thus remained hitherto limited to accession coun-
tries, the main avenue for democracy promotion in the ENP has been,
apart from hesitant linkage policies (see above), sectoral cooperation at
the transgovernmental level.
As a new form of association policy below the threshold of member-
ship, the ENP promotes democratic governance norms through third
countries’ approximation to EU sectoral policies. While proclaiming
a process of gradual approximation based on shared values (includ-
ing democracy, human rights, and the rule of law), the ENP has so
far focused more on functional cooperation in sectoral policies such
as market regulations or environmental or migration policy, in which
the neighboring countries agree to approximate their legislation to the
EU acquis. Considering the constraints on democracy promotion out-
side an enlargement framework, the European Commission outlined in
2006 that ‘[d]emocratic governance is to be approached holistically, tak-
ing account of all its dimensions (political, economic, social, cultural,
environmental, etc.). [ . . . ] Accordingly, the concept of democratic gov-
ernance has to be integrated into each and every sectoral programme’
in relations with third countries (European Commission 2006: 6).
In contrast to the two other models of external democracy promo-
tion, the governance approach is very recent and has hitherto only been
systematically researched within NCCR Democracy in a project on the
EU’s democracy promotion through the ENP. In a comparison of three
policies (competition, environment, and migration policy) and four
countries, two from the eastern neighborhood (Moldova and Ukraine)
and two from the southern neighborhood (Jordan and Morocco), it
could be shown that the EU does promote democratic governance
norms through functional cooperation with a certain success. How-
ever, this success is hitherto mainly limited to the adoption of such
norms in sectoral legislation and does, with a few exceptions, not yet
manifest in rule application. Interestingly, this effect seems to work
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relatively independently from the influence of leverage or linkage, since
country-level political variables (membership aspirations and the degree
of political liberalization) do not explain the variation in outcomes
(Freyburg et al. 2011; Freyburg et al. forthcoming).
The study shows that the transfer of democratic governance norms
follows a sectoral dynamic and matches the conditions stipulated by the
governance model. Accordingly, the adoption of democratic governance
provisions by the target states is the more successful the more strongly
these provisions are codified in the sectoral acquis; the more institu-
tionalized the cooperation between the EU and ENP states is, the more
interdependent the parties are, and, finally, the lower adoption costs
are for national governments and sectoral authorities. The strongest
effects of democratic governance promotion were found in the field of
environmental cooperation, which is relatively highly institutionalized
given the existence of several international frameworks of coopera-
tion,3 and where the EU acquis includes strong provisions, in particular
with regard to participation and transparency, that are backed by the
international Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Par-
ticipation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental
Matters of 1998. Moldova was one of the first countries to ratify the
Aarhus Convention and translated its central provisions into the 2000
Law on Access to Information. The EU also promoted the adoption of a
law on access to environmental information in Morocco that emulates
the rules concerning participation and transparency included in the EU
acquis and the Aarhus Convention, as well as the Law on Environmental
Impact Studies that guarantees public access to environmental infor-
mation and the right to appeal. However, the implementation of these
norms has remained patchy at best (Freyburg et al. 2011).
Other examples of successful democratic norm transfer could also
be found in the more politicized field of migration policy, where the
EU has backed its external policies by projects conducted through
the International Organisation for Migration, the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and transgovernmental networks
such as the Söderköping and Budapest processes to the east and more
informal cooperation to the south. For instance, the Moldovan Law on
the Status of Refugees from 2002 explicitly states that the law is to bring
domestic legislation on asylum to internationally recognized standards,
including pertinent democratic norms such as non-discrimination, fair
consideration of applications for asylum, provision of exhaustive infor-
mation about procedures, possibilities for appeal and contacting the
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UNHCR representative. Even Morocco, which, given its geographical
situation, faces strong disincentives to engage in democratic governance
with regard to migration and asylum, has introduced legislative provi-
sions, for example, obliging the authorities to explain negative asylum
decision (accountability) and to inform asylum seekers of their rights
(transparency) as well as to provide access to a lawyer and allow contest-
ing the decision before an administrative court. The adoption of these
norms is claimed to be a result of EU influence. Although, as in the
case of environmental provisions, the study finds little evidence for the
translation of these legislative changes into administrative practice, it
concludes that in a long-term perspective, the adoption of the principles
of transparency, accountability, and participation in sectoral legislation
may play a positive role in processes of democratization. While demo-
cratic governance is unlikely to – by itself – engender systemic change, it
nevertheless plays an important role in preparing the legal and bureau-
cratic basis upon which eventual transitions toward a new democratic
order can draw.
This interpretation is corroborated by a separate but related study, in
which Tina Freyburg shifts the focus from the macro-level of domes-
tic legislation to the micro-level of actors’ perceptions (Freyburg 2011a
and 2011b). She asks whether participation in transgovernmental policy
networks influences the attitudes of state officials regarding democratic
governance. In a comparative analysis of two EU twinning projects
in Morocco, she finds conditional support for the effectiveness of
democratic governance promotion. Whereas in the issue area of envi-
ronmental policy, the participants in the twinning project exhibited
a significantly higher support for democratic governance than the
non-participants, this was not the case for the twinning project on com-
petition policy. The difference cannot be accounted for by properties of
the state officials, such as their linkage experiences, but is best explained
by the difference in politicization (the intensity of the political actors’
interests at stake) between the two sectors. The finding that non-
politicized sectors are more conducive to democratic governance pro-
motion matches the results of the previous study (Freyburg et al. 2011).
In so far as EU networking and policy-transfer activities contribute to
public officials’ attitudinal support for democratic governance norms,
one may also conclude that they will play a positive role in sustaining
democratic transitions. Of course, however, this diffusion of democratic
governance norms via sectoral legislation should not go at the expense
of democratic legislative processes in the respective countries.
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Conclusion
This chapter has discussed three models of external democracy promo-
tion by international actors. Although the focus was laid on the EU, the
models are also applicable to international organizations more gener-
ally and partly also to states in their relations with authoritarian and
democratizing countries. These three models document different ways
in which globalization doesn’t actually challenge democracy but rather
contributes to its horizontal spread, even if only imperfectly.
First, international organizations can use their influence to link cer-
tain benefits of membership to the requirement of democratic reforms.
This leverage model of accession conditionality has been successfully
applied by the EU in the context of its enlargement policy. It presup-
poses a sizeable incentive for authoritarian regimes to agree to domestic
reforms as well as a credible and consistent conditionality policy on
the part of the external actor. In theory, this instrument is also avail-
able to other international organizations, but a look for instance at the
Council of Europe or the World Trade Organization show that it is not
consistently applied. Softer forms of leverage are used in the field of
development aid and financial cooperation by the International Mon-
etary Fund or the World Bank. However, the requested reforms follow
more the leaner principles of good governance and are less targeted
toward democratic reforms proper.
The second approach to external democracy promotion, linkage, is
also available to other international actors. Research on the promotion
of international human rights has well documented how international
organizations and transnational non-governmental organizations form
alliances with domestic democratic forces in authoritarian countries.
This pressure from above and from below can lead to a ‘boomerang
effect’ by which authoritarian governments over time decide to restrain
from human rights abuses and may even become socialized into human
rights norms (Risse et al. 1999). In the case of EU and democracy pro-
motion, however, the use of linkage strategies, including also measures
targeted at socio-economic development such as aid and trade, have not
yielded tangible results, probably also because of a lack of engagement
on the part of the EU itself.
In light of these limits to established strategies of external democ-
racy promotion, newer research has analyzed how far the more general
phenomenon of intensifying functional cooperation in different policy
areas among countries, the establishment of transgovernmental net-
works sustaining such cooperation among public administrations and
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the processes of policy transfer and norm diffusion embedded therein
may contribute to the diffusion of democratic governance norms. First
studies on the EU’s Neighbourhood Policy confirm such subtle processes
of democratic governance promotion through functional cooperation
under certain conditions, which refer mainly to the salience of demo-
cratic rules in the legislative texts and treaties upon which this cooper-
ation is based as well as the intensity of institutional ties. The question
of how far the governance model of external democracy promotion also
applies to other international actors should be a question for further
research.
The juxtaposition of these three models of purposeful external
democracy promotion should however not obscure the important inter-
linkages and interdependencies between the processes and triggers
highlighted in each of these models. There is much to suggest that in
order to be really successful in inducing sustainable democratic change
the three models would have to be enacted in parallel as they all speak to
different but equally necessary levels of democratic transformation. For
instance, the introduction of democratic governance principles relating
to the transparency and accountability of public administration as well
as to the participation of civil society will remain void if the country
lacks a vivid civil society and institutions guaranteeing the rule of law.
Also, top-down approaches following the leverage model run the risk
of provoking more destabilization than democratization if the socio-
economic preconditions for democracy are lacking. Taken in isolation,
each model faces particular risks that may run counter to the goal of
democratization and, under certain circumstances, even spur violent
conflict (Cederman et al. 2010a, 2011). In any case, the sources of suc-
cessful democratization are much more complex than what external
triggers can yield. Even if the international community were consistent
and comprehensive in its democratization policies, which it rarely is, the
success of these policies will still, to a very considerable extent, rest on
domestic predispositions in the target countries. As argued in Chapter 2,
however, these domestic preconditions are difficult to influence from
the outside.
Notes
1. This section draws heavily on Lavenex and Schimmelfennig (2011).
2. Huntington (1991) was one of the first (quantitative) researchers to deal with
the impact of development on democratic transitions. The empirical results
showed that during the so-called third wave, from 1976 to 1990, countries in
the middle-income zone are most likely to make a transition to democracy.
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154 Globalization and the Horizontal Promotion of Democracy
‘As countries develop economically and move into this zone, they become
prospects for democratization’ (Huntington 1991: 60). More recent studies
in this tradition emphasize, apart from economic wealth, heterogeneity of
production, equality, and education, also cultural, ethnic, and religious factors
as prerequisites for democracy (e.g. Lipset 1994).
3. These include, in the field of transboundary waters, the Central and Eastern
Europe, Caucasus, and Central Asia component of the EU Water Initiative
(EUWI) , the EU-sponsored Danube – Black Sea Task Force, and the UN Envi-
ronment for Europe Process to the East; or the Euro-Mediterranean Water
Directors Forum, the Mediterranean component of the EUWI, the Short and
Medium-term Priority Environmental Action Programme and the activities of
the United Nations Development Program to the South.
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Mediatization as a Challenge:
Media Logic Versus Political Logic
Frank Esser
Political communication is a precondition of democracy, and democracy
depends heavily on the infrastructure of the media system (see
chapters 1 and 2). The media and mediated communication are of
central relevance for contemporary societies due to their decisive influ-
ence on, and consequences for, political institutions, political actors,
and individual citizens. Political actors have learnt to accept that their
behavior to a significant extent is influenced by the rules of the game set
by the mass media. This transformation has been described as a shift to
audience democracy (Manin 1995) or media democracy (Jarren 2008a).
The idea of media democracy is an extension of the model of represen-
tative democracy (see Chapter 3). It refers to a development that at its
beginning aimed to make politics more inclusive and transparent. In the
process policy-makers have become accountable to an ever growing vol-
ume of interests and demands from the public – not only in the context
of elections but in many phases of the policy process. The pressure on
policy-makers to be responsive to public opinion in general and special
interests in particular has increased the role of the mass media in many
ways. Politicians have grown to rely on the mass media for gauging pub-
lic opinion (using media coverage as a proxy for public sentiments), and
for generating attention, acceptance, and legitimation of their actions
(using media channels for public presentation of politics).
Theoretically associated with the concept of media democracy is the
notion of a media society (Mazzoleni 2008c). This idea implies that tra-
ditional mass media, as well as the new online media, are pervading
all spheres of social life and have thus become the central precondi-
tion of exchanges and interactions among individuals and organizations
of society. The media society can be seen as the result of a process of
functional differentiation making the media increasingly independent
155
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156 Mediatization as a Challenge
of their former sponsors, which were, in the European tradition, pri-
marily the churches and the political parties (Jarren 2008a). The media
now operate according to a specific media logic and, due to economic
necessities, are guided by commercial rules in order to maximize their
audience shares.
This transformation process toward greater media dependency is
accompanied by critical undertones. This is particularly true with regard
to potential transformations of democratic politics as a result of media-
tization processes. Critics worry that the media may interfere with the
‘chain of responsibility’ and the ‘chain of accountability’ in irrespon-
sible ways (see the model of representative democracy in Chapter 3).
With regard to the former, the media may cause traditional institu-
tions of preference mobilization and preference aggregation (like parties,
parliaments) to decline; and with regard to the latter they may pres-
surize political actors to succumb to the specific operating logic of the
news media when justifying their actions to the public. By assuming the
role of an alternative public’s representative, the media see it as their
responsibility to scrutinize and evaluate politicians and their actions.
They do so by their ownmedia specific standards, and may, for example,
‘sanction’ them with bad press. The media legitimize their increasingly
proactive political involvement with reference to democratic expec-
tations such as providing ‘transparency’, contributing to ‘checks and
balances’, and vitalizing the ‘public sphere’. However, on the other
hand, the media themselves are hard to ‘sanction’ themselves in case
of negative consequences. This can pose a challenge to democracy, as
argued by Mazzoleni and Schulz (1999: 248):
While the political parties are accountable for their policies to the
electorate, no constitution foresees that the media be accountable for
their actions. Absence of accountability can imply serious risks for
democracy, because it violates the classic rule of balances of power in
the democratic game, making the media (the fourth branch of govern-
ment) an influential and uncontrollable force that is protected from
the sanction of popular will.
Within the model of representative democracy the mass media have
become an omnipresent, highly consequential ‘environmental factor’
that sometimes irritates, interferes, or even obstructs political processes.
At the same time the media expand the repertoire of action for politi-
cians who try to use the media to their advantage. The opportunity
structures for a growing relevance of the media in politics do not follow
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internationally uniform developments and are subject to conditional
factors. The concept of ‘mediatization of politics’ serves as a context-
sensitive tool for addressing the question of where media intrusion
endangers the functioning of the democratic process, and where it may
enhance it. This chapter lays out a theoretical framework of mediati-
zation of politics whereas the following Chapter 8 reports empirical
findings from projects currently underway within the National Com-
petence Center of Research on Challenges to Democracy in the 21st
century (NCCR Democracy, Zurich).
Mediation and mediatization
Before addressing specific challenges to democracy it is important to
place the mediatization of politics in context and illustrate its new qual-
ity. Scholars differentiate it from mediation of politics, which is an older
concept that refers to the overall difference that media make by being
there in the political world (McQuail 2010: 82–86). In the context of
political communication, mediation is primarily used to denote the
neutral act of transmitting messages through the media, and experienc-
ing politics through mass communication channels (Mazzoleni 2008b;
Strömbäck 2008). When politics has become mediated, people depend
on the media for information about politics. The media have long acted
as a mediator between the citizenry on the one hand, and the institu-
tions involved in government, elections, and opinion formation on the
other. The media also mediate between different actors and institutions
within the governing or political communication system more broadly.
In fact, as Lucian Pye (1993: 443) put it, ‘political life in any mass society
is impossible without established methods of political communication.’
Some scholars have long argued that to a certain extent politics is com-
munication (Deutsch 1963). Almond and Powell argued already in 1966
that ‘communication pervades the entire political process’ (p. 80) and
noted that all functions performed in the political system – political
socialization and recruitment, interest articulation, interest aggregation,
rule-making, rule-application, and rule-adjudication – are performed by
means of communication. For example, the preferences of citizens must
be articulated by communication and are channeled into institutions
of preference aggregation by mass media first and foremost. In a sim-
ilar vein, political outcomes have to be communicated to the public –
againmostly through channels of mass communication. In this sense, to
speak of modern politics as being mediated is merely ‘a descriptive state-
ment’ (Mazzoleni and Schulz 1999: 250). It is also based on a rather static
10.1057/9781137299871 - Democracy in the Age of Globalization and Mediatization, Hanspeter Kriesi, Daniel Bochsler, Jörg Matthes,
Sandra Lavenex, Marc Bühlmann and Frank Esser
Co
py
rig
ht
 m
at
er
ia
l f
ro
m
 w
w
w
.
pa
lg
ra
v
ec
o
n
n
ec
t.c
om
 - 
lic
en
se
d 
to
 U
ZH
 H
au
pt
bi
bl
io
th
ek
 / 
Ze
nt
ra
lb
ib
lio
th
ek
 Z
ür
ic
h 
- P
al
gr
av
eC
on
ne
ct
 - 
20
13
-0
3-
29
158 Mediatization as a Challenge
understanding of basic fundamentals that fails to capture the changing
interdependent relationships between media and politics.
Mediatization, in contrast, is an inherently process-oriented concept
that focuses on howmedia influence has increased in a number of differ-
ent respects. As such, mediatization is not restricted to politics. Rather,
it has been conceptualized as being on par with other major societal
change processes such as modernization, individualization, and glob-
alization (Hjarvard 2008; Krotz 2007; Mazzoleni 2008c). As noted by
Mazzoleni (2008c: 3053):
In brief, the concept of ‘mediatization of society’ indicates an exten-
sion of the influence of the media into all societal spheres. Therefore,
it is important to see what the domains are that are influenced by
the media system (remembering that the media system is both a
cultural technology and an economic organization). In broad and
general terms, all the main societal domains are affected by the con-
nection between media and society: sex/gender and generational
relationships, deviance, control and surveillance, religious and ritual
dimensions, power relationships, urban environment and city life,
localization and globalization processes, and so on.
Following this line of thought, Hjarvard (2008) describes mediatization
of society as a process whereby ‘the media have become integrated into
the operations of other social institutions, while they also have acquired
the status of social institutions in their own right’ (p. 113). Thus, besides
involving themselves in other institutions, the media appear increas-
ingly as an autonomous entity with its own institutional logic. This
process can be observed empirically in the ways in which the media
intervene in the interaction between individuals within a given institu-
tion, between institutions, and in society at large (Hjarvard 2008). The
mediatization of politics is thus part of a more general process in highly
developed, post-industrial mass democracies. The degree of mediatiza-
tion might vary, as the degree of modernization, individualization, and
globalization also does, but it still affects society – including politics – in
numerous and fundamental ways. At its core, mediatization is a process-
oriented concept that is about ‘changes associated with communication
media and their development’ (Schulz 2004: 88) or, to quote Hjarvard
(2008: 113), ‘the process whereby society to an increasing degree is
submitted to, or becomes dependent on, the media and their logic.’
It is assumed that, like with globalization, more and more regions
and cultures will be affected by mediatization, but there will also
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be considerable differences in the influence mediatization exerts.
Globalization is related to mediatization in at least two ways, as Hjarvard
(2008: 113) points out: ‘on the one hand, globalization presumes the
existence of the technical means to extend communication and interac-
tion over long distances and, on the other hand, it propels the process
of mediatization by institutionalizing mediated communication and
interaction in many new contexts’. It is important to emphasize that
neither mediatization nor globalization are coercively consistent, linear,
or teleological, as Horkheimer and Adorno (1969) showed for another
meta-process, enlightenment (Krotz 2007). It can thus be an oppor-
tunity as well as a problem for societies. Whether mediatization has
positive or negative consequences is an open empirical question and
cannot be determined in a priori set terms. It depends on a range of fac-
tors that also describe the varieties found in contemporary democracies
(see Chapter 4).
Blumler and Kavanagh’s (1999: 211) early definition of mediatization
as ‘the media moving toward the center of the social process’ can be
specified insofar as the media provide a commons for society, a shared
forum of communication that other institutions and actors increasingly
use as arenas for their interaction (Hjarvard 2008). Within the model of
representative democracy as laid out in Chapter 3 the media not only
occupy the public sphere but have become its dominant occupant. The
consequences of a public sphere that is regulated by media logic can
be captured theoretically within the framework of neo-institutionalism
(Donges 2006, 2008; Jarren 1996; Marcinkowski 2005, 2007).
Mediatization of politics: An institutionalist perspective
In the course of the development from mediation to mediatization, the
mass media are less and less regarded as mere technical channels of com-
munications. Instead, the media are regarded as ‘organized actors’ (Fox
News, the New York Times, the BBC, The Sun) which pursue certain goals
and act in the interest of realizing these goals. For scholars who exam-
ine the mediatization of politics, one group of media organizations is
particularly relevant – the group of news organizations.
News organizations can be grouped together as an inter-organizational
field. This field can be conceived of as a singular institution because
its constituent organizations are structured similarly to achieve simi-
lar goals, they follow ‘shared rules’ of what is considered appropriate
professional behavior, they operate in the same economic and polit-
ical environments, and above all they adopt the same basic rules of
10.1057/9781137299871 - Democracy in the Age of Globalization and Mediatization, Hanspeter Kriesi, Daniel Bochsler, Jörg Matthes,
Sandra Lavenex, Marc Bühlmann and Frank Esser
Co
py
rig
ht
 m
at
er
ia
l f
ro
m
 w
w
w
.
pa
lg
ra
v
ec
o
n
n
ec
t.c
om
 - 
lic
en
se
d 
to
 U
ZH
 H
au
pt
bi
bl
io
th
ek
 / 
Ze
nt
ra
lb
ib
lio
th
ek
 Z
ür
ic
h 
- P
al
gr
av
eC
on
ne
ct
 - 
20
13
-0
3-
29
160 Mediatization as a Challenge
the game when confronted with the question of what is important and
interesting enough to be considered news (Cook 2006; Scott 1994). Jour-
nalists follow professional rules when they select their stories (criteria
of newsworthiness), when they interact with news sources (exchange
of exclusive information for granting publicity), while they incorporate
norms like objectivity into their news production as a strategic ritual
(to protect themselves against outside criticism; see Hjarvard 2008).
Various media outlets constitute the building blocks of the media as
an institution (which has come to rule the public sphere as depicted
in Figure 3.2, Chapter 3). The rules and norms that govern the media
taken as a whole are often more important than what distinguishes
one media company, outlet, type, or format from another (Altheide and
Snow 1979, 1988, 1991; Mazzoleni 2008c). This is not to say that there
are no significant differences between, say, public service news and com-
mercial television news, but rather that the commonalities, from the
perspective of mediatization, are more important than the differences.
Stated differently, mediatization means that the media form a system
in their own right, independent of, although interdependent with, other
social systems such as the political system (Cook 2005; Hjarvard 2008;
Marcinkowski and Steiner 2010; Mazzoleni 2008c; Strömbäck 2008).
Institutions are generally defined as collections of rules and routines
identifiable across the organizations that are generally seen within a
society to preside over a particular social sphere (March and Olsen
1998). A key argument for treating the media as an institution is one
of power. Neo-institutionalism conceptualizes the news media as exert-
ing influence through consonant and cumulative reporting, resulting
from a professional consensus and comparable routines of how to make
news (Cook 2005). The core institutional feature of the news media
is their trans-organizational mode of operation, called ‘media logic’,
which refers to the media-specific rules of selecting, interpreting, and
constructing political news messages. The fact that everyone else in
society – including politicians, parties, governments – has learnt to
adjust and adapt to the media logic as the obligatory way of perceiv-
ing and interpreting the world, and acting upon it, has further boosted
the media’s significance (Altheide and Snow 1979). Mediatization then
can be defined as the growing intrusion of media logic as an institu-
tional rule into other fields where it now supplements (and in extreme
cases replaces) existing rules for defining appropriate behavior.
Mazzoleni and Schulz (1999) describe mediatized politics as ‘poli-
tics that has lost its autonomy, has become dependent in its central
functions on mass media, and is continuously shaped by interactions
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with mass media’ (p. 250). What turns modern mass media into polit-
ically relevant actors is media logic. This media logic comprises the
professional production routines in newsrooms where political state-
ments are translated into ‘stories’, but also technological possibilities
and constraints, and finally the economic organization of the media
organization. A transmission of this logic and its establishment in other
social fields would be a sufficient indicator for the impact of the media
that exceeds their original mediating function. Mediatization can thus
be further defined as a temporal (dynamic) process of media-induced
change that is characterized by the institutionalization of media logic
in social spheres that were previously considered separate from the
mass media (Schrott 2009). In such cases, media logic does not replace
the original logic but overlays it. Mediatization of politics thus refers
to changes in the decision criteria and action rationales of political
institutions without turning them into media institutions.
The neo-institutionalist approach has proved particularly fruitful
for studying mediatization (Cook 2005, 2006; Donges 2008; Hjarvard
2008; Marcinkowski 2005, 2007; Sparrow 1999, 2006). Cross-nationally
speaking one can distinguish different path-dependent models of
institution-formation, different regulatory cultures of media policy, and
different institutional arrangements ruling the media–politics inter-
changes. Within each country news-media organizations have become
more similar to one another as they increasingly sought to differen-
tiate themselves from their political environment. Cook (2005) and
Sparrow (1999) conceptualize the news media as a social sector at
least partially autonomous from external pressures and exhibiting some
degree of internal homogeneity, which taken as a whole is able to
exert a significant amount of power vis-à-vis other social sectors. Cross-
national differences in how media institutions developed are explained
with longstanding historical and ongoing struggles in the formation
of media–politics relationships. The process of institution-formation
explains why, in each country, the news is rather similar from one
news outlet to the next. Several factors push news workers toward simi-
lar news within any given country: professional consensus, comparable
routines of making news, the need under deadline to reduce high uncer-
tainty about what is news, the reliance on standard definers of reality,
and how public policies and government officials accommodate and
regulate news workers as a distinct group (Cook 2006).
The broad acceptance of media logic as a ‘rule of the game’ (North
1990: 3) or ‘way of life’ (Altheide and Snow 1979: 237) gains a structure-
forming quality. From the standpoint of political actors, the mass media
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are providing a regular and persisting framework through which and
within which they operate (Sparrow 1999). As an institution, the news
media constrain the choice sets of political actors. The actions of the
media thereby guide and channel – or structure – the actions of those
working in government, public administration, and the various stages
of the political process (Donges 2008; Jarren 2008a; Marcinkowski 2007;
Sparrow 2006). From a neo-institutionalist standpoint a key aspect of
mediatization is that the media constitute the contextual framework (or
communicative infrastructure) through which politics presents itself to
the public or is represented by news outlets.
The news media thereby exert important effects on political actors
but there is an important reciprocal loop in this relationship. Modern-
day politicians have internalized the media’s attention rules, production
routines, and selection criteria, and try to exploit this knowledge for
attaining political goals. If political actors stage an event in order to get
media attention, or if they fashion an event in order to fit to the media’s
needs, we speak of a self-mediatization (Meyer 2002). Politicians’ instru-
mental use of marketing strategies, proactive news management and
spin doctoring also fall under this term.
Self-mediatization of politics
Understanding self-mediatization is crucial for gaining a complete pic-
ture of the interactional media–politics relationship. At the macro-level,
the political system and media system are two distinct institutional
spheres which fulfill divergent functions: the policy making versus the
news making. However, because democratic politics is dependent on
legitimacy through continuous public support, political actors (includ-
ing governments, parties, and associations) have a vital interest in
presenting their programs, goals, and accomplishments on the media
stage. In fact, the principle of answerability and accountability oblige
political actors to inform the public of their policies, decisions, and
plans. To achieve this, actors in the political system have in recent years
professionalized their self-presentational skills. They did so by setting
up and upgrading ‘media relations’ units and staffing them with experts
whose task it is to tailor all political output to media logic. By way of
‘self-mediatization’, politics engages in a process of self-initiated stage-
management and media-friendly packaging. For example, when Tony
Blair’s New Labour government came into power in 1997, it introduced
decisive changes to the approach of government communication. They
installed a new Strategic Communications Unit, supplemented with a
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24-hour media monitoring unit, to assist them with coordinating the
dissemination of the government’s message of the day; they appointed
friendly former journalists to senior posts in government departments;
they increased the number of special advisers with an explicit pre-
sentational role; they used new media modes to circumnavigate the
Whitehall press corps and communicate with relevant parts of the pub-
lic directly, among others. Many of these changes were so fundamental
that they became subject to parliamentary inquiries, independent inves-
tigations, and critical media scrutiny (cf. Kuhn 2002; Scammell 2001;
Seymour-Ure 2002).
The imperative of professionalizing political publicity holds ‘that
attending to communication through the media is not just an add-on
to political decisions but is an integral part of the interrelated processes
of [ . . . ] policy-making and government itself’ (Blumler and Kavanagh
1999: 214). In the age of mediatized politics, media logic has recast the
inner workings of the representative model of democracy (Chapter 3).
To understand this process analytically, it is useful to distinguish three
steps in the process of political communication (Meyer 2002; Sarcinelli
2011):
• the ‘production’ of politics at the level of program development,
problem-solving, bargaining of interests, and decision making;
• the ‘self-representation’ of politics at the level of publicizing plans
and justifying outcomes – increasingly with the help of political
communication professionals; and
• the ‘media representation’ of politics in the form of news reports.
Within our model of representative democracy (Figure 3.2, Chapter 3),
the production of politics refers basically to the implementation of pref-
erences, the self-representation of politics, and the media representation
of politics in the public sphere. Under the conditions of mediatized pol-
itics, self-representation by political actors has gained enormously in
importance, both in terms of personnel and methods (Esser and Spanier
2005). Whereas political scientists describe its function innocuously
as ‘communicative representation’ (Mansbridge 2009) and journalists
sometimes pejoratively as ‘spin doctoring’ (Esser 2008a), we describe it
as ‘self-mediatization’, that is, as self-initiated stage-management of pol-
itics by means of strategic communication in an effort to master the
new rules that govern access to the public sphere (cf. Meyer 2002). It is
a reflexive response by the political system to media-related changes
in their institutional environment. This process has therefore also
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been described as ‘reflexive mediatization’ whereby political actors take
advantage of media services, anticipate their effects, and exploit them
through strategic communication for their own purposes (Marcinkowski
and Steiner 2010; Schulz 2011).
The political logic
Differentiating between the ‘production of politics’ and ‘self-
presentation of politics’ within the political system has important
implications for understanding ‘political logic’. Politics can be said to
be ultimately about who has the right to make authoritative decisions
and policies for solving problems that require political decisions. Thus,
while power is an integral and inevitable part of politics, politics is also
about policies and programs for solving societal problems according to
various value systems or ideologies. Some might argue that power is the
ultimate goal, and policy programs and promises are the means to reach
that goal (Downs 1957). But others might argue that, while power is the
means, being able to enact policies according to their own value system
or ideology is the ultimate goal (Sjöblom 1968). The conflict between
these two positions will probably never be resolved, but it is impor-
tant to recognize that politics cannot be reduced to one dimension only
(Strömbäck 2011; Strömbäck and Esser 2009). This has implications for
defining political logic where three dimensions can be distinguished:
politics, policy, and polity (Meyer 2002: 11–13; Pennings et al. 2006:
23–26). This triad has been developed in political science as an ana-
lytical tool to delineate the ‘political’ from the ‘non-political’, and to
distinguish political logic from the logics of other societal spheres like
economics, sports, or the media (Pennings et al. 2006: 23–26). This triad
also provides guidelines for journalists as to how to communicate the
essential features of political realities comprehensively and authentically
(Meyer 2002: 1–26).
Policy aspects
The policy-related facet refers to the ‘production’ side of politics. Within
the model of representative democracy (Chapter 3), the production
logic of politics dominates the stages of policy making and policy
implementation. It is prevalent in phases and institutional settings
that are characterized by coordinating and balancing interests, organiz-
ing negotiations, debating alternative policy choices, devising programs
through deliberation and collective decisions, reaching consensus, and –
ultimately – finding long-term solutions to substantial issues.
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Politics aspects
Politics in contrast is a more power-oriented facet. It refers to the
‘self-presentational’ side of politics. It is particularly prevalent when
politicians seek to gain office in election campaigns or when they,
once in office, approach governing as a permanent campaign. Formally
speaking, self-presentational politics is dominant in the stages of inter-
est articulation and preference mobilization, problem definition, policy
communication, and outcome justification (see Figure 3.2, Chapter 3).
It must be emphasized that self-presentational politics is not com-
pletely issueless. Its main goal is to garner support for one’s program.
Strategies for achieving this may include political pseudo-events, image
projections, and symbolic politics. The democratic justifications behind
presentational politics are to publicly visualize responsiveness, demon-
strate answerability, personalize responsibility, and make account-giving
a public act. Compared to the production side of politics, the presenta-
tional side is more interested in individuals than collectives, short-term
effect than long-term reflection, front-stage than back-stage, strategy
than policy, prioritization than objective needs, and gaining support
than balancing out compromise.
Polity aspects
If the first two facets of political logic pertain to the policy and poli-
tics dimension of politics, then polity is the third constituent element
(see Table 7.1). It refers to the system of rules regulating the polit-
ical process. Understood as the underlying institutional structure of
democracy, the polity framework limits what political actors can do.
Even within a single system many aspects of polity are currently
undergoing change as democracies move from ‘nationalized’ to ‘dena-
tionalized’ entities, from a hierarchical ‘government’ approach to a
network-oriented ‘governance’ approach, or from ‘party democracy’ to
‘media democracy’. Equally important are those institutional elements
in the set ups of democratic systems that have remained unchanged.
Table 7.1 The three constituents of political logic
Political logic
Policy aspects Politics aspects Polity aspects
Policy- and decision-
based ‘production’
of politics
Power- and publicity-gaining
‘self-presentational’ politics
Institutional framework
conditions of politics
10.1057/9781137299871 - Democracy in the Age of Globalization and Mediatization, Hanspeter Kriesi, Daniel Bochsler, Jörg Matthes,
Sandra Lavenex, Marc Bühlmann and Frank Esser
Co
py
rig
ht
 m
at
er
ia
l f
ro
m
 w
w
w
.
pa
lg
ra
v
ec
o
n
n
ec
t.c
om
 - 
lic
en
se
d 
to
 U
ZH
 H
au
pt
bi
bl
io
th
ek
 / 
Ze
nt
ra
lb
ib
lio
th
ek
 Z
ür
ic
h 
- P
al
gr
av
eC
on
ne
ct
 - 
20
13
-0
3-
29
166 Mediatization as a Challenge
From an internationally comparative perspective, differences in govern-
ment systems, electoral systems, party systems, and political cultures
must be accounted for in assessments of political logic as these insti-
tutional polity elements have direct implications for the policy and
politics dimensions in a given country.
As Marcinkowski (2005) has argued convincingly, not all politi-
cal institutions within a single system are equally prone to being
mediatized – only those where opportunity structures allow for the
political logic being complemented, overlaid, or replaced bymedia logic.
Institutions that are dependent on public support and therefore guided
by self-presentational logic will be affected the most. The US polity
environment and the typical US-style election campaign, for example,
offer multiple opportunities for accommodating media logic, and candi-
dates and their advisers will see their electoral chances rather enhanced
than threatened by adapting their operations to media logic. In con-
trast, Swiss-style direct-democratic votes on policy issues are a different
matter – and somewhat less prone to mediatization – because the pol-
icy dimension of issue deliberation and the polity element of consensus
democracy balance out the self-presentational element of the campaign
process. Political institutions least likely to be affected by mediatization
are those guided almost exclusively by the production logic of politics,
for example confidential negotiating committees. Should media logic
interfere with delicate negotiations nonetheless, it is likely to disrupt or
even obstruct their way of working.
The media logic
Altheide and Snow (1979) introduced the term media logic and
described it as a specific ‘format’. Format defines how material is
organized, the style of presentation, the focus or emphasis, and the
‘grammar’ of the mediated communication (Altheide and Snow 1979:
10). The main aspects of format are the selection, organization, and pre-
sentation of information, as Altheide (1995: 11) later explained. Media
logic can thus be understood as a particular way of covering and inter-
preting social, cultural, and political phenomena. It encompasses all
those imperatives that guide the production of news that – from the
standpoint of the general public – serves as an authoritative represen-
tation of the political reality. This can create a very real tension with
political logic.
News-media logic, like political logic, consists of a combination of sev-
eral elements (Hallin and Mancini 2004a; Mazzoleni 2008d). The most
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Table 7.2 The three constituents of news-media logic
News-media logic
Professional aspects Commercial aspects Technological aspects
News-production
according to
distinctively
journalistic norms
and criteria
News-production
according to economically
motivated rationales
Medium-specific
technological conditions
of news-production
important constituents are professionalization and commercialization,
followed by technological change (see Table 7.2). They describe differ-
ent forces of the news media’s operating logic, making media logic – like
political logic – a hybrid concept that combines three sub-concepts. All
three are assumed to causally influence the culture of news production
in individual media organizations and in media institutions as a whole.
More importantly, they are considered to be chiefly responsible for a his-
torical process of greater differentiation of the media system from the
political process (and thus help explain the relationship between media
and political logics).
Based on these differences in the relationship between media and pol-
itics, Hallin and Mancini (2004a) have introduced three media-system
models: the ‘liberal model’ which prevails in Great Britain, Ireland, and
North America; the ‘democratic corporatist model’, which is located
across northern continental Europe, and the ‘polarized pluralist model’,
which is found in the Mediterranean countries of Southern Europe.
Briefly stated,
the Liberal Model is characterized by a relative dominance of market
mechanisms and of commercial media; the Democratic Corporatist
Model by a historical coexistence of commercial media and media
tied to organized social and political groups, and by a relatively active
but legally limited role of the state; and the Polarized Pluralist Model
by integration of the media into party politics, weaker historical
development of commercial media, and a strong role of the state.
(Hallin and Mancini 2004a: 11)
According to the diversity of political systems (see Chapter 4), different
patterns in media–political relations have emerged that are of relevance
for understanding different shades of media logic.
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Professional aspects
Professionalization of journalism means that journalism is differenti-
ated as an occupation and institution from other social institutions,
particularly politics, and follows a distinct common culture and distinct
sense of social purpose. Here we follow the argumentation of Hallin and
Mancini (2004a, 2004b) who distinguish three dimensions.
Professionalism means growing autonomy from outside influences
and outside control over one’s work. In liberal and democratic-
corporatist media systems, journalism has achieved autonomy at a faster
rate and to a greater extent than in polarized-pluralist systems. In liberal
and democratic-corporatist systems, this helped erode press/party par-
allelism. In polarized-pluralist systems, journalists have been subject to
political instrumentalization, or even control, to a certain extent until
today, and are thus more likely to lack a set of professional practices that
is different from political logic.
Professionalism means, secondly, a distinct set of professional norms
like protecting sources, separating news and advertisements, and – most
importantly – common rules for selecting material. News factors like
timeliness, proximity, surprise, conflict, harm, personalization, or elite
involvement have emerged as universally accepted criteria for determin-
ing newsworthiness. Interestingly, norms that signal clear distance to a
partisan-political logic (like objectivity, neutrality, fourth estate, watch-
dog) gained broad acceptance first in liberal systems, from where they
diffused later into democratic-corporatist systems (but more often as
an ideal than a practice). In democratic-corporatist systems, journalistic
norms that are in accordance with political logic (like advocacy, pro-
portional representation of viewpoints, civic education) also prevailed.
In polarized-pluralist systems, partisan-political rather than distinctively
journalistic criteria continue to guide news work.
Professionalism means, thirdly, a claim to serve the public interest.
Being recognized by society as a ‘public trust’ is an important histor-
ical development in the professionalization of journalism. It assigns
certain democratic functions to the news media that are crucial for
the chain of responsibility and accountability (see Chapter 3), like
contributing to enlightened understanding through substantive and
uncensored information, contributing to public deliberation and opin-
ion formation through diverse and inclusive issue debates, monitoring
the political environment and alerting citizens to important and poten-
tially dangerous developments, as well as facilitating the communicative
exchange between the governed and the governing and holding the
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latter accountable in case of misconduct or underperformance. Serving
as a public trust justifies certain legal privileges and eases journalists’
relations with sources and other social institutions. Even in liberal sys-
tems, the ‘social responsibility model’ of journalism served as a guiding
principle from the beginning (aiming at providing information that is
important for informed citizenship and rational participation, rather
than information that the political elite allows to be known), but already
in the 1940s the US Hutchinson Commission of the Press (1947) saw this
principle compromised by commercial influences (to which we turn in
the next section).
Yet there is another aspect of media professionalism that deserves
attention: journalistic voice (Zaller 1999). Journalists want to be more
than mere mouthpieces of politicians and would rather control, frame,
and interpret the flow of political communication themselves. Accord-
ing to inner-professional standards, an excellent piece of journalism
is one that is rich in journalistic interpretation and critical analysis.
This enhances peer recognition, professional prestige – and is intellectu-
ally more rewarding. Thus, journalists have an interest in creating and
selling a form of journalism that offers more than stenographic tran-
scription of what others have said, or one that appeals to the lowest
common denominator of the mass market. What journalists add should
be, in their ideal, as arresting and manifestly important as possible – so
as to call attention to journalists and to the importance of their work
(Zaller 1999).
This understanding of professional journalism as an autonomous,
value-added process underwent a shift in the late 1960s toward ‘critical
professionalism’ (first in liberal systems, later in democratic corporatist
systems). A new ideal of critical scrutiny emerged that concentrated
on blunders in political strategy and mistakes in governing (Hallin and
Mancini 2004b; Neveu 2002). Critical journalists will, for every political
statement, seek a counter-statement from an opponent, thus creating a
more confrontational climate in media–politics relations (Westerstahl
and Johannson 1986). Critical professionalism grew out of increased
levels of education (leading to more reflexivity and analysis in news
reporting) and a general shift toward post-materialist values. Combined
with new opportunities of opinion-polling it contributed to the emer-
gence of a new, self-assured role-understanding: a self-perception of
journalism as the (better) representative of the public will (Hallin and
Mancini 2004b; Patterson 2009).
This new style of more assertive, skeptical reporting and interpre-
tation turned at times adversarial when journalists felt threatened in
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their reporting options. In order to protect their professional integrity
and their public image as an independent institution, journalists grew
increasingly critical toward proactive news management and manipula-
tive message control by political communication experts responsible for
the self-representation of politics. The self-mediatization of politics led
to ‘countermeasures’ like negative, deconstructive, or even cynical news
(Blumler 1999; Kerbel 1999; Zaller 1999), and contributed in the US and
Western Europe to a ‘démontage of politics’ in public affairs coverage
(Kepplinger 1998; Patterson 1993).
We can thus distinguish several effects of professional imperatives on
political news coverage:
• gatekeeping and reporting according to news values (instead of
political values);
• controlling access to the mediated public sphere (by selecting voices
and standpoints according to news values);
• agenda setting (by selecting and prioritizing issues according to news
values);
• balanced reporting (incorporating counter-standpoints, dissociating
journalism from being a political mouthpiece);
• interpretative, analytical reporting (dissociating journalism from
being a political mouthpiece; contributing to informed citizenship;
participating actively in public opinion formation; inserting critical
expertise);
• critical watchdog reporting (observing public-interest obligation like
account-holding, creating transparency, demanding answerability;
but also inserting critical professionalism);
• adversarial attack-dog reporting (countering attempts of political
instrumentalization; but also incorporating critical professionalism).
Many of these professional aspects refer to the news media in their
role of an independent representative of the public that may pressur-
ize officials – according to its own standards and operating logic – to
be responsive to those very demands it has made public in the first
place, and evaluate them accordingly. As either a publicly recognized
or a mere self-appointed account-holder it can sanction officials with
good or bad press. Mediatization theory expects that with increasing
professionalization the news media assume a more autonomous, proac-
tive role within core processes of representative democracy – those of
responsibility and accountability (see Chapter 3).
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Commercial aspects
Commercialization as the second core constituent of media logic has
a strained relationship with professionalization. Journalists in many
news organizations traditionally have insisted on a principal separation
between the newsroom on the one side and the business departments
(advertising, marketing, owner interests) on the other. They did so in
an effort to preserve their autonomy against commercial forces. Yet,
under the influence of growing neo-liberalism and deregulation in most
Western media systems, news organizations have lost autonomy in rela-
tion to the market at the same time as they became more detached
from the political system. Put differently, commercialization pushed
news organizations further away from the world of politics but more
toward the world of business. As a result, Hallin and Mancini (2004a)
state, ‘the journalist’s main objective is no longer to disseminate ideas
and create social consensus around them, but to produce entertainment
and information that can be sold to individual consumers’ (p. 277).
They further argue that commercial imperatives are most pronounced
in the media logic of liberal systems, and that in recent times more and
more media organizations in the democratic-corporatist and polarized-
pluralist systems have fallen under their influence too. Yet one could
make the argument that, for example, in democratic-corporatist systems
public service broadcasters and quality newspapers are still more driven
by professional than commercial considerations – although even they
could not escape the transformational effects of the ‘commercial deluge’
since the mid 1980s (Hallin and Mancini 2004a: 252).
Mazzoleni (2008b, 2008c; see also Mazzoleni and Schulz 1999; Hallin
and Mancini 2004a: 278–281) distinguishes several effects of commer-
cial imperatives on political communication:
• spectacularization (playing up sensational or uncommon features of
political events);
• confrontainment (focusing on conflict rather than compromise,
scandal rather than investigation);
• dramatization (relying on emotionalization, visualization, polariza-
tion, and stereotyping for storytelling; adopting ‘game schema’ and
‘horse race frames’ in election coverage);
• infotainment (packaging political news in appealing formats by using
‘soft news’ angles and ‘episodic framing’; emphasizing the ‘common
citizen’ perspective by privileging ordinary citizens and common
sense over elite discourse and party representatives);
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• personalization (attributing political activity to individuals as
opposed to parties and institutions; constructing political news
around persons with their own temperaments, charisma, looks,
idiosyncrasies, ideas; pressurizing political institutions to presiden-
tialize their leadership style and recruit more personnel with tele-
genic image, popular rhetoric, and marketable messages);
• transformation of discourse (favoring ‘sound bite news’ that frag-
ments the political discourse in brief, catchy phrases, and ‘image bite
news’ that relies on compelling visuals);
• depoliticization (marginalizing substantial issue discussion since it
is considered a turnoff in race for ratings and profit; strategic
instead of issue framing; reducing national and international policy
coverage).
It must be emphasized that some of these indicators have actually
a ‘professional’ core but have been overlaid with a ‘commercial’ logic.
A case in point is confrontainment. A focus on conflict and scandal is of
high commercial ‘animation value’ but, at the same time, connected
to the rise of critical professionalism. Confrontainment can thus be
said to reflect a commercially motivated exaggeration of the profession-
ally motivated watchdog function. Put differently, confrontainment is
driven simultaneously by the desire of media organizations to com-
pete for audience, and by the desire of journalists to build professional
prestige and assert their independence vis-à-vis political actors. Other
hybrid elements of media logic, combining commercial and professional
imperatives, include negative tonality, or strategic reporting.
Mediatization theory recognizes that commercial influences may
have a certain liberating, mobilizing effect on media and politics, and
also open up new possibilities. By and large, however, proponents
point to potentially detrimental effects for representative democracy –
particularly with regard to the role of the news media in chains of
responsibility and accountability. They fear that commercial impera-
tives of media logic lead to an insufficient supply of substance in public
affairs coverage that no longer allows for an adequate understanding
and evaluation of available policy options. They further suspect that
commercial media logic will discourage political interest, subvert politi-
cal knowledge, and disadvantage the formation of informed opinions as
well as the deliberation of key issues. The media may become unreliable
or altogether unhelpful in assessing whether policy-makers’ decisions
match citizens’ preferences. A decline in transparent and comprehen-
sive policy coverage may further undermine the media’s capacity to act
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as an institutionalized account-holder; its specific kind of coverage may
even discourage citizens to get involved themselves, check on their rep-
resentatives, and fight for their interests. We will expand this discussion
further in Chapter 8 and, at this point, move on to the third component
of the hybrid concept of media logic, technology.
Technological aspects
A third element of media logic is technology. It refers to how the
applied communication technologies shape content in production and
reproduction processes. The ways in which radio, television, print, and
internet translate political reality into story ‘formats’ is influenced by
the physical nature of their respective information technology. Tech-
nology pressures the news practitioners embedded within them to adopt
certain formats – television formats for instance are arguably more lin-
ear, more visual, more affective, and less cognitively complex than print
formats.
A core question is what the advent of new online media will con-
tribute to the present understanding of mediatization. With its open-
ness, interactive structure, and flexibility, the internet creates new
opportunities for bottom-up communication, for the expression of pub-
lic preferences, for participation in policy making, and for holding
political actors accountable for their actions (through e-consultation,
online petitions, alternative blogs, citizen journalists; see Coleman and
Blumler 2009; Brants and Voltmer 2011). The interactive, participatory
logic of the internet has also created new opportunities for countering
the traditional top-down communication of existing print and broad-
cast media: new websites – either by news aggregators or alternative
suppliers – increasingly threaten the business model of legacy media,
the professional model of journalism, and the traditional understand-
ing of political news (Brants and Voltmer 2011). Sobering aspects of
this new interactive online logic are that its participatory and delib-
erative potential has rarely been realized so far, that its potential of
creating multiple public spheres has rather increased fragmentation and
polarization, and that it thus far has enriched popular culture more
than institutionalized politics (Dahlgren 2009; Hindman 2009). How-
ever, it must be also emphasized that the internet has had only modest
success in displacing traditional media sources (Hindman 2009), and
there is strong evidence that the mediatization effects of the old media
will endure in the new. By this we mean that online news providers
may only resonate professionally and commercially in the long run if
their content follows a similar media logic to their offline counterparts.
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Some observers thus expect a convergence process whereby old and new
media operate alongside each other with a singular, merged media logic
(Schulz 2004). The central conclusion at the moment is that both tradi-
tional news media logic and new interactive online logic seem to ‘imply
a process whereby established communication elites are losing their abil-
ity to control the public debate and the way in which political issues are
framed’ (Brants and Voltmer 2011: 11).
Conclusion
We conclude our discussion of political logic by reiterating that political
logic consists of three facets (Table 7.1): The two more prominent ones
are the policy-oriented ‘production side’ and the politics-oriented ‘self-
presentational side’. The third facet, the polity-oriented ‘institutional
side’, is somewhat beneath the surface of day-to-day politics but conse-
quential for its execution. It is crucial to understand that most political
events and processes are composed of all three facets, and public com-
munication about them will need to reflect all three facets if it aims
to meet the requirements of responsibility and accountability as laid in
Chapter 3. This would be the yardstick for covering politics according to
political logic: news media would be expected to pay tribute to all three
aspects of the political in their public affairs coverage (Meyer 2002).
It would facilitate an ‘enlightened understanding’ of politics which is
necessary for citizens to form their preferences and recognize whether
political decisions correspond with their preferences or not (important
elements of the chain of responsibility in our model of representative
democracy; see Chapter 3). Transparent and comprehensive information
allows citizens also to better evaluate the performance of policy-makers
and sanction them in case they do not meet expected standards (which
are important elements of the chain of accountability).
It is an unresolved scholarly debate whether or not to demand of the
media the ‘full’ democratic standard or a ‘reduced’ standard in their
public political affairs coverage (Bennett 2003; Patterson 2003; Zaller
2003), yet most agree that citizens can only acquire relevant informa-
tion from the media about politics if the media report on the political
process in all its diverse dimensions and facets (Meyer 2002; Sarcinelli
2011). The degree to which the media cover politics according to politi-
cal logic or media logic is a core question of mediatization research. It is
another open question that can only be answered by empirical stud-
ies of concrete cases whether the intrusion of media logic leads to an
enhancement, adaptation, obstruction or even substitution of political
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functions (Marcinkowski 2005). The composition of political logic (i.e.
the proportion of its three facets) behind an event or within an institu-
tion predetermines its chance of being mediatized, and predetermines
the concrete mediatization effect. This leads Marcinkowski (2005: 364)
to argue that a democratic system will never be mediatized in toto but
rather be distinguished ‘by islands of higher and lower mediatization’.
Media logic affects the front-stage part of political activity (‘politics’)
more easily and forcefully than the back-stage part (genuine ‘policy
making’). One should thus refrain from making sweeping assumptions
about transformations of the entire model of representative democracy
(see Figure 3.2, Chapter 3) without detailed, comprehensive analyses of
all political institutions and processes. It should further be taken into
account that we are confronted with a variety of democratic settings in
the West (Chapter 4), each offering different entry points and defense
barriers to media influences.
We conclude our discussion of media logic by reiterating that its
three facets are professional, commercial, and technological aspects (see
Table 7.2). Over time, commercialization helped push news organiza-
tions further away from the world of politics and more toward the
world of economics. It has had the additional effect of eroding various
elements of journalistic professionalism in the long run.
Professionalization, commercialization, and technological change are
the independent variables that explain (or drive) media logic but it is
important to recognize that these processes have developed differently
in different countries and across time. It follows that media logic appears
in diverse shades and compositions across types of media channels and
genres, and across time periods and media systems. For example, private
television stations and tabloid newspapers in a highly commercialized
media market (like contemporary US) are likely to be guided by a more
commercially driven composition of media logic than public service
channels and quality newspapers in the Scandinavian countries of the
1960s. The difference in media logic between public broadcasters and
highbrow quality newspapers on the one hand and commercial broad-
casters and lowbrow popular newspapers on the other hand may in
certain fields be weaker than is theoretically often assumed (Esser 2008b;
Strömbäck and Dimitrova 2011).
Our tripartite differentiation of facets of media logic allows for more
precise predictions about the mediatization of politics in different
contexts. But it must be emphasized that the concrete effects of media-
tization on politics depend on the respective policy, process, and polity
conditions. Based on these theoretical foundations (and the necessary
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176 Mediatization as a Challenge
differentiations between different kinds of political and media arrange-
ments) the following Chapter 8 turns to concrete empirical evidence
gathered by colleagues inside and outside NCCR Democracy. It will con-
clude with an overall assessment of implications of the mediatization of
politics for representative democracy.
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Mediatization Effects on Political
News, Political Actors, Political
Decisions, and Political Audiences
Frank Esser and Jörg Matthes
We define mediatization as the growing intrusion of media logic as
an institutional rule into fields where other rules of defining appro-
priate behavior prevailed (see Chapter 7). Mediatization can lead to an
enhancement, adaptation, obstruction, or even substitution of politi-
cal functions by the logic of the media system. At its extreme it can
lead to a state of ‘mediatized politics’ where politics ‘has lost its auton-
omy, has become dependent in its central functions on mass media, and
is continuously shaped by interactions with mass media’ (Mazzoleni
and Schulz 1999: 250). The professional, commercial, and technologi-
cal production rules of the media –its operating logic – are important
requirements which political actors must take into account if they are
to receive publicity, public support, and legitimacy. Media logic provides
an incentive structure that contextualizes, and often shapes, political
processes – particularly those that are dependent on publicity and pub-
lic support. From this it follows that – contrary to a priori assumptions
of a fully transformed ‘media democracy’ – the concept of mediatization
does not assume a complete ‘colonialization’ of politics by the media.
Rather we expect that some institutions, stages, and activities in the
political process will be mediatized more than others, depending on
how media-compatible they are (Marcinkowski 2005). Those character-
ized by the power- and publicity-gaining self-presentational aspects of
political logic are more likely to be affected by media logic than those
characterized by the policy- and decision-based production aspects. Put
simply: political institutions in need of publicity are easier to mediatize
than others (Marcinkowski and Steiner 2010).
177
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178 Mediatization Effects
We acknowledge that mediatization may endanger the functioning of
representative democracy in some parts and to some degree but assume
that the process of mediatization is not one-sided and self-contained.
Mediatization is not one-sided because not everything that looks like
media dominance can actually be attributed to the independent behav-
ior of journalists. Often it is political actors themselves who use the mass
media for their own ends: they may anticipate media logic by staging
events whose sole purpose it is to generate news coverage for their own
interests; they may have an interest in playing up certain media issues
and playing down others in an effort to hurt the opposition; or they may
substitute political activities by mediated activities if the latter allow
them to mobilize their base more effectively than via party channels.
Despite growing attempts by political actors to professionalize their self-
mediatization strategies, there is plenty of evidence that political actors
quickly lose control over the news agenda – not the least because the
media dislikes to be instrumentalized.
Mediatization of politics as a multi-dimensional concept
To gauge the degree of mediatization, Strömbäck (2008, see also
Strömbäck and Esser 2009) has suggested a useful typology that dis-
tinguishes four dimensions of mediatization. Developing this a little
further, we distinguish four dimensions of mediatization focusing on
(1) contents, (2) actors, (3) organizations and processes, and (4) audi-
ences of political communication.
• The first dimension examines whether media coverage of political
affairs is predominantly shaped by media logic or political logic.
• The second dimension examines how political actors (individuals)
are guided by elements of media logic.
• The third dimension investigates how political organizations and
decision-making institutions (parties, governments, interest groups,
negotiation committees, and bargaining processes) are affected by
media logic.
• The fourth dimension investigates the effects of mediatization on
people’s knowledge, perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors.
An important pre-condition for mediatization processes is the growing
independence of the media from political institutions. This histori-
cal process has progressed at different rates and to different levels in
contemporary societies. In most cases, though, the mass media have
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Frank Esser and Jörg Matthes 179
established themselves as a highly influential new player in the inter-
mediary system of society, now competing for attention and credibility
with parties, churches, unions, interest groups, and other ‘old’ inter-
mediaries. International surveys show that the media have become the
most important source of political information for the wider public,
so that the question of how ‘political reality’ is constructed by the
news media is of general importance (dimension 1). We assume that
news production today is more closely linked to media logic – that is,
driven by professional and commercial motives. We also assume that
the growing importance of the media and their media logics has placed
great demands on political actors (dimension 2), on organizations and
the intermediary system (dimension 3), on policy-making institutions
(dimension 3), and on citizens (dimension 4). The model of representa-
tive democracy described in Chapter 3 is thus expected to be undergoing
transformational change.
Since we understand mediatization as a developmental process,
empirical research should ideally employ longitudinal designs. Because
the main drivers of media logic – professional, commercial, and tech-
nological development – are not universally consistent across countries,
empirical research into mediatization should be context-sensitive and
thus adopt cross-national comparative designs.
As should also be apparent from the above, the four dimensions of
mediatization are highly intercorrelated. The breakdown into separate
dimensions might help clarify the concept and aid in assessing the
degree to which politics in a particular setting is mediatized. This does
not, however, imply that the process of mediatization must be linear
or unidirectional. As argued earlier, it is certainly conceivable that the
impact of media logic on political actors, located within political insti-
tutions, varies both within and across countries and across time and
circumstances. Against this background, several main lines of challenges
to democracy can be fleshed out (Chapter 7; see also Chapter 4 on the
varieties of democracy).
Precondition: Independence of the news media from
political institutions
For the media to have an independent impact upon other social or
political actors or institutions, as implied by the mediatization the-
sis, they have to form an institution in their own right. Lucht and
Udris (2011; Udris and Lucht 2009) examined the degree of functional
differentiation – or lack of differentiation – between media and political
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180 Mediatization Effects
institutions in five countries over time. This team traced the retreat of
organizational links between news organizations and political organiza-
tions in Austria, Germany, Switzerland, France, and Great Britain over
an almost 50-year period from 1960 to 2008. In each of these coun-
tries (treated as representatives of the democratic-corporatist model,
pluralist-polarized, and liberal model of media–politics relations; see
Hallin and Mancini 2004a), the authors studied the 30 largest print-
news titles (popular, mid-market, and quality outlets published daily or
weekly) as well as the most-watched television information programs
(pursuing hard news, soft news, or mixed approaches) for their links
to parties, churches, associations, and other intermediary or govern-
ment institutions. Their analysis shows that the disentanglement of
the press from their former social and political ties has progressed first
and foremost in the liberal system (Britain), followed by the largest
democratic-corporatist system (Germany), and then by the smallest
democratic-corporatist system (Switzerland). In Austria, another small-
ish corporatist system, the process is still underway and political par-
allelism of the press still fairly noticeable. The only polarized-pluralist
system in the sample (France) provides an ambivalent picture. Develop-
ments in the French press are in many ways similar to those in the other
two models but also influenced – and at times offset – by the histori-
cally close ties between media and politics (reflecting the deep cultural
embedding of the media more than its crude instrumentalization). The
French television sector has, as in the other two models, seen the advent
of programs mixing hard and soft news but hard news still accounts for
most programs.
From a cross-national and cross-temporal standpoint we can deduce
from this study that mediatization effects are more widespread today
than in the past, and that they are most pervasive in the liberal sys-
tems and least common in the polarized-pluralist systems. An important
similarity across all systems could be observed with regard to how the
differentiation process takes place: first the circulation of news outlets
with close social or political ties decreases; then news outlets with close
social or political ties go either out of business or cut their former ties
to social or political institutions and transform themselves into purely
economic organizations.
Challenge 1: Mediatization of political reality in ‘news’
Given the centrality of media to politics, political actors are continu-
ously involved in efforts to shape news coverage of political and current
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affairs. At the same time, the media personnel do not want to be reduced
to passive carriers of political actors’ messages. Journalists view it as
their professional responsibility to act as a watchdog and to make their
own decisions regarding what to cover and how to cover it. Whether
journalists or their sources have the most power in this ‘negotiation of
newsworthiness’ (Cook 2005) is a contested issue. What is consequen-
tial in this context is whether news-media content is shaped mainly by
the characteristics and needs of the media or by the wants and needs
of political actors and institutions. In the former case, news-media logic
is decisive for how the media cover social and political affairs, whereas
in the latter case political logic is decisive (Strömbäck 2011). This sug-
gests that the first important aspect of the mediatization of politics
is the degree to which news-media content is determined mainly by
news-media logic as opposed to political logic.
Oftentimes nowadays, the production of news is not primarily driven
by the needs of politicians but by the tastes and preferences of media
consumers, potentially giving birth to a populist political culture (see
chapters 7 and 9 of this volume). Such a dominance of media logic is
often theorized to result in a simplification, dramatization, or negative
representation of politics favoring conflict, scandals, and episodic over
thematic frames. In fact, political communication scholars in Europe
and North America have observed structural trends in the news cover-
age of politics such as a shift from hard news to soft news (Patterson
2000), an increase of political trivialization (Bennett 2003), a rising neg-
ativity in political news coverage (Farnsworth and Lichter 2007), and a
shrinking degree of sound bites by political actors (Patterson 2000; for
European data see Esser 2008a). As should be apparent, all these devel-
opments are expected to have a negative impact on the functioning of
representative democracy. After all they do not help put pressure on
politicians to address legitimate concerns of the public, nor do they
put the news media in a more credible position to demand responsi-
ble behavior of politicians – they rather discredit the media’s role within
the chains of responsiveness and accountability (see chapters 3 and 7).
Along this line of argument, Patterson (2002) has found that –
with the rise of interpretive journalism – media coverage of political
campaigns in the US has become overwhelmingly negative (see also
Farnsworth and Lichter 2006). Likewise, findings by Kepplinger’s (1998,
2002) extensive analysis of German newspapers from 1951 to 1995
suggest an increase of negative statements about politicians (with a con-
stant share of positive statements) and an increasing amount of items
referring to problems (with a decreasing amount describing solutions).
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182 Mediatization Effects
Beyond the increasing negative characterization of politics (as a conse-
quence of mediatization), Patterson’s (1993) content analysis of US news
magazines also found a rising share of horse-race journalism, focusing
on strategies, personalities, and campaign tactics rather than on substan-
tial issue frames. Research indicates that this development is less present
in Europe compared to the US (see for instance, Wilke and Reinemann
2000). Still, with a diminishing level of substance in political coverage,
the watchdog function of journalism is undermined and the media plat-
form is more often used by journalists or ‘the man in the street’ than by
substantive experts or politicians. The consequences of these forms of
coverage are predominantly negative. For instance, horse-race coverage
has been shown to foster public distrust, particularly among politically
less sophisticated people (Cappella and Jamieson 1997).
Another line of research has investigated the personalization of
politics as an indicator of mediatization. Though research on person-
alization has been characterized by various theoretical frameworks,
disagreement about definitions, and diverse methodologies (see Adam
and Maier 2010), the prevailing key argument is that news cover-
age emphasizing candidates, politicians, and personalities has increased
over time when compared to organizations, parties, and issues. Several
reasons for this observation have been suggested. One the one hand,
it is expected that the media increasingly ‘have a limited capability to
transmit a full and complete picture of the political world, so they give
priority to those aspects that can be transformed into good media prod-
ucts’ (Campus 2010: 221). On the other hand, it is believed that the
relevance of political parties in the political communication process is
waning, and this, in turn, opens the floor to personalities as transmit-
ters of political messages (Dalton 2000). The negative implications of a
rising personalization of politics for the functioning of democracy are
straightforward: when serious, argument-based issue politics is increas-
ingly displaced by political performers that ‘have gained the status of
celebrities, like rock stars or movie stars’ (Campus 2010: 223), the public
is seduced into making superficial judgments based on largely irrelevant
criteria.
Despite its intuitive appeal, however, there is only limited support
for the personalization thesis in recent scholarly literature (Adam and
Maier 2010; Kriesi 2011; Vliegenthart et al. 2010). In fact, neither has
personalization of media content increased over the past decades, nor
is there a rising influence of personality or candidate-based decision-
making processes in public opinion formation (Adam and Maier 2010;
for cross-country evidence, see Kriesi 2011).
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Furthermore, with news content determined by media logic, the
lines between news and entertainment become increasingly blurred.
As Blumler and Kavanagh (1999: 225) have put it,
Key boundaries that previously shaped the political communication
field seem to be dissolving – for example, between ‘political’ and
‘nonpolitical’ genres, between matters of ‘public’ and ‘private’ con-
cern, between ‘quality’ and ‘tabloid’ approaches to politics, between
journalists serving audiences as ‘informers’ and as ‘entertainers’, and
between ‘mass’ and ‘specialist’, ‘general’ and ‘attentive’ audiences.
This has stimulated a debate about the quality and future of news
journalism, culminating in the question of whether political news will
endure to serve its basic function of informing the public about issues
of collective interest.
After all, these trends toward negativity, personalization, and
populism can undermine the chain of responsiveness insofar as they
compromise the formation of people’s preferences: lack of access to
substantive information, lack of access to undistorted and diverse infor-
mation, and lack of opportunity to deliberate pose serious challenges
to a vivid public sphere and thus democratic life. These content fea-
tures may also undermine the chain of accountability by handicapping
citizens’ capability to evaluate the inclusiveness and fairness of the
policy-making process as well as properly evaluate political outcomes
for their service to the public good (see Figure 3.2 in Chapter 3).
Yet, the extent to which political news is shaped by media logic is
vastly different across systems, as an ongoing study by Esser (2008a;
see also Esser and Buechel 2012; Esser and Umbricht 2012) indicates.
It compares television and newspaper reporting of public affairs across
space and time. The study is interested in the media-centered political
reporting style in which, increasingly, journalists become the stories’
main news-makers, not politicians or other social actors. This style can
be interpreted as professionally motivated behavior by journalists to
increase their influence, authority, and prestige – and, ultimately, their
control over the news content. Its theoretical underpinnings are the
concepts of ‘media intrusion’ (Baran 1990) or ‘journalistic intervention’
(Blumler and Gurevitch 2001). Media interventionism in election cam-
paigns is high when journalists report on politics in their own words,
scenarios, and assessments – and when they, for example, grant politi-
cians only limited opportunities to present themselves with their own
voice in the news.
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184 Mediatization Effects
In accordance with the theoretical accounts outlined so far, the con-
textual setting of the US is expected to favor a news culture that displays
the largest degree of journalistic intervention. At the other extreme of
the spectrum is France, a prototype of the polarized-pluralist model
of media–politics relations, where the least inclination to journalistic
intervention is expected. These assumptions were tested with a content
analysis of television election news in the US, Great Britain, Germany,
and France over two election cycles. The study found, indeed, evidence
of a more interventionist US approach and a non-interventionist French
approach (Esser 2008a). French election stories displayed a more pas-
sive, yielding reporting style and were more structured by political logic
whereas US (and to a lesser degree German) stories were more structured
by interventionist media logic.
In addition to this television study, Esser and Umbricht (2012) con-
ducted a newspaper content analysis comparing political affairs cover-
age from six countries (Great Britain, US, Germany, Switzerland, Italy,
France) over five decades (1960–2010). This attempt to map reporting
styles outside election periods also found strong evidence in support of
Hallin and Mancini’s (2004a) three models. Political news coverage in
liberal systems is most forcefully characterized by media logic, in par-
ticular by the commercial imperatives of media logic. In Great Britain
and the US (i.e. countries of the liberal system) political news cov-
erage is characterized by personalization, strategy frames, negativism,
conflict-focus, and a generally audience-grabbing ‘pragmatic’ approach
to political reporting. Coverage in Switzerland and in Germany (i.e.
in the countries of the democratic-corporatist model) shows less con-
flict, less negativism, less personalization, little to no criticism of the
government or governing, less strategic framing, a greater reliance on
established sources, and a generally sacerdotal approach to political
reporting. Beyond the direct implications these results have for the effec-
tiveness of the chains of responsiveness and accountability, this study
also found that the news media in the different countries under exam-
ination contribute to different understandings of democracy. In their
daily political affairs coverage, the Swiss news organizations exhibit
quality standards much more in line with the idealistic conception
of a participatory or consensus democracy, whereas the quality stan-
dards being realized in US news coverage are more in accordance with a
pragmatic, more elitist conception.
The finding that Switzerland is an exceptional case – largely protected
from destabilizing influences of an over-commercialized media logic – is
confirmed by findings by Matthes et al. (2010) on Swiss news coverage
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in Swiss direct-democratic campaigns. They found no signs at all to
diagnose a negative or impertinent rendering of politics (as a conse-
quence of mediatization). For instance, a content analysis of television
and newspaper coverage for the asylum-law campaign revealed that only
6.7 per cent of all statements voiced by political actors (in news cov-
erage) included a direct attack on the political opponent. By contrast,
news coverage was rather substantial, factual, and based on arguments
that were relevant to the campaign. In contrast to US findings (e.g.
Patterson 1993) there was a very low share of episodic news frames
present in the news (only 2.8 per cent). At least in the peculiar case
of Switzerland, there are hardly any traces for a media logic dominat-
ing the news. In fact, Swiss news coverage seems to play a de-escalating
role, focusing on substantial arguments rather than sharp conflict. The
exceptional role of the Swiss democracy, which features already promi-
nently in our comparative discussion of political systems (see Figures 4.5
and 4.9 in Chapter 4 on the varieties of democracy), is also reflected in
these findings on the Swiss media system and news culture.
This general picture was further confirmed by another content analy-
sis of Swiss (and German) news exploring the question of whether media
coverage of political affairs still reflects features of political logic or is
solely driven by a standardized media logic. This study by Floss and
Marcinkowski (2008) finds – in line with expectations – that news cov-
erage of negotiating processes in Switzerland is characterized by a greater
amount of collective orientation and consensus frames (and framed less
in personalized and conflictual scenarios than in Germany). News fram-
ing thus seems to reflect core polity aspects of a country’s political logic,
although it may also contain considerable elements of media logic.
Challenge 2: Consequences of mediatization on political
actors and organizations
The more dependent political actors and organizations are on public
opinion, and the greater their need to influence public opinion, the
greater their dependence on, and hence their need to influence, the
news media and their coverage. There are three strategies to achieve
this (Strömbäck 2011: 375): one is to leverage the advantage political
actors retain with respect to the access to information that might be
transformed into news. Another strategy is through increased efforts
at agenda-building and news management. A third strategy is to make
the media and their potential reactions an important consideration in
all political processes, from the selection of issues to promote, policies
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186 Mediatization Effects
to pursue, and people to appoint or nominate, to the way campaigns
are run.
Thus, to influence the news, political actors must devote ever more
resources to the task of news management. And yet, success may come
at a price – the adaptation to or adoption of media logic. Political actors
may reach their immediate goal of getting ‘into the news as they wish’,
but ‘they may end up losing the war, as standards of newsworthiness
begin to become prime criteria to evaluate issues, policies, and politics’,
as Cook (2005: 163) has argued so forcefully.
The pressure to ‘perform’ in an audience democracy, to be ‘authen-
tic and empathic, populist, and entertaining’ (Brants et al. 2010: 31)
is likely to privilege those actors and organizations who fully adapt to
the media logic. This is particularly true of populist leaders and move-
ments, potentially resulting in a rise of populism (Mazzoleni 2008a;
Mazzoleni et al. 2003; Mény and Surel 2002). In a heavily media-
tized democracy populism benefits from a media complicity (Mazzoleni
2008a), as a result of which the news media rather prefer popular, that
is dramatized and emotionalized, messages (as conveyed by populist
political leaders) over a more neutral but less arousing style of political
reporting.
As a consequence, and challenge to democracy, political success might
then be determined by media competence, not substantive competence
(Reinemann 2010), and party leaders ‘are more likely to be chosen
because of their ability to deal with the media rather than their skills
of building alliances across social groups and fractions’ (Brants and
Voltmer 2011: 6). As Papadopoulus observed, there is also a risk of a
broadening gap between mediatized ‘front-stage’ politics and the more
complex policy-making activities which take place at the ‘back-stage’
involving non-elected actors. This could result in a decreasing over-
lap between the true policy agenda (driven by the political logic) and
the media agenda (driven by the media logic). This insight also reflects
the argument of Chapter 7 that policy is less prone to mediatization
compared to politics.
As another potential threat to democracy, a spiral of mistrust might
evolve between journalists and politicians. The reason is that politi-
cians become more sophisticated in instrumentalizing journalists for
their own purposes and, as a consequence, ‘journalists complain about
politicians who, to control the uncertainty of the outcome of free pub-
licity, have in a process of “mediatization” professionalized the art of
news management and introduced the framing and packaging of spin’
(Brants et al. 2010: 29). It follows that journalists might put less trust in
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politicians, which in turn could have an impact on politicians’ trust in
journalism as well.
There is some evidence for mediatized campaigning strategies by
political actors. For instance, Maurer (2010) found that political actors
in Germany (and the news media) largely fail to precisely communi-
cate their substantial goals and policies. However, our research on three
direct-democratic campaigns conducted in Switzerland came to a more
positive conclusion. Hänggli and Kriesi (2010) and Hänggli (2010) report
findings indicating that the news media rather faithfully reproduce the
framing by camps present in direct-democratic campaigns. Using a con-
tent analysis of all campaign material and all campaign news coverage
(television and newspaper), they could show that the frames in the
news media generally correspond to the frames found in the media
input communicated by political actors. They also found that the ratio
between pro and contra arguments in news was around one, signaling
that the media generally tended to balance the news. Personal inter-
views conducted with all main campaigners supported the conclusion
that media coverage was balanced rather than biased. Only very few
campaigners felt they were treated badly in their respective news cov-
erage. The study also found that there was a clear dialogue between
the camps visible in news coverage. That is, the audience was given the
possibility of learning about the positions of all camps involved. Never-
theless, such campaign dialogue was, as could be expected, significantly
less present in free news media. The free press mediated less and pro-
vided a less coherent picture. These newspapers mainly reprinted the
information provided by the news agency.
Compared to the media input, however, there were a few differences
in the media’s news reporting. First, media input involving attacks and
conflicts was generally more likely to be covered. Still (and quite remark-
ably), substantive frames largely dominated all campaigns. Thus, there
was strong indication that Swiss direct-democratic campaigns were pri-
marily conducted in substantive terms. Second, the news media rarely
increased the share of the main frames compared to the media input
because the respective political actors were very active with adver-
tisements and focused on the respective frames in their ads. Third,
compared to media input, the media increased the share of counter-
frames three times. These findings again reflect a media logic that favors
dialogue and vital exchange of arguments. Taken together, the findings
of this project are not at all alarming for the quality of direct-democratic
campaigns. Overall, one could say that the news media are doing quite
a good job in this specific context. They mediate the frames provided
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188 Mediatization Effects
by political actors. Rephrased, instead of political actors (and their cam-
paign material) being governed by a media logic, one could conclude
that media content is governed by a political logic.
From a different vantage point, the study of Swiss direct-democratic
campaigns revealed additional findings that are compatible with this
claim. Thus, in his extensive analysis of eight direct-democratic cam-
paigns, Bernhard (2010) analyzed the role of the news media in
explaining the campaign-related power of political actors. Starting with
the general observation that the media have become an autonomous
force in politics, Bernard conducted interviews with all relevant cam-
paign managers who acted on behalf of their respective organizations.
Campaign-related power was measured with reputational indicators
based on a series of questions. Combining these data with a content
analysis of campaign coverage, he found that media coverage increased
rather than decreased campaign-related power. Furthermore, results
suggested that the amount of resources in general and of money in par-
ticular have a positive impact on power, though this influence is much
smaller than is commonly expected. Based on these findings, Bernhard
(2010: 18) concludes that,
direct democracy thus not only enables weak actors (such as parlia-
mentary minorities or even outsiders) to provoke a public debate on
issues of their concern, but also to gain a fair amount of media access.
In this sense, Swiss media can be credited with a ‘democratizing force’
in these campaigns.
This underscores the importance of political communication as a key
precondition of democracy (Chapter 2), and its positive contribution to
democracy if the news media’s role is confined to mediation rather than
mediatization. It also illustrates the importance of polity again, that is,
of specific contextual conditions, which in the case of Switzerland seem
rather favorable for positive media effects (see chapters 4 and 7).
Challenge 3: Consequences of mediatization on political
organizations and decision-making institutions
Media-driven democratic systems are assumed to cause the decline of
political parties as parties lose their function to mediate between the
people and the government to the mass media. The US is the prototype
of a decaying system in which the candidates no longer need the parties
to reach the voters but instead rely completely on the media (Patterson
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1993). The situation in Europe is different. Although political leaders
may run campaigns independently of the traditional party system, as
the Italian example of Berlusconi demonstrated, the usual pattern is still
that candidates are nominated by party organizations and that the cam-
paigns depend to a high degree on the party organizations (Mazzoleni
and Schulz 1999). Nevertheless, even in Europe parties are pressurized to
adapt to a changing mass communication environment. This raises the
question of whether mediatization could damage the party structure of
European democracy, or undermine its reputation as being an effective
political order.
A comprehensive study by Jarren, Donges, and Vogel (Donges 2008;
Donges and Vogel 2008; Jarren 2008b; Steiner and Jarren 2009; Vogel
2010) analyzed party organizations in Austria, Germany, Great Britain,
and Switzerland. They aimed to assess the extent to which the rules and
repercussions of media logic challenge long-established mass parties in
their execution of core democratic functions.
In the four countries, the study finds that mediatization clearly influ-
ences organizational structures and behaviors of political parties – and
particularly those structures and behaviors that are responsible for the
‘self-presentation of politics’. Since structural changes in this sector are
rather similar across parties, this can be read as evidence for reciprocal
observation and imitation of parties across national borders. Different
shapes and speeds of the process can be explained by the impor-
tance of polity-related framework conditions that do not offer the same
kind of opportunity structures for media-induced changes. Altogether,
it appears that European parties are very conservative organizations,
although – and especially after election defeats – they are able to adjust
to altered environments. An important environmental factor (among
others) are the mass media which, through consonant and cumula-
tive reporting, are perceived as a powerful institution that controls the
communication infrastructure of society.
Within the mediatization process that triggered structural changes
within European party organizations a three-step process of changed
perceptions, structural change, and changes in output can be distin-
guished (Donges 2008; Donges and Vogel 2008): the change process
starts with the perception within party organizations that the media
and mass media communication have become an increasingly relevant
factor in their operational environmental. Communication is no longer
viewed a mere ‘add-on’ to policy making. Party organizations monitor
and imitate one another, so that structural changes within one organi-
zation are copied quickly by others. With regard to structural changes,
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190 Mediatization Effects
the responses to mediatization within parties manifested themselves
most clearly in the expansion of organizational structures responsi-
ble for communication, and the assignment of additional staff. Two
models of internal change became apparent: the integration of all
communication tasks within one unit, and the differentiation of inter-
nal and external communication in different units. A trend toward
bundling competences, tasks and resources in terms of ‘centralization’
could not be confirmed. In particular, parties with a distinctively fed-
eral form of organization found themselves less able to change their
internal structures because they needed to balance the requirements of
media communication (for instance, rapid responses) and internal fac-
tions (for instance, collective decision making and consultation). Party
organizations are investing more and more resources in communica-
tion, especially personnel, but these developments must be considered
against the background of the declining membership rates and thus
smaller party income. In the amount of financial resources allocated to
communication, a general upward trend is not observable.
The third step concerns output. Although party organizations are
found to communicate more extensively than in the past, a funda-
mental increase in certain channels of communication, for instance,
press releases or press conferences, is not observable in the majority
of parties analyzed. The internet has become the most important tool
for internal communication (intranet), and the most relevant channel
of communication to inform party officials and members before the
media can do so. In general, however, new communication technology
seems to supplement rather than replace traditional channels of internal
communication.
A similar three-step process, described here for political parties, was
also found to be at work for governments (Vogel 2010). The current
changes in the media environment have also enabled more possibilities
for interest groups and civil society actors. They find new opportunities
to raise issues and influence politics through a mix of private (lobbying)
and public (mediated) campaign strategies (Steiner and Jarren 2010). Or
to put this in the language of our model of representative democracy
in Chapter 3: the administrative channel experiences an extension of
access under the influence of mediatization and allows for a potentially
broader representation of interests.
A study by Marcinkowski and collaborators (Floss 2010; Marcinkowski
2007; Schrott and Spranger 2007; Spörer-Wagner and Marcinkowski
2010a and 2010b) examined the mediatization of political bargain-
ing processes in Switzerland and Germany. It analyzed how print and
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broadcast media covered different negotiating institutions in both coun-
tries, such as the committees mediating between the two chambers of
the German and Swiss parliaments (the German Vermittlungsausschuss
and the Swiss Einigungskonferenz) as well as various government-
initiated committees like the German committee for sustainability in
financing the social security systems (Rürup Committee) or the joint
committee of the German federal parliament concerned with the reform
of the labor market (Hartz Committee).
In line with differentiation between policy and politics (see
Chapter 7), political negotiations can be made public (front-stage bar-
gaining) or kept private (back-stage bargaining). In the examples above,
all meetings were kept private because experience shows that exclusion
of the public facilitates compromise: concessions can be made and com-
promise reached without participants losing their credibility as loyal
representative of their respective interests. Yet, by definition, the ratio-
nales of media publicity and political negotiation are hard to combine:
the media call for transparency in political processes and show specific
interest in individuals, conflicts, and negative outcomes. Negotiations,
on the other hand, require an atmosphere of privacy which allows
for compromises, communicated to the public as collective decisions
without indicating any winner or loser.
Given this incompatibility between news-media logic and political
bargaining logic, a considerable decline in the quantity and quality of
negotiation outcomes seems likely in a mediatized environment. On the
other hand, bargaining officials can also exploit the media public for
selfish reasons. For instance, political actors can try to increase their
bargaining power through the mobilization of external support. One
effective strategy of going publicmay be to leak insider information con-
fidentially to the media. It follows that media disclosures about delicate
negotiations can occur in many ways – by journalists pursuing trans-
parency (according to professionally motivated media logic) or pursuing
spectacularization of politics (according to commercially motivated
media logic), or by politicians engaging in self-mediatization (accord-
ing to self-representational political logic) – and eventually complicate
collective decision making.
The study finds, indeed, that media attention creates difficulties for
finding a compromise. But, ultimately, it is not so much media-induced
intrusion but negotiators’ self-mediatization which poses the biggest
challenge to successful political bargaining. The study concludes that,
although media logic is omnipresent in the minds of participants, it
does not have a direct destructive effect. A more reciprocal effect is at
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192 Mediatization Effects
work where media awareness (triggered by high-density reporting) leads
to communication failures of participants – for example, by spreading
indiscretions and non-authorized information, by inefficient news man-
agement of the negotiation leadership, or by uncoordinated statements
of appointed speakers.
For the concept of mediatization, the studies by Jarren et al. and
Marcinkowski et al. both underscore that the media have an impact on
organizational and institutional actors not only through their coverage
but equally so through their very existence. Political actors and organi-
zations are under pressure to engage in self-mediatization because they
causally attribute power to the media and their operating logic. The
subjective perception of media power is sufficient to prompt changes
in political behavior. From the perspective of democratic theory one
may thus conclude that processes of responsiveness and accountability
increasingly follow considerations of media logic.
The second study illustrates also that transparency comes at a cost.
This is another lesson for the chain of accountability described in
Chapter 3. Striking a balance between political values of confidentiality,
compromise, and collective decisions on the one hand and news values
of transparency, conflict, and interest-pursuing personalities has become
harder to accomplish. The balance is shifting in favor of the media if
considerations of media logic begin to influence how politicians con-
duct negotiations (the production of politics) and how they try to win
and ultimately sell negotiations (the politics-oriented self-presentation
of politics). Under conditions of mediatization scholars will also be well-
advised to check whether journalists’ demand for transparency is driven
by democracy-related motives (raising answerability) or democracy-
distant motives (fueling spectacularization), in other words by profes-
sional or commercial imperatives of media logic (see Chapter 7, on
answerability see also Chapter 3).
Challenge 4: Consequences of mediatized
information for citizens
Normative theories of modern representative democracies rest on an
information environment that enables citizens to learn about political
and social affairs, evaluate the actions of elected political figures, get
information needed for sound decision making, and communicate their
opinions to these representatives. As put by Delli Carpini (2004: 395),
theories of direct democracy assume an even
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richer communications environment that helps provide citizens with
the motivation, ability, and opportunity to participate in more ongo-
ing, demanding, and varied ways. In turn, limitations in the com-
munications environment are pinpointed as a primary reason why
democratic practice falls short of normative expectations, whereas
enhancements to this environment are held out as a way to improve
this state of affairs.
The impact of mediated communication on citizens’ civic attitudes
is of special interest for the fourth dimension of mediatization. This
addresses – in the language of the model of democracy in Chapter 3 –
the conditions of a mediated public sphere, in particular the degree
to which people use various kinds of media for information about
politics, develop political perceptions and preferences, make their pref-
erences heard, participate in the policy-making process, and evaluate
the production and self-presentation of politics.
The ways in which the news media portray politics – though these
ways vary across countries (see Esser 2008a; Vliegenthart et al. 2011) –
pose a challenge for these democratic functions, especially with regard
to participation. Research has demonstrated, for instance, that negative
media coverage of politics fosters citizens’ dissatisfaction with politics
(Fackler and Lin 1995) as it decreases trust in politicians in particular
(Kepplinger et al. 1986) and democracy in general (Della Porta 2000).
Dissatisfaction with politics, in turn, reduces citizens’ willingness to
become engaged. It goes without saying that a decrease in participa-
tion (i.e. low voter turnout) affects the very heart of political decision
making and reduces the quality of democratic representation. Further-
more, negative media coverage might not only be detrimental to the
credibility of politicians and politics but also to news credibility itself
(Patterson 2002). As Patterson (2002: 93) suspects, ‘knee-jerk criticism
only weakens the press’s watchdog capacity. When the press condemns
everything and everyone, audiences will shun the messenger.’ Simi-
lar effects have been found for horse-race coverage. It points citizens
to the power-seeking self-interests and strategic goals of politicians.
As a result, politicians’ substantive frames are perceived as less cred-
ible and more tactically motivated. Such reporting nourishes a spiral
of cynicism, with ‘cynicism not only in terms of politics, politicians,
and policy but also vis-à-vis the messengers themselves, the journalists
as the reliable and trustworthy guardians of democracy’ (Brants et al.
2010: 26).
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The dissolving boundaries between the genres of news and entertain-
ment, especially, have – in the eyes of some scholars (e.g. Jamison and
Baum forthcoming; Patterson 2000) – alarming consequences for the
citizens’ capacity to fulfill their responsibilities in a democracy. Find-
ings by Aarts and Semetko (2003), for instance, suggest that tabloid
news users are less informed and involved than users of classic news for-
mats. Also new US entertainment formats such as The Daily Show by Jon
Stewart and Stephen Colbert’s Colbert Report have unwittingly become
recognized by citizens as legitimate news sources and trustworthy polit-
ical commentators. The use of The Daily Show, for example, has been
found to increase political distrust and decrease support for presidential
candidates, especially for young voters (Morris 2009).
The results of a study by Schemer (2009, 2010a) also demonstrate that
only specific media outlets are likely to arouse voters’ emotions, mainly
due to their style of reporting. Some media outlets provide factual back-
ground information that may even decrease emotion arousal. Extensive
panel survey studies on three Swiss direct-democratic campaigns (asy-
lum policy; corporate taxation; naturalization of immigrants) found
strong evidence that especially elite newspapers and some regional
papers are excellent in providing background information about polit-
ical issues. However, other outlets, such as tabloid news, and intense
political talk may be detrimental to democratic processes of opinion
formation. In fact, it was found that the use of tabloids such as 20
Minutes or Blick increased negative emotions toward asylum seekers
in the course of the political campaign. That is, the more people use
tabloids as important sources of information, the more they see anger
and fear toward asylum seekers. Moreover, political talk and campaign
advertising had the same effects: the more people relied on talk shows
such as Arena, the more negative their affective reactions toward asy-
lum seekers. This effect can be traced back to the conflictive nature
of this specific genre. The focus on conflict and the polarization of
political positions in these broadcasts may have created the impression
that asylum policy is a big problem that political actors cannot solve.
Additionally, campaign ads that portrayed asylum seekers mainly in a
negative light (e.g. refugees as bogus asylum seekers and scroungers that
abuse the Swiss welfare system) also aroused negative emotions such as
anger and fear in audience members (Schemer 2010b). In contrast, how-
ever, the use of elite press decreased negative emotions toward asylum
seekers (Schemer 2010a). Obviously, the focus of these media sources on
facts and background information worked against the emotion arousal
of tabloid news.
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Pointing to the larger questions of democratic citizenship, these stud-
ies make a clear case that the arousal of negative emotions in political
campaigns can have a considerable impact on the voting intentions of
citizens. For the direct-democratic campaigns, negative emotions turned
out to be important predictors of voting intentions above and beyond
the approval of arguments that were relevant in the specific campaigns
(Kühne et al. 2011; Schemer 2009). Thus, emotions can directly enter the
judgment formation of individuals and distract people from deliberating
on the relevant campaign arguments. In this context, affect functions
as a surrogate for information. However, this effect was only present
for tabloid media outlets. In fact, the opposite was true for quality
news media that largely dominate direct-democratic campaigns when it
comes to the sheer quantity of coverage (see Hänggli 2010). How far the
specific conditions of the Swiss political and media system can account
for this positive finding remains an issue for further exploration.
In the more general body of scholarly work, though, not all research
points in the same direction. Some studies found that media use is
positively correlated with political interest, political knowledge, and
political participation. Others found that media use can also foster
cynicism, apathy, ignorance, and disengagement. There is even some
evidence that negative coverage raises citizens’ interest in campaigns,
which leads Patterson (2002: 90–91) to conclude that there ‘is some-
thing worse than exposure to persistently negative news, and that’s no
news exposure at all’ (Patterson 2002: 97). There is also some evidence
indicating that political comedy programs have the potential to educate
viewers and stimulate interest among those citizens who may other-
wise be disengaged from the political process. Baum (2002) suggests an
‘incidental byproduct’ model, which holds that soft news makes polit-
ical information accessible to otherwise politically inattentive viewers
(see also Van Zoonen et al. 2007). Similarly, Baum (2003) observed a
‘gateway’ effect, whereby exposure to soft news outlets motivates view-
ers to consume additional political information via traditional news
sources.
Research by Matthes et al. (2010) found no indication for negative
effects of news exposure on political trust. Using survey data on the
issues of asylum policy and the World Economic Forum, they could
demonstrate that exposure to Swiss news coverage actually increased
rather than decreased trust in politicians and the political system. This
effect can be explained by the lack of negative news footage character-
izing politicians as unreliable, selfish, or lacking credibility. For these
two issues, by contrast, politicians were largely able to stage themselves
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in positive terms, demonstrating their substantial competence, good
will, and broad issue knowledge. With such a positive (and uncritical)
depiction of political actors in the news, it is not surprising that expo-
sure to news content led to outcomes likely to foster participation and
engagement.
One approach to resolving the contradictory expectations caused by
political mobilization approaches and media malaise theories is to start
at the beginning of the effects chain, the early socialization phase of
children and young adults. A study by Bonfadelli, de Vreese, and col-
laborators (Kunz 2011; Möller 2010) analyzes how adolescents develop
democratic competencies and participatory repertoires in today’s multi-
channel environments. This process is heavily mediated since very few
adolescents have any direct experience with politics. Relying on repre-
sentative surveys in the Netherlands and Switzerland among teenagers
aged 15–18, this study finds four universal factors for political engage-
ment in both countries: participating (high involvement), deliberating
(online discussions), contributing (donating and collecting money), and
voting. With regard to political attitudes, though, there are significant
cross-national differences. In Switzerland, where people can participate
in direct-democratic procedures and are exposed to extensive media cov-
erage of the accompanying issue-centered campaigns, teenagers have a
much stronger sense of being ‘able to influence policy outcomes’ than
their Dutch opposites. Thus, the ‘internal efficacy’ of teenagers being
socialized into a direct democracy is significantly higher than of those
living in a representative democracy. A moderating effect of news-media
use could not be established but the results underscore the great impor-
tance of the institutional framework conditions – the polity imperative
of politics – for socialization effects.
In sum, democracy requires its citizens to have an ‘enlightened under-
standing’ of the issues that concern their lives (see Chapter 3). They are
dependent on a political communication environment that provides the
resources necessary to understand and evaluate the available political
options. So far the Swiss media system seems to fare better in this regard
than comparable systems (for instance in the Netherlands), although
important qualifications must be made for the emotion-driven discourse
in tabloids and talk shows. If the political communication behavior of
the Swiss youth is any indication of the future then the Swiss system
may be in for a change. Only a very small minority is politically active
(at a level comparable to those in the Netherlands) and their current
online communication behavior seems to carry them away from the
center of institutionalized politics rather than toward it. If correct, this
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process is likely to have feedback implications for the system itself, at
least in the long run.
Conclusion
The model of representative democracy as laid out in Chapter 3 is
undergoing change. On the one hand state politics is embedded in an
increasingly international, multi-layered political structure (chapters 5
and 6), and on the other it is confronted with an increasingly self-
determined media system (chapters 7 and 8). As a result of these
developments national sovereignty has been compromised in various
ways, and conventional political actors and institutions have suffered
a similar challenge to their status. In many (although not all) Western
democracies we observe a decline in public support for traditional par-
ties and institutional politics, decliningmembership and turn-out levels,
and falling levels of citizen engagement. At the same time, mass media
has grown enormously in significance. A wide range of channels and
genres provides a large diversity of content, and this content addresses
people less and less in their roles as democratic citizens and more and
more in their roles as consuming audiences. This is the outcome of a
long-term process that has evolved in stages, which have been described
variously as a sequence of ‘political communication eras’ (Blumler and
Kavanagh 1999) or ‘phases of mediatization’ (Strömbäck 2008). The con-
ditions of the current era, as laid out in chapters 1 and 7, have led
scholars to describe most Western societies as ‘media democracies’ (see
Jarren 2008b; Pfetsch and Marcinkowski 2010).
In a neutral understanding, the term media democracy refers to the
fact that fundamental elements of the ‘chain of responsiveness’ and
‘chain of accountability’ cannot be realized anymore without the ser-
vices of a mass communication infrastructure. Both chains require –
as explained in Chapter 3 – that citizens are reliably and accurately
informed, and that their choices in elections and other contexts are rea-
soned and rational. In practice it often suffices that citizens scan the
political process from a distance and use heuristic shortcuts, rather than
elaborate arguments, to make up their minds. The normative democratic
ideal, however, is one of enlightened citizenry to which the news media
are key contributors. In addition to information, the news media are also
expected to provide analysis: coherent frameworks of interpretation that
help citizens to recognize their own interest and preferences, evaluate
political outcomes, and comprehend globalized and mediatized poli-
tics. An extension to the information and analysis function is the role
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198 Mediatization Effects
of critical scrutiny over the powerful, be they in government, business,
or other influential spheres of society. In the capacity as watchdog, the
news media monitor whether politicians fulfill their responsibilities to
the people who elected them, and whether their policies and programs
are based on sound judgment. In addition to providing transparency
and checks and balances in their information and watchdog role, the
news media serve as a mediator between the citizen and the politician.
In this role as public representative they are expected to ensure that the
preferences of the public are heard. This is aided by pluralist and inclu-
sive news coverage that serves as a mediated proxy of the public sphere.
Finally, the news media can assume the role of an advocate or champion
of the people. The news media can serve as advocates for particular polit-
ical programs and perspectives, and mobilize people to act in support of
these programs.
In their provision of information, analysis, critical scrutiny, public
representation, and advocacy the news media have a wider range of
content genres at their disposal. The media are thus moving toward the
center of the democratic process by providing a shared forum that other
political institutions and social actors increasingly use as an arena for
their interaction.
Whether or not the news media fulfill their intended democratic func-
tions in practice has become a matter of fierce debate. It is here that the
neutral use of the term media democracy is tipping into negative terri-
tory. In negative use, media democracy refers to conditions in which
the imperatives of media logic (and its underlying powers of critical
professionalism, commercialism, and technological change) undermine
journalists’ ability to be objective, pluralistic, and conscious of society’s
needs. Critics claim that many Western democracies are pushed and
deformed by media organizations which find pleasure (and professional
and commercial satisfaction) in interfering with political processes. The
information value and orientation value of their media coverage is said
to be decreasing due to a growing fixation on sensation, conflict, drama,
triviality, and negativity – all of which is expected to foster public cyni-
cism and political alienation (Blumler and Gurevitch 1995; Lloyd 2004;
Meyer 2002; Patterson 1993, 2002). In its extreme, this scenario expects
societies to turn into ‘mediacracies’ in which informed citizenry and
traditional political institutions deteriorate beyond recognition (Meyer
2002).
A counter-scenario to mediacracy is ‘telecracy’ – another negative out-
growth of media democracy (Mazzoleni and Schulz 1999; Pfetsch and
Marcinkowski 2010). The term telecracy describes political actors not
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as victims but beneficiaries of mediatization. Here, politicians govern
‘with’ and ‘through’ the media, and rely heavily on strategic commu-
nication and news management. They employ professionalized com-
munication experts who help them exploit media logic for their own
purposes. A prototype is said to be Berlusconi’s Italy (Croci 2001; Raniolo
2009).
Both scenarios are obviously gross exaggerations but help explain
the scholarly attention this line of research has received. Follow-
ing recommendations by Jarren (1996, 2008b), Donges (2008), and
particularly Marcinkowski (2005, 2007) we have developed a neo-
institutionalist conceptualization of mediatization. It helps us explore
potential challenges to democracy that can be traced either to the ini-
tiative of the media or the self-mediatization of political actors. In a
neo-institutionalist perspective the media are considered as providing
a ‘regular and persisting framework’ through which and within which
political actors operate (Sparrow 1999: 10). The media thereby guide and
channel – or structure – the actions of those working in government,
public administration, and the various stages of the political process
(Donges 2008; Jarren 2008b; Marcinkowski 2007; Sparrow 2006). Put
simply, the media constitute the communicative infrastructure through
which politics presents itself to the public (reflexive mediatization via
self-presentation) or is represented by the media itself (direct mediatiza-
tion via news coverage). As an institution in its own right it is guided
by an autonomous operating logic. Everything that ‘runs through it’
will be formatted by media logic. This process can obstruct, enhance
or substitute political functions. However, not all political institutions
are equally dependent on mediated services and, hence, are less pressur-
ized to adapt (or even submit) to media logic. The research we discussed
in this chapter confirms this by showing that not all political organiza-
tions, institutions, and systems are equally prone to become mediatized.
And not all media organizations and systems are driven by the same
blend of media logic. Its three constituents – professional, commercial,
and technological aspects (see Table 7.2 in Chapter 7) – mix differ-
ently in different settings and therefore produce different mediatization
effects on their own content, political actors, organizations, institutions,
and audiences (see Chapter 3).
Three characteristics of mediatization effects are crucial to under-
stand: first, in addition to direct, media-induced effects we must pay
at least the same amount of attention to reflexive, self-mediatization
effects initiated by political actors in response to what they per-
ceive as a powerful media environment. The ‘professionalization’ of
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self-mediatization (i.e. the externalization and scientification of polit-
ical public relations) is one of the best-documented consequences of
direct mediatization. Second, mediatization effects ought to be studied
at three levels of analysis: the micro-level of individual actors or recip-
ients (and their opinions, decisions, and behaviors); the meso-level of
parties, governments, interest groups, decision-making institutions, but
also media organizations; and the systemic macro-level where implica-
tions of media logic for political culture or consequences of national
media policy styles for media logic can be studied. Third, and related
to the second, it is important to realize that mediatization effects can
be assumed for the interactions between political actors (politics), the
definition of political issues and problems (policy), and the normative
and institutional order of a system (polity). We argued in the context of
our definition of political logic (Table 7.1 in Chapter 7) that the politics
sphere is the easiest to mediatize and the polity sphere the hardest.
Although it may be natural to ask whether mediatization improves or
worsens the quality of democracy, in actual research this question needs
to be broken down in more specific investigations. Does mediatization
have a positive or negative influence on the structure and function-
ing of public communication? This is a key issue addressed by the first
dimension of our mediatization concept. It examines the representation
of politics in the news and is interested in the information quality of
political news coverage, particularly in the framing of public issues and
debates, the involvement of different types of actors in the discourse,
their communication style and level of argumentation analysis.
Does mediatization improve or dampen the responsiveness of the
political-administrative system and the control of political power? This
question is behind the investigations on the diversity and quality of
political coverage as well as agenda-building and agenda-setting. It is
also tied to the question of whether mediatization puts political orga-
nizations or institutions under stress so that their political functions
begin to suffer. These questions are addressed by the second and third
dimension of our mediatization concept.
Does mediatization promote or constrain people’s access to political
information and their political competences? This is related to whether
mediatization favors or reduces political engagement and political par-
ticipation of citizens. It also asks whether mediatization promotes or
diminishes the public’s confidence in democracy and its institutions.
These questions refer to information processing, media use, and political
awareness as well as the relationship between political communica-
tion and political engagement. It has also prompted investigations into
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concepts such as video malaise or political cynicism, which are all
discussed in the context of the fourth dimension of mediatization.
This chapter showed that although the adaptation of democracies to
the mediatization of politics has so far been cast in mainly negative
terms, our research comes to quite moderate conclusions. Any prema-
ture talk about ‘media democracy’ must be checked to see if really all
political structures, processes, and policy fields are mediatized – and not
just those which are inherently dependent on public support. In many
areas we do see clear trends toward mediatization of politics but they
constitute less fundamental discontinuities than anticipated in some
parts of the literature. These trends do, however, signal a growing ten-
sion between the needs of democratic institutions and the media, which
sporadically claim to be the guardians of democracy but just as often
neglect or deny the responsibility that goes with the job. These changes
vary in severity from one political system to another, and one should
beware of over-generalization.
In some European countries (and this includes Switzerland) gov-
ernments are still in a position to tackle these problems by way of
media-policy initiatives aimed at securing better media performance or
limiting media commercialism. This route of action is no longer avail-
able in the US, and many European states have also been moving in the
direction of deregulation and neo-liberalism lately.
Whatever may be done to remedy some of the problems discussed
here will have to be gradual and long term, and will depend on the
ability of democratic institutions to solve their own problems of com-
munication effectively. As argued by McQuail et al. (2007: 276): ‘It will
involve the combined efforts of active citizens, politicians who take a
wider view of their responsibilities, and journalists and other media
people who recognize a professional and institutional task of informing
citizens.’
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Conclusion: An Assessment
of the State of Democracy Given
the Challenges of Globalization
and Mediatization
Hanspeter Kriesi
In this concluding chapter, we shall try to assess the contemporary state
of democracy as we know it on the basis of the previous chapters of this
volume. We shall do so in three steps. First, we shall discuss the global
spread of democracy at the level of the nation-states. Second, we shall
discuss the vertical spread of democracy within the emerging multilevel
governance structures. Our main focus in this respect will be the EU.
Third, we shall try to assess the democratization of established democ-
racies. This section will focus on the experience of Western European
democracies in particular. In assessing the state of the art of democrati-
zation, we shall try not to succumb to the pessimism that has seized a
large number of perspicacious observers of the current state of democ-
racy. Nor shall we fall into the opposite extreme which believes that we
live in the best of all worlds. Democracy is progressing worldwide, but it
is never guaranteed once and for all. Confronted with new challenges,
the process of democratization continues in an open-ended way.
The global spread of democracy
Democracy progresses in global waves, and the third, most recent wave
has had the most profound consequences on the spread of democ-
racy across the globe. Since the early 1970s, the number democracies
has risen steadily. According to the Polity IV index, the number of
‘full democracies’ in the world more than doubled between 1985 and
2010 (from 43 to 93), while the number of full autocracies was cut by
202
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more than two-thirds. For the first time in human history, a majority of
the world population lives under freely chosen governments. In spring
2011, democracy even started to spread to the Arab countries of North
Africa and the Middle East, which have been particularly resistant to the
contemporary wave of democratization (Teorell 2010: 50).
As a result of global processes of modernization, there seems to be
a universal demand for democratic government. This is documented
by Welzel and Inglehart (2008: 136), whose optimistic view suggests
that the modernization process quasi-automatically produces the gen-
eral cultural demand for the democratization process today. Thanks
to its many virtues, democracy seems to have become, as argued by
Amartya Sen (1999), a universal value. However, as we have discussed
in Chapter 2, the pressure of the universal demand for democracy is not
quasi-automatically transformed into democratization, but gives rise to
democratization only under favorable political conditions.
Thus, the third wave of democratization has swept across the globe
thanks to a favorable international political opportunity structure.
At the most general level, the demise of the authoritarian hegemonic
power of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War have given
rise to a more supportive international context, allowing for the diffu-
sion of democracy across Southern, Central, and Eastern Europe, Latin
America, and other parts of the world. We have discussed these pro-
cesses in detail in Chapter 2. More specifically, the horizontal spread
of democracy has benefited from the spatial proximity of neighboring
states, from international networks (especially those provided by supra-
national international governmental organizations (IGOs)), and by the
impact of the media. Finally, more recently, the spread of democracy
to ever more nation-states has also been explicitly promoted by the
democratic hegemon, the US, and by the EU.
We have presented the EU’s efforts in democracy promotion in more
detail in Chapter 6. As this chapter shows, the EU has successfully
applied the leverage mechanism in the framework of its enlargement
program, which held out the credible promise of EU membership to all
those states that were ready to give up authoritarian rule. While this
‘top down’ mechanism proved to be highly successful, the ‘bottom up’
linkage mechanism of creating the socio-economic preconditions for
democracy, however, did not deliver tangible results in the European
case. For countries that do not have a membership perspective, the
EU now also implements a third kind of mechanism – governance,
which contributes to democratization by transferring to authoritarian
regimes democratic principles of governance related to accountability,
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transparency, and participation (of non-state actors in administrative
decision and policy making). This mechanism is intended to prepare
the legal administrative ground upon which eventually political transi-
tions can occur. The studies reported in Chapter 6 confirm the impact
(so far limited to legislation and not yet extending to implementation
of policies) of such subtle processes of democracy promotion.
The important message of this analysis of democracy promotion as
well as of our analysis of the preconditions of democracy more gener-
ally (Chapter 2) is that the success of democratization crucially depends
on the domestic preconditions in the target countries – conditions
which are difficult to influence from the outside. In an analysis of the
factors that undermine democracy, Fish and Wittenberg (2009: 258f.)
show that, over the past several decades, the main culprits for democ-
ratization’s reversal have not been the popular masses (which, under
contemporary conditions, push for democracy rather than against it,
as shown by Bermeo (2003)), nor insurgents, nor foreign powers, or
armed forces (which may also have contributed to setbacks of democ-
racy in some countries), but the chief executives. Illustrative examples of
countries where the chief executives have been responsible for derailing
democracy are President Lukashenko’s Belarus, King Hussein’s and King
Abdallah’s Jordan, Kuwait, Vladimir Putin’s Russia, and Robert Mugabe’s
Zimbabwe. According to these authors, the key to reducing the poten-
tial for presidential or monarchical abuse of power is a strong legislature:
the weaker the legislature, the greater the chance that democracy fails.
Their policy prescription is obvious (Fish and Wittenberg 2009: 261):
‘would-be democratizers should take special interest in strengthening
the legislature’. This policy recommendation has the weakness that it
tends to put the cart before the horse. Of course, a strong legislature
provides a check on presidential strongmen. But then the strong legis-
lature is precisely the kind of institution that is not a precondition, but
the result of processes of democratization.
We would like to add three caveats to the generally quite optimistic
picture of the horizontal spread of democracy across the globe. First,
it is not stressed enough that democratization takes time. As is indi-
cated by our analysis of the variety of democracies in Chapter 4, the
emerging democracies are still more illiberal than the Western European
and Anglo-Saxon democracies (US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand) that
have been established during the first two waves. This means that it is
unwise to judge the new democracies according to standards that many
of the established democracies would themselves have failed not so long
ago. Second, there is always the possibility of setbacks. There have been
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two periods of de-democratization in the past – the thirties, when only
a few European democracies survived the authoritarian onslaught, and
the sixties and seventies, when many emerging democracies in South-
ern Europe, Latin America, and Asia succumbed to military coups and
authoritarian tendencies (e.g. Indira Gandhi’s martial law in India).
Third, there are still many remaining authoritarian regimes. The most
prominent example is China – a country that has become an economic
world power and that is becoming an increasingly important military
power, but that is still subject to the authoritarian rule of the Com-
munist Party. We assume that the future of democracy across the globe
crucially depends on the future of democracy in China. If we are to
believe the survey results of Welzel and Inglehart (2009: 139f.), China
is a prominent exception among the countries surveyed to the extent
that the country actually became somewhat less democratic from 1988
to 2000–2004, despite mass demands for more democracy. According to
their figures, China, together with Belarus, is the country with the great-
est gap between the mass demands for democracy and the real, existing
level of democratization.
The new media may provide a possibility for enhancing trans-
parency and accountability in a country like China. Thus, The Economist
(January 28, 2012: 19) suggests that Weibo, the Chinese equivalent to
Twitter, ‘transformed public discourse in China. News that three or four
years ago would have been relatively easy for local officials to suppress,
downplay or ignore is now instantly transmitted across the nation. Local
protests or scandals to which few would once have paid attention are
now avidly discussed by Weibo users’ (of whom there are now around
250 million in China). However, as we have pointed out in Chapter 2,
there is no easy technological fix to overcome the obstacles to democ-
racy, but that, once again, politics decisively shapes the preconditions
of democracy. In the remaining authoritarian countries, without some
baseline conditions of rule of law, transparency, and accountability,
opposition, dissent, and reform movements ‘will face an increasingly
uphill battle against progressively more innovative forms of censorship
and surveillance’ (MacKinnon 2011: 44).
The vertical spread of democracy
Compared to the global spread of democracy, the democratization of
the emerging multilevel governance structures has been much less
successful so far, and remains the crucial challenge for democracy in
long-established democracies. As we have argued in chapters 1 and 5,
10.1057/9781137299871 - Democracy in the Age of Globalization and Mediatization, Hanspeter Kriesi, Daniel Bochsler, Jörg Matthes,
Sandra Lavenex, Marc Bühlmann and Frank Esser
Co
py
rig
ht
 m
at
er
ia
l f
ro
m
 w
w
w
.
pa
lg
ra
v
ec
o
n
n
ec
t.c
om
 - 
lic
en
se
d 
to
 U
ZH
 H
au
pt
bi
bl
io
th
ek
 / 
Ze
nt
ra
lb
ib
lio
th
ek
 Z
ür
ic
h 
- P
al
gr
av
eC
on
ne
ct
 - 
20
13
-0
3-
29
206 Conclusion: An Assessment of the State of Democracy
the growing interconnection of national societies increasingly requires
political regulation and coordination across borders. This need has been
met by the extension of horizontal coordination between nation-states,
but, increasingly, it is also being met by the vertical integration of
national political systems into supranational polities such as the EU.
Our discussions of vertical democratization has mainly been focused on
the case of the EU, since it is the form globalization takes in Europe, and
since it is the most advanced form of vertical integration of national
political systems.
In Chapter 5, we introduced three models for the discussion of
the emerging vertical forms of democracy – the intergovernmental
model, the federal model, and the multilevel model. The intergovern-
mental model hardly predicts any problems for democracy as a result
of the establishment of international functional regimes – everything
remains under the control of democratically legitimated national gov-
ernments. However, this model does not take into account that the
ambitious European integration project has gone far beyond traditional
international regimes, and therefore requires new forms of democratic
legitimacy.
According to the federal model, by contrast, we simply need to extend
the territorial model of the nation-state by adding a supranational layer
to the national political systems of the member-states of the integrated
polity. The supranational level constitutes the new center of the new
polity, and the corresponding demos constitutes a new community of
solidarity that includes all the national demoi of the member-states.
With respect to a large number of policy domains, these national demoi
may continue to be governed by the national governments of the
member-states, but important competences that require coordination
across national borders fall under the competence of the supranational
center. Given that the interdependencies between the member-states are
likely to increase over time, we can expect that an increasing number
of competences will be shifted to the center in the future. The fed-
eral model presupposes clear-cut territorial borders of the supranational
polity, as well as a great deal of internal political structuration at the
supranational level.
While the European integration process has gone far beyond the inter-
governmental model, it has only partly followed the federal model. This
is the reason why we have focused our discussion of vertical democrati-
zation on the multilevel model, which is more flexible and considers the
complex interlinkages between national (including subnational) and
supranational levels in the real world. This model takes into account
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the coexistence of territorial (type I) and functional (type II) governance
structures in the context of contemporary multilevel regimes.
As far as the territorial structures are concerned, the political process
within multilevel governance structures poses a number of challenges
for democracy. First of all, it leads to a one-sided empowerment of
the national and supranational executive branches, at the detriment
of the national and supranational parliaments. Second, by extending
the chains of responsiveness and accountability to additional layers of
(supranational) government, the inclusiveness, transparency, and ulti-
mately the responsiveness and accountability of the political process is
reduced. Finally, and most importantly, the demos corresponding to the
emerging territorial polity at the supranational level is slow to develop,
and the political structuring at the supranational level remains deficient.
These problems for democracy within the emerging multilevel polity
are exacerbated by the fact that functional structures of type II are
heavily competing with territorial structures at the supranational level.
While these structures also exist at the national level, they are typ-
ically strengthened in multilevel governance structures (for the EU,
see Bartolini 2005: 382; Papadopoulos 2010). Type-II structures com-
pound the problems of inclusiveness, transparency, and ultimately of
the responsiveness and accountability of the political process, by widen-
ing the scope of the stakeholders (to include supranational institutions,
such as the European institutions or the WTO, multiple national gov-
ernments, independent regulatory agencies, and an non-transparent
set of private corporations and interest groups), by multiplying the
political arenas (formal and informal committees, independent agen-
cies, international networks, and public fora), and by generally rein-
forcing the technocratic element in political decision-making to the
detriment of democratically accountable representatives. Type-II struc-
tures strengthen the positions of policy communities of experts of low
visibility, who are ‘decoupled’ from representative bodies, and more
accountable to ‘peers’ (to the other participants in these networks) than
to the voters. In functionally defined structures ‘stakeholders’ replace
territorially defined ‘demoi’, which leads, as we have noted in chapters 1
and 3, to ‘advocacy democracy’, that is, to representation by interest
groups and social movement organizations at the detriment of territorial
representation through the electoral channel.
As a result of these developments, there is an increasing lack of
congruence or symmetry between decision-takers and decision-makers
within the multilevel polity. The national demoi are affected by deci-
sions taken by decision-makers who are at best only very indirectly
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accountable to them. At the same time, the national governments,
which are still the key focus of democratic accountability, see their
maneuvering space drastically reduced by these developments. The
recent problems in the eurozone perfectly illustrate this point: the
governments of the Southern European member-states are put under
pressure by their colleagues from other member-states to take the mea-
sures necessary to save the common currency. In the Italian case, the
government succumbed to this pressure in fall 2011, and was replaced
by a government of technocrats which was taking the measures imposed
by the functional imperatives of the monetary union. In the Greek case,
the government not only succumbed to international pressure, and was
replaced by a government of technocrats in 2011, it also had to face the
‘troika’ – the representatives of the European Commission, the European
Central Bank, and the IMF – making sure that the domestic conditions
for international support were, indeed, fulfilled.
We contend that the resulting ‘democratic deficit’ in multilevel gov-
ernance structures can hardly be alleviated by functional forms of
inclusion, participation, and accountability. The main problem with
such forms of ‘advocacy democracy’ is that, as we have suggested in
Chapter 2, this kind of democratization involves institutional mech-
anisms which are unfamiliar to the citizens, since they diverge from
the standard democratic models developed in the nation-state contexts
(Hurrelmann 2010: 7). Moreover, such functional forms of inclusion,
participation, and accountability mainly exist at the elite level and do
not extend to the citizens at large. As a result, the increasing functional
integration in Europe might even provoke a reaction on the part of the
European citizens that seeks to reduce the territorial community of sol-
idarity to the national, or even regional or group level (see Kriesi et al.
2008, 2012; Offe 1998, 2003).
Imagining the future of democracy in multilevel governance struc-
tures can take the gradualist route, extrapolating from national territo-
rial models, or the transformationalist route of rejecting existing models
and claiming that such structures require new models (Cheneval and
Schimmelfennig 2011). Following the gradualist route, alleviating the
democratic deficit in a multilevel structure like the EU may become
possible by strengthening the territorial representation structures at the
supranational level, that is, by moving into the direction of the fed-
eral model. This does not necessarily presuppose the existence of an
integrated European demos – the different national demoi may coexist
with an initially weak European demos, as in the Swiss model. However,
this way of proceeding presupposes enhanced political structuring at
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the European level or, in other words, the politicization of the European
integration process at both the domestic and the supranational level.
As a matter of fact, as has been argued by Hooghe and Marks (2009), the
European populations are waking up to the increasing importance of
the EU for their well-being. The increasing salience of the EU is already
undermining the ‘permissive consensus’ about the EU, which has been
characteristic for the European citizens in the past. The relative conver-
gence of the national electorates and party systems observed by Camia
and Caramani (2011) also contributes to the preconditions of enhanced
political structuring at the EU level. This in turn, is likely to provide the
leverage for the political structuration of the European issue at both the
national and the European level.
In fact, as a recent study of the ongoing politicization of the European-
integration process at the national level by Höglinger (2012) suggests,
this politicization process is firmly embedded in the national party con-
flict. First of all, the main protagonists of the politicization of European
integration at the national level are supranational and national (foreign
and domestic) public authorities (mainly representing the executive
branch) and political parties. Taking into account that parties assume
two roles in democratic polities – they represent and they govern –
this means that parties are the key actors for the politicization of
European integration. Second, the multidimensionality of the European
integration process (deepening, enlargement, social regulation, market-
making) provides multiple opportunities for politicization related to
traditional conflict structures, but whether and how European inte-
gration has been politicized at the national level is largely explained
by traditional lines of conflict and by well-established programmatic
profiles.
Along the transformationalist route, the democratization of multilevel
governance structures may give rise, as Cheneval and Schimmelfennig
(2011) suggest, to entirely new forms of ‘demoicracy’ (see Chapter 2).
A demoicracy has a double normative reference – citizens and statespeo-
ples (people of the member-states of the multilevel structure). It does not
compromise on core fundamental rights of individuals but it balances
the political rights of individuals and statespeoples (who are themselves
organized within liberal democracies). The principles of demoicracy
as formulated by Cheneval (2011) stipulate that any concrete integra-
tion among demoi will have to be approved by self-governing demoi;
that the demoi do not mutually discriminate against each other and
against their citizens; that the citizens of a member-statespeople benefit
from entry rights and political rights in other member-statespeoples;
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that citizens and statespeoples benefit from equal legislative rights;
that multilateral law enjoys primacy over national law; that linguis-
tic territoriality is recognized and that the member-statespeoples agree
upon a commonly used language as lingua franca; and that the dif-
ference principle holds for member-statespeoples. As Cheneval and
Schimmelfennig (2011) observe, these principles have been to a surpris-
ingly large extent been implemented in the EU.
As far as we are concerned, these principles are, however, not fun-
damentally different from the federalist model as it has, for example,
been implemented in Switzerland. Thus, in both the federalist and the
demoicracy model, the representation of the citizens has to be balanced
with the representation of the statespeoples. Not only in the demoicracy
model (see Cheneval and Schimmelfennig 2011: 17), but also in the fed-
eralist model, this can be done ‘by the institution of two procedurally
linked governing bodies’ (e.g. two parliamentary chambers) or ‘by bal-
ancing two forms of counting votes in direct citizen voting, one of all
citizens and of the citizens as grouped by statespeoples’ (e.g. by requiring
double majorities among citizens and statespeoples).
The democratization of established democracies
As we have shown in Chapter 4, existing democracies differ consider-
ably in the way they implement basic liberal and democratic principles.
There is great variety in the way democracy is implemented across the
world. Apart from being more or less liberal, established democracies
vary according to whether they are consensual or majoritarian, purely
representative or representative with direct-democratic elements, fed-
eral or centralized, inclusive or exclusive. In Chapter 4, we also showed
that there are trade-offs involved in the implementation of the basic
democratic principle: in the real world, it is not possible to maxi-
mize all the aspects of this principle. Thus, majoritarian systems are
more accountable than consensual ones, but they pay for this greater
accountability by more limited representativeness and a certain lack
of responsiveness. Or, there is a trade-off between the elections and
direct-democratic procedures: where the latter are elaborated, elections
count for less and, accordingly, electoral participation is low and rather
unequal. The upshot of the exploratory analysis in Chapter 4 is that
institutional designers have to make some hard choices when trying to
make democracy work.
We have also observed great variability within established democ-
racies with respect to the mediatization challenge, which we mainly
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discussed for established democracies at the national level. Mediatiza-
tion, the intrusion of media logic as an institutional rule into politics,
depends very much on the type of media system in a given democracy.
In the Western European countries analyzed by several studies reported
in Chapter 8, the effects of mediatization have not (yet) manifested
themselves to the same extent as in the US. Thus, personalization has
not generally been increasing across Western European countries (Kriesi
2011). Other elements of media-centered reporting style like negativity,
sensationalism, or strategy-focused interpretation are more widespread.
It appears that the representation of politics in the news media follows
more the specific interests of the media (i.e. the professional, commer-
cial, and technological imperatives of media logic) than characteristic
dimensions of the political logic (i.e. policy, politics, and polity). Media
logic undermines the chain of responsiveness in those cases where it
compromises the formation of people’s preferences: lack of access to
substantive information, lack of access to undistorted and diverse infor-
mation, and lack of opportunity to deliberate pose serious challenges to
a vivid public sphere and thus democratic life. These content features
may also undermine the chain of accountability by handicapping citi-
zens’ capability to properly evaluate political outcomes for whether they
match their preferences or serve the higher public good.
In general, liberal media systems (US, UK) have moved farthest in the
direction of the imperatives of media logic, while democratic-corporatist
systems (Austria, Switzerland) have moved much less along this path,
and polarized-pluralist systems (France) have probably been least sub-
ject to mediatization trends. Switzerland is a noteworthy special case
(see also Chapter 4), where moderate mediatization effects are further
curtailed by a consensual, integrative, and direct-democratic structure
and culture. Studies reported in Chapter 8 found, for instance, that
reporting on Swiss direct-democratic campaigns was still mainly focused
on substance, and dominated by the politicians’ arguments and not by
media logic. In other cases, Switzerland conforms more to the expected
effects of mediatization as is indicated by a study on themediatization of
bargaining institutions in Germany and Switzerland. This study found
that media attention, indeed, creates difficulties for political compro-
mise finding. However, it was not media intrusion that posed the biggest
challenge to successful political bargaining in these two countries but
the negotiators’ self-mediatization (going public). Self-mediatization is
a widespread trend in Western European politics. It is driven by a sub-
jective perception among politicians that the mass media has become a
powerful institution to reckon with, and that proactive changes within
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political organizations are necessary to be back on an equal footing
again. Studies on Western European parties and governments found
ample evidence for this phenomenon (Chapter 8).
In spite of this great variability, we would still argue that, as a result of
the joint impact of globalization and mediatization, established democ-
racies face some common general challenges today. Most importantly,
the embedding of nation-states into multilevel governance structures
poses a set of important challenges to established democracies at the
national level. As discussed in detail in Chapter 5, with the trans-
fer of decision-making competences to the supranational level, very
serious problems are posed with respect to the congruence between
the government and the people, the inclusion and participation of
national parliaments and national electorates in the political process,
the transparency of the decision-making process, the accountability
of national executives and of non-representative supranational execu-
tive bodies to national parliaments and national electorates, and the
multiple executives’ responsiveness to the citizens’ needs.
We do not want to go into the related details here again, but we want
to point out that the consequences of globalization and mediatization
for national politics reinforce tendencies at the level of national rep-
resentative democracies that have already been developing for other
reasons as well. First of all, they contribute to the weakening of the
parties’ representation function and the accompanying increasing alien-
ation of the voters from the political process. Thus, the empowerment
of the executive branch at the detriment of parliament that is a result of
the internationalization of politics tends to reinforce the parties’ gov-
erning function and to weaken their representative function (which
operates through parliament). Moreover, the embedding of the national
governments into the multilevel structures implies that, as Mair (2009)
has observed, the parties who routinely govern are exposed to the
increasing tension between their role as representatives of the national
citizen publics, and their role as responsible governments. As representa-
tives of the national citizen publics, they are expected to be responsive
and accountable to their voters; as responsible governments, they are
expected to take into account the increasing number of principals con-
stituted by the many veto players who now surround the government
in its multilevel institutional setting. This is a direct consequence of the
governing parties’ reduced maneuvering space.
The mediatization of politics also contributes to the shifting balance
of party functions by reducing the role of the party apparatus, by fos-
tering the ‘depoliticization’ of the party base and by linking the parties’
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leaders more directly to their voters. The increasing autonomy of the
media from the political system and their increasing role for politics
has led to an adaptation of politicians, parties, and governments to the
imperatives of ‘media logic’. Parties and politicians devote more atten-
tion to the already mentioned phenomenon of the ‘self-mediatization
of politics’ (see Chapter 7), that is, the self-initiated stage-management
of politics by means of strategic communication in an effort to mas-
ter the new rules that govern access to the public sphere. Politicians,
parties, and governments professionalize their internal and external
communication and devote more of their resources to communication
(see Chapter 8). Professional communication specialists at the service of
party leaders and governments are replacing party militants.
Second, globalization and mediatization contribute to the increasing
divorce between ‘front-stage’ and ‘back-stage’ politics at the national
level. As we have argued in Chapter 3, the electoral channel has
never been the only channel of representation at the national level
in established democracies. It has always been complemented by the
administrative channel and protest politics and, in some countries,
by the direct-democratic channel. However, as we have argued earlier,
the emerging multilevel governance structures have reinforced repre-
sentation in the administrative channel, that is, in a range of arenas
that are little visible, operate back-stage and are not directly elec-
torally accountable. Similarly, mediatization reinforces the uncoupling
of front-stage and back-stage politics. On the one hand, as is argued
by Frank Esser (Chapter 7), the front-stage of the political process, that
is, the political contest side of ‘politics’, is more easily subject to self-
mediatization by politicians than the back-stage of policy making. The
ongoing policy-making processes generally are too numerous for the
limited scope of public attention, they need to be kept out of the lime-
light to protect the negotiators’ room for maneuver, and they often are
too complex and too technical for detailed public scrutiny. On the other
hand, the journalists’ practices in a professionalized and commercialized
media system – negative reporting, horse-race journalism (focusing on
strategies, personalities, and campaign tactics), conflict-focus, personal-
ization, infotainment, and their intrusive or interventionist reporting
(journalists reporting on politics in their own words granting politicians
only limited opportunities to present themselves with their own voice) –
mainly tend to focus on the political contest at the detriment of the
policies’ substantive content.
We would like to suggest that both the decline of the parties’ link-
age function and the tendency in political communication to focus on
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the political contest and to give short shrift to the substance of poli-
tics (to policies, but also to ideologies, programs, fundamental political
questions) contribute to the alienation of the voters from the politi-
cal process and to populist reactions on the part of the public. The
voters get the impression that the parties which habitually govern are
all alike, that they all betray the public behind the scene, and that
they all merit sanctioning by popular vote in the upcoming elections.
Both the decline of the parties’ linkage function and the decoupling
of the front-stage and the back-stage of politics tend to facilitate the
entry of populist leaders who are appealing to the popular dissat-
isfaction with established parties and their ‘betrayal’ of the popular
demands.
Populist appeals to the public, in turn, are reinforced by the two chal-
lenges to democracy we have been studying here. On the one hand, they
are exploiting the consequences of globalization for significant parts of
the population who feel threatened by the opening up of the cultural,
political, and economic borders of the nation-state. Thus, mobilization
by the populist nationalist right in particular has successfully appealed
to the globalization losers, and contributed to the restructuring of polit-
ical conflict in Western European countries more generally (Kriesi et al.
2008, 2012). On the other hand, as has been pointed out in Chapter 8,
populist mobilization is facilitated by the mediatization of politics: to
the extent that news production is driven by the tastes and preferences
of the consumers, it gives birth to a populist political culture. In a heav-
ily mediatized democracy, populist leaders benefit from some sort of
‘media complicity’ (Mazzoleni 2008: 50). Such leaders are attractive for
the media because they have news-value: they tend to have charisma,
they are typically outsiders, who have not been part of the traditional
political elites in their respective countries, they share the resentment of
their clientele, and they are crass enough to express the emotions and
ideas of these potentials (i.e. they spell out publicly what the ‘common
man’ has always thought by himself).
Conclusion
We have attempted to analyze the challenges globalization and medi-
atization pose for democracy today. Our focus has mainly been on
Western Europe, where the challenge of globalization for democracy
means European integration in particular. In the future, this focus
should certainly be extended to cover other parts of the world as well,
to begin with Central and Eastern Europe, where the two challenges
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of globalization and mediatization may have different implications for
democracy.
In our attempt to work out the implications of the two challenges, we
have mostly treated them individually and have not been very success-
ful in elaborating the relationships between them and their joint impact
on democracy. Thus, we have studied mediatization almost exclusively
at the national level and we have hardly paid any attention to the spread
of regional or even global communication systems (e.g. television chan-
nels such as Al Jazeera, CNN, or RTL) that reach their audiences across
national borders, and to their impact on democracy and democratiza-
tion at the national and supranational level (e.g. on the Arab Spring).
More specifically, we have paid little attention to the role of new media
(internet, blogs, Twitter, Facebook) for democracy and democratization
at the national and supranational level. In future research, questions
related to the interaction between mediatization and globalization need
to get the attention that they deserve.
Finally, we have not analyzed populist mobilizations in this volume,
but we would like to suggest that, at least in Western Europe, as a result
of the impact of the two challenges to national politics, populist reac-
tions have become more likely and more consequential for the fate
of democracy than they have been in the past. We would also like
to suggest that the study of populist mobilizations should be placed
high on the research agenda for the future of democracy in the 21st
century. At this point, we do not know where the populist challenge
in established democracies is going to lead them. We do want to sug-
gest, however, that an exclusively pessimistic reading of this challenge
is unwarranted. Rather than indicating the demise of the established
Western European democracies, the populist challenge may well be an
indication that they are alive and kicking, and that they are finally com-
ing to grapple with their most important challenge – the establishment
of a multilevel governance structure in Europe. To conclude, we agree
with Tony Judt (2005: 796): ‘At the beginning of the twenty-first cen-
tury, the dilemma facing Europeans was [ . . . ] rather, a question – the
question – which history had placed upon the agenda in 1945 and
which had quietly but insistently dislodged or outlived all other claims
upon Europeans’ attention. What future was there for the separate
European nation-states? Did they have a future?’
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